Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is ...
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Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.Less
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.
Terryl C. Givens
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195167115
- eISBN:
- 9780199785599
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195167115.003.0019
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The Paris Art Mission introduced European developments and training into Utah art at the turn of the century. Today, loose alliances like the New York Mormon Artists Group have supplanted efforts to ...
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The Paris Art Mission introduced European developments and training into Utah art at the turn of the century. Today, loose alliances like the New York Mormon Artists Group have supplanted efforts to create a self conscious style (as with the Art and Belief Movement). World class sculptors as well as prominent painters emerged by mid-century. A regular international art competition is the major vehicle for opening the church to cultural influences from beyond the United States.Less
The Paris Art Mission introduced European developments and training into Utah art at the turn of the century. Today, loose alliances like the New York Mormon Artists Group have supplanted efforts to create a self conscious style (as with the Art and Belief Movement). World class sculptors as well as prominent painters emerged by mid-century. A regular international art competition is the major vehicle for opening the church to cultural influences from beyond the United States.
Akeel Bilgrami (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231170802
- eISBN:
- 9780231541015
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231170802.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
What is the character of secularism in countries that were not pervaded by Christianity, such as China, India, and the nations of the Middle East? To what extent is the secular an imposition of ...
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What is the character of secularism in countries that were not pervaded by Christianity, such as China, India, and the nations of the Middle East? To what extent is the secular an imposition of colonial rule? How does secularism comport with local religious cultures in Africa, and how does it work with local forms of power and governance in Latin America? Has modern secularism evolved organically, or is it even necessary, and has it always meant progress? A vital extension of Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, in which he exhaustively chronicled the emergence of secularism in Latin Christendom, this anthology applies Taylor’s findings to secularism’s global migration. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Rajeev Bhargava, Akeel Bilgrami, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Sudipta Kaviraj, Claudio Lomnitz, Alfred Stepan, Charles Taylor, and Peter van der Veer each explore the transformation of Western secularism beyond Europe, and the collection closes with Taylor’s response to each essay. What began as a modern reaction to—as well as a stubborn extension of—Latin Christendom has become a complex export shaped by the world’s religious and political systems. Brilliantly alternating between intellectual and methodological approaches, this volume fosters a greater engagement with the phenomenon across disciplines.Less
What is the character of secularism in countries that were not pervaded by Christianity, such as China, India, and the nations of the Middle East? To what extent is the secular an imposition of colonial rule? How does secularism comport with local religious cultures in Africa, and how does it work with local forms of power and governance in Latin America? Has modern secularism evolved organically, or is it even necessary, and has it always meant progress? A vital extension of Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, in which he exhaustively chronicled the emergence of secularism in Latin Christendom, this anthology applies Taylor’s findings to secularism’s global migration. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Rajeev Bhargava, Akeel Bilgrami, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Sudipta Kaviraj, Claudio Lomnitz, Alfred Stepan, Charles Taylor, and Peter van der Veer each explore the transformation of Western secularism beyond Europe, and the collection closes with Taylor’s response to each essay. What began as a modern reaction to—as well as a stubborn extension of—Latin Christendom has become a complex export shaped by the world’s religious and political systems. Brilliantly alternating between intellectual and methodological approaches, this volume fosters a greater engagement with the phenomenon across disciplines.
David A. Hollinger
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158426
- eISBN:
- 9781400845996
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158426.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in ...
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This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in the distinctive contexts of England in the 1870s and New England in the 1890s. It argues that Clifford displayed more sensitivity than James did to the consequences of belief. This is an ironic reversal of roles in the story of a great pragmatist who insisted that “the whole defense of religious faith hinges upon” the action that faith requires or inspires. James' “The Will to Believe” should be understood not only as an artifact of its author's agony about the fate of Christianity in the age of science, but also as a product of his political complacency. Clifford had a much more modern understanding than James did of the function of belief systems in society and politics.Less
This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in the distinctive contexts of England in the 1870s and New England in the 1890s. It argues that Clifford displayed more sensitivity than James did to the consequences of belief. This is an ironic reversal of roles in the story of a great pragmatist who insisted that “the whole defense of religious faith hinges upon” the action that faith requires or inspires. James' “The Will to Believe” should be understood not only as an artifact of its author's agony about the fate of Christianity in the age of science, but also as a product of his political complacency. Clifford had a much more modern understanding than James did of the function of belief systems in society and politics.
