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This final chapter considers the part that religion has played in Paisley's politics and his political appeal. It argues that Paisley's religious identity was an important part of his political appeal to a minority of unionist voters. While securing his core support, his constant criticisms of liberal and ecumenical deviations in the major Protestant churches alienated many unionists