Jennifer Lackey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199219162
- eISBN:
- 9780191711824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The focus of this chapter is a view dominating discussion in the current epistemological literature — the Belief View of Testimony — according to which transmission lies at the heart of testimonial ...
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The focus of this chapter is a view dominating discussion in the current epistemological literature — the Belief View of Testimony — according to which transmission lies at the heart of testimonial exchanges. According to the necessity claim of this thesis, a hearer knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, on the basis of a speaker's testimony that p, only if the speaker herself knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. According to the sufficiency claim of this thesis, if a speaker knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, and a hearer comes to believe that p, on the basis of the content of this speaker's testimony that p without possessing any relevant defeaters, then the hearer also knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. This chapter argues, first, that unreliable believers can nonetheless be reliable testifiers, thereby showing that the necessity claim is false and, second, that reliable believers can nonetheless be unreliable testifiers, thereby showing that the sufficiency claim is false.Less
The focus of this chapter is a view dominating discussion in the current epistemological literature — the Belief View of Testimony — according to which transmission lies at the heart of testimonial exchanges. According to the necessity claim of this thesis, a hearer knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, on the basis of a speaker's testimony that p, only if the speaker herself knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. According to the sufficiency claim of this thesis, if a speaker knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, and a hearer comes to believe that p, on the basis of the content of this speaker's testimony that p without possessing any relevant defeaters, then the hearer also knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. This chapter argues, first, that unreliable believers can nonetheless be reliable testifiers, thereby showing that the necessity claim is false and, second, that reliable believers can nonetheless be unreliable testifiers, thereby showing that the sufficiency claim is false.
Jennifer Lackey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199219162
- eISBN:
- 9780191711824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops an alternative picture of testimonial knowledge and justification — called the Statement View of Testimony — that focuses on the epistemic status of the statements of speakers, ...
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This chapter develops an alternative picture of testimonial knowledge and justification — called the Statement View of Testimony — that focuses on the epistemic status of the statements of speakers, not of their beliefs. This new conception of testimonial knowledge shows that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another's beliefs; we learn from one another's words. The remainder of this chapter is then devoted to defending this view of testimony from three different kinds of objections that have been raised in the recent literature: one that focuses on the counterexamples to the Belief View of Testimony, one that targets the positive Statement View of Testimony, and one that attacks the overall approach to theorizing about the epistemic status of testimony. It is concluded that all three objections fail to pose a problem for the view of the epistemology of testimony developed in this book.Less
This chapter develops an alternative picture of testimonial knowledge and justification — called the Statement View of Testimony — that focuses on the epistemic status of the statements of speakers, not of their beliefs. This new conception of testimonial knowledge shows that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another's beliefs; we learn from one another's words. The remainder of this chapter is then devoted to defending this view of testimony from three different kinds of objections that have been raised in the recent literature: one that focuses on the counterexamples to the Belief View of Testimony, one that targets the positive Statement View of Testimony, and one that attacks the overall approach to theorizing about the epistemic status of testimony. It is concluded that all three objections fail to pose a problem for the view of the epistemology of testimony developed in this book.
Jennifer Lackey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199219162
- eISBN:
- 9780191711824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines a further objection that has been raised to the view defended in this book — an objection that is grounded in a widely accepted thesis about the norm governing proper assertion. ...
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This chapter examines a further objection that has been raised to the view defended in this book — an objection that is grounded in a widely accepted thesis about the norm governing proper assertion. According to the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, or the KNA, a speaker should assert that p only if she knows that p. Given that the counterexamples to the Belief View of Testimony in Chapter 2 rely on speakers who offer assertions in the absence of knowledge, it has been argued that such examples fail because the speakers in question violate the KNA. This chapter argues, however, that the KNA is false. An alternative norm of assertion is then developed — the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion, or the RTBNA — that not only avoids the problems afflicting the KNA, but also more fully and coherently accommodates our general intuitions about both asserters and their assertions.Less
This chapter examines a further objection that has been raised to the view defended in this book — an objection that is grounded in a widely accepted thesis about the norm governing proper assertion. According to the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, or the KNA, a speaker should assert that p only if she knows that p. Given that the counterexamples to the Belief View of Testimony in Chapter 2 rely on speakers who offer assertions in the absence of knowledge, it has been argued that such examples fail because the speakers in question violate the KNA. This chapter argues, however, that the KNA is false. An alternative norm of assertion is then developed — the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion, or the RTBNA — that not only avoids the problems afflicting the KNA, but also more fully and coherently accommodates our general intuitions about both asserters and their assertions.
Bruce N. Waller
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262028165
- eISBN:
- 9780262327404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028165.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral ...
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Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral responsibility, and other forces must be supporting that strong belief. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility examines the various forces that hold the moral responsibility system in place, both in philosophy and in criminal justice. The major elements of the moral responsibility system include belief in a just world, belief in rugged individualism (and self-making), and belief that moral responsibility protects human dignity. Together, those factors block deeper inquiry into the causes of character and behavior, and the insistence on limiting deeper inquiry is fundamental to preserving belief in moral responsibility. The neoliberal culture promotes strong belief in a just world (including belief in a just economic system) as well as belief in the “self-made man,” and that culture is also the most deeply committed to individual moral responsibility.Less
Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral responsibility, and other forces must be supporting that strong belief. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility examines the various forces that hold the moral responsibility system in place, both in philosophy and in criminal justice. The major elements of the moral responsibility system include belief in a just world, belief in rugged individualism (and self-making), and belief that moral responsibility protects human dignity. Together, those factors block deeper inquiry into the causes of character and behavior, and the insistence on limiting deeper inquiry is fundamental to preserving belief in moral responsibility. The neoliberal culture promotes strong belief in a just world (including belief in a just economic system) as well as belief in the “self-made man,” and that culture is also the most deeply committed to individual moral responsibility.
Leslie R. Martin, Kelly B. Haskard-Zolnierek, and M. Robin DiMatteo
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195380408
- eISBN:
- 9780199864454
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380408.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter reviews theoretical models that have guided thinking and research on health behavior change, providing a historical perspective on major developments in the field. Included in this ...
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This chapter reviews theoretical models that have guided thinking and research on health behavior change, providing a historical perspective on major developments in the field. Included in this overview are the Health Belief Model, Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, Transtheoretical Model of Change, Social-Cognitive Models, Precaution-Adoption Process Model, and the Information–Motivation–Strategy Model. The contexts in which these models have been tested, along with their effectiveness as demonstrated by the empirical literature, are described. Examples for practical application are also provided, as are caveats and information about contexts in which these models (or portions thereof) are not well supported.Less
This chapter reviews theoretical models that have guided thinking and research on health behavior change, providing a historical perspective on major developments in the field. Included in this overview are the Health Belief Model, Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, Transtheoretical Model of Change, Social-Cognitive Models, Precaution-Adoption Process Model, and the Information–Motivation–Strategy Model. The contexts in which these models have been tested, along with their effectiveness as demonstrated by the empirical literature, are described. Examples for practical application are also provided, as are caveats and information about contexts in which these models (or portions thereof) are not well supported.
Paul Bushkovitch
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195069464
- eISBN:
- 9780199854615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195069464.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, World Early Modern History
The most important changes in the religious experience of the upper strata of Russian society in the seventeenth century were the result of internal intellectual trends and the reorientation of court ...
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The most important changes in the religious experience of the upper strata of Russian society in the seventeenth century were the result of internal intellectual trends and the reorientation of court life by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, both in response to a changing society and politics. The church was equally or more concerned with other issues, principally its attempts to remold popular religious practices and to check the spread of the schism of Old Belief, as well as with defending its own rights and dignity against the tsar. The church's agenda was thus different from the court's, but the two regularly impinged on one another and in some cases actually overlapped.Less
The most important changes in the religious experience of the upper strata of Russian society in the seventeenth century were the result of internal intellectual trends and the reorientation of court life by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, both in response to a changing society and politics. The church was equally or more concerned with other issues, principally its attempts to remold popular religious practices and to check the spread of the schism of Old Belief, as well as with defending its own rights and dignity against the tsar. The church's agenda was thus different from the court's, but the two regularly impinged on one another and in some cases actually overlapped.
Simon J. Bronner
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781496822628
- eISBN:
- 9781496822673
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781496822628.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This book proposes to answer the pressing philosophical as well as psychological question of why people repeat themselves. It redefines folklore as traditional knowledge that serves this need in ...
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This book proposes to answer the pressing philosophical as well as psychological question of why people repeat themselves. It redefines folklore as traditional knowledge that serves this need in human lives and develops a "practice theory" around this idea. Practice, more than other suggested keywords of performance or enactment in social theory, connects localized culture with the vernacular idea that "this is the way we do things around here." The term invites study of what people do repeatedly to understand what they have in "mind." Demonstrating the application of this theory in folkloristic studies, Bronner offers four provocative case studies of psychocultural meanings that arise from traditional "frames of action" and address issues of the day: labeling of boogiemen to express fear of sexual molestation, connecting "wild child" beliefs to school shootings, identifying the crisis of masculinity in adolescent expression. Turning his analysis to the analysts of tradition, Bronner uses practice theory to evaluate the agenda of folklorists in shaping perceptions of tradition-centered "folk societies" such as the Amish, unpacking the culturally based rationale of public folklore programming, interpreting the evolving idea of folk museums in a digital world, and assessing how the terms folklorists use and the things they do affect how people think about tradition. This is a book intended to think about what people do in the name of tradition, and why.Less
This book proposes to answer the pressing philosophical as well as psychological question of why people repeat themselves. It redefines folklore as traditional knowledge that serves this need in human lives and develops a "practice theory" around this idea. Practice, more than other suggested keywords of performance or enactment in social theory, connects localized culture with the vernacular idea that "this is the way we do things around here." The term invites study of what people do repeatedly to understand what they have in "mind." Demonstrating the application of this theory in folkloristic studies, Bronner offers four provocative case studies of psychocultural meanings that arise from traditional "frames of action" and address issues of the day: labeling of boogiemen to express fear of sexual molestation, connecting "wild child" beliefs to school shootings, identifying the crisis of masculinity in adolescent expression. Turning his analysis to the analysts of tradition, Bronner uses practice theory to evaluate the agenda of folklorists in shaping perceptions of tradition-centered "folk societies" such as the Amish, unpacking the culturally based rationale of public folklore programming, interpreting the evolving idea of folk museums in a digital world, and assessing how the terms folklorists use and the things they do affect how people think about tradition. This is a book intended to think about what people do in the name of tradition, and why.
Matthew Mutter
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300221732
- eISBN:
- 9780300227963
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300221732.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Restless Secularism explores the efforts of modernist writers to articulate a viable secular imagination, to trace the relation of this secular imagination to the Christian culture from which it ...
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Restless Secularism explores the efforts of modernist writers to articulate a viable secular imagination, to trace the relation of this secular imagination to the Christian culture from which it emerged, and to purify secular life of its religious residues. Yet it is also a study of the difficulty modernists have disentangling themselves from religious modes of understanding and experiencing the world, and emphasizes the persistent appeal of religious forms of imagination. The book contends that secularism has a distinct and historically contingent imaginary; it traces the modernist struggle both to articulate the contours of this imaginary and to elucidate its consequences for multiple fields of experience. Rather than focusing on private religious belief, the book shows, through a careful investigation of the work of Wallace Stevens, Virginia Woolf, W. B. Yeats, and W. H. Auden, how the shift from a religious to a secular imaginary has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of language, aesthetics, emotion, and the body and the material world. The book centers on Stevens’s attempts to pit a secular poetics of tautology against the religious promiscuity of metaphor, Woolf’s skirmishes with the eschatological significance of beauty, Yeats’s attempt to replace spiritualized emotion with the pagan “passions,” and Auden’s critique of magical thinking. Finally, it identifies a distinctly post-religious “problem of evil” that disturbs the secular imperative to affirm the immanence of life.Less
Restless Secularism explores the efforts of modernist writers to articulate a viable secular imagination, to trace the relation of this secular imagination to the Christian culture from which it emerged, and to purify secular life of its religious residues. Yet it is also a study of the difficulty modernists have disentangling themselves from religious modes of understanding and experiencing the world, and emphasizes the persistent appeal of religious forms of imagination. The book contends that secularism has a distinct and historically contingent imaginary; it traces the modernist struggle both to articulate the contours of this imaginary and to elucidate its consequences for multiple fields of experience. Rather than focusing on private religious belief, the book shows, through a careful investigation of the work of Wallace Stevens, Virginia Woolf, W. B. Yeats, and W. H. Auden, how the shift from a religious to a secular imaginary has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of language, aesthetics, emotion, and the body and the material world. The book centers on Stevens’s attempts to pit a secular poetics of tautology against the religious promiscuity of metaphor, Woolf’s skirmishes with the eschatological significance of beauty, Yeats’s attempt to replace spiritualized emotion with the pagan “passions,” and Auden’s critique of magical thinking. Finally, it identifies a distinctly post-religious “problem of evil” that disturbs the secular imperative to affirm the immanence of life.
J. Robert G. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- February 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198850205
- eISBN:
- 9780191884672
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198850205.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What is representation? How do the more primitive aspects of our world come together to generate it? How do different kinds of representation relate to one another? This book identifies the ...
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What is representation? How do the more primitive aspects of our world come together to generate it? How do different kinds of representation relate to one another? This book identifies the metaphysical foundations for representational facts. The story told is in three parts. The most primitive layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of sensation/perception and intention/action, which are the two most basic modes in which an individual and the world interact. It is argued that we can understand how this kind of representation can exist in a fundamentally physical world so long as we have an independent, illuminating grip on functions and causation. The second layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of (degrees of) belief and desire, whose representational content goes far beyond the immediate perceptable and manipulable environment. It is argued that the correct belief/desire interpretation of an agent is the one which makes their action-guiding states, given their perceptual evidence, most rational. The final layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of words and sentences, human artefacts with representational content. It is argued that one can give an illuminating account of the conditions under which a compositional interpretation of a public language like English is correct by appeal to patterns emerging from the attitudes conventionally expressed by sentences. The three-layer metaphysics of representation resolves long-standing underdetermination puzzles, predicts and explains patterns in the way that concepts denote, and articulates a delicate interactive relationship between the foundations of language and thought.Less
What is representation? How do the more primitive aspects of our world come together to generate it? How do different kinds of representation relate to one another? This book identifies the metaphysical foundations for representational facts. The story told is in three parts. The most primitive layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of sensation/perception and intention/action, which are the two most basic modes in which an individual and the world interact. It is argued that we can understand how this kind of representation can exist in a fundamentally physical world so long as we have an independent, illuminating grip on functions and causation. The second layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of (degrees of) belief and desire, whose representational content goes far beyond the immediate perceptable and manipulable environment. It is argued that the correct belief/desire interpretation of an agent is the one which makes their action-guiding states, given their perceptual evidence, most rational. The final layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of words and sentences, human artefacts with representational content. It is argued that one can give an illuminating account of the conditions under which a compositional interpretation of a public language like English is correct by appeal to patterns emerging from the attitudes conventionally expressed by sentences. The three-layer metaphysics of representation resolves long-standing underdetermination puzzles, predicts and explains patterns in the way that concepts denote, and articulates a delicate interactive relationship between the foundations of language and thought.
Ian Ker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199569106
- eISBN:
- 9780191702044
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569106.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
John Henry Newman turned his thoughts to the obstacles of the development of doctrine before the end of 1842. He devoted the last of the university sermons in preparation for his “best book”. The ...
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John Henry Newman turned his thoughts to the obstacles of the development of doctrine before the end of 1842. He devoted the last of the university sermons in preparation for his “best book”. The first of the Sermons, on the Theory of Religious Belief, preached at the University of Oxford, warned against “answering every objection to the words of Scripture” and the next sermon “The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason” presumed an act of faith to be an exercise of reason. But the last and most brilliant of the sermons is “The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine”. Newman's theory was that doctrinal developments in Catholicism were merely interpretations of the original revelation presented to Christ and his Apostles. Newman felt, in this sense, preserved the nineteenth-century Christian dogma and that the people only needed to believe in the one unified Catholic Church.Less
John Henry Newman turned his thoughts to the obstacles of the development of doctrine before the end of 1842. He devoted the last of the university sermons in preparation for his “best book”. The first of the Sermons, on the Theory of Religious Belief, preached at the University of Oxford, warned against “answering every objection to the words of Scripture” and the next sermon “The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason” presumed an act of faith to be an exercise of reason. But the last and most brilliant of the sermons is “The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine”. Newman's theory was that doctrinal developments in Catholicism were merely interpretations of the original revelation presented to Christ and his Apostles. Newman felt, in this sense, preserved the nineteenth-century Christian dogma and that the people only needed to believe in the one unified Catholic Church.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues against the existence of a direct connection between objects of perception and objects of thought as a way of understanding the fact that colours do not belong to an independent world outside ...
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Argues against the existence of a direct connection between objects of perception and objects of thought as a way of understanding the fact that colours do not belong to an independent world outside the mind. With direct connection, predicational seeing is possible, linked to propositional thought and judgement and to human beliefs about the object in question, even though physical objects may be found to have no colours perceived or believed to exist by humans. Argues that there cannot be the jettisoning of all beliefs about colour in order to reject truths about it, and shows that the metaphysical error theory is unsustainable by itself.Less
Argues against the existence of a direct connection between objects of perception and objects of thought as a way of understanding the fact that colours do not belong to an independent world outside the mind. With direct connection, predicational seeing is possible, linked to propositional thought and judgement and to human beliefs about the object in question, even though physical objects may be found to have no colours perceived or believed to exist by humans. Argues that there cannot be the jettisoning of all beliefs about colour in order to reject truths about it, and shows that the metaphysical error theory is unsustainable by itself.
Bruce N. Waller
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262028165
- eISBN:
- 9780262327404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028165.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The deep nonconscious belief in a just world – extensively studied by psychologists – is basically the belief that good things happen to good people and bad things to bad people. When an innocent ...
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The deep nonconscious belief in a just world – extensively studied by psychologists – is basically the belief that good things happen to good people and bad things to bad people. When an innocent person is harmed, belief in a just world is threatened. A common way of preserving belief in a just world is by concluding that the “innocent victim” must in fact be at fault. It is a powerful and influential belief, notwithstanding the fact that it is obviously false; and it is a powerful motivating factor in support of belief in moral responsibility, as well as the grounds for supposing that “ought implies can.”Less
The deep nonconscious belief in a just world – extensively studied by psychologists – is basically the belief that good things happen to good people and bad things to bad people. When an innocent person is harmed, belief in a just world is threatened. A common way of preserving belief in a just world is by concluding that the “innocent victim” must in fact be at fault. It is a powerful and influential belief, notwithstanding the fact that it is obviously false; and it is a powerful motivating factor in support of belief in moral responsibility, as well as the grounds for supposing that “ought implies can.”
Bruce N. Waller
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262028165
- eISBN:
- 9780262327404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028165.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Belief in moral responsibility is held in place by a larger belief system in which moral responsibility is deeply embedded. When operating within the deep assumptions of that system moral ...
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Belief in moral responsibility is held in place by a larger belief system in which moral responsibility is deeply embedded. When operating within the deep assumptions of that system moral responsibility seems secure and obvious, and challenges to that system often appear ridiculous. Advocates of the moral responsibility system regard the basic principles of that system as fixed and certain and assume that even critics of the moral responsibility system must adhere to its basic operating principles. The attempt to deal with the challenges of nonconscious choices shows the powerful grip of the moral responsibility belief system.Less
Belief in moral responsibility is held in place by a larger belief system in which moral responsibility is deeply embedded. When operating within the deep assumptions of that system moral responsibility seems secure and obvious, and challenges to that system often appear ridiculous. Advocates of the moral responsibility system regard the basic principles of that system as fixed and certain and assume that even critics of the moral responsibility system must adhere to its basic operating principles. The attempt to deal with the challenges of nonconscious choices shows the powerful grip of the moral responsibility belief system.
Terence Irwin
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195086454
- eISBN:
- 9780199833306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195086457.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The core argument of chapter 9 is the thesis that the epistemological distinction between knowledge and beliefs introduced in the Meno plays a crucial role in the consideration of virtues. Thanks to ...
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The core argument of chapter 9 is the thesis that the epistemological distinction between knowledge and beliefs introduced in the Meno plays a crucial role in the consideration of virtues. Thanks to this distinction, Plato can indeed dismiss the theory according to which virtues are only instrumental. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the theory of virtue of the early dialogues is the result of having knowledge of the importance of virtues but not a proper and true knowledge of them.Less
The core argument of chapter 9 is the thesis that the epistemological distinction between knowledge and beliefs introduced in the Meno plays a crucial role in the consideration of virtues. Thanks to this distinction, Plato can indeed dismiss the theory according to which virtues are only instrumental. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the theory of virtue of the early dialogues is the result of having knowledge of the importance of virtues but not a proper and true knowledge of them.
Lisa Bortolotti
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198863984
- eISBN:
- 9780191896262
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited ...
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Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis, and may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, elaborated delusional beliefs, motivated delusional beliefs, and optimistically biased beliefs. In the book, Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where the notion of epistemic innocence captures the fact that in some contexts the adoption, maintenance or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence is a weaker notion than epistemic justification, as it does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs. However, it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness and psychological adaptiveness in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.Less
Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis, and may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, elaborated delusional beliefs, motivated delusional beliefs, and optimistically biased beliefs. In the book, Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where the notion of epistemic innocence captures the fact that in some contexts the adoption, maintenance or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence is a weaker notion than epistemic justification, as it does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs. However, it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness and psychological adaptiveness in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
Heather Martel
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780813066189
- eISBN:
- 9780813058399
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813066189.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter introduces the book as an account of the transcultural love story imagined by Protestants that historicizes the meanings of love and friendship in a colonial context. While historians ...
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This chapter introduces the book as an account of the transcultural love story imagined by Protestants that historicizes the meanings of love and friendship in a colonial context. While historians have looked at greed and power in colonialism, this book examines Protestants’ belief systems as another historical motivation, one shaped by events at Fort Caroline. As an introduction, this chapter states the thesis, sets the scene, introduces the science of humoralism, defines categories and labels used for groups discussed, and identifies historiographic contexts for the book.Less
This chapter introduces the book as an account of the transcultural love story imagined by Protestants that historicizes the meanings of love and friendship in a colonial context. While historians have looked at greed and power in colonialism, this book examines Protestants’ belief systems as another historical motivation, one shaped by events at Fort Caroline. As an introduction, this chapter states the thesis, sets the scene, introduces the science of humoralism, defines categories and labels used for groups discussed, and identifies historiographic contexts for the book.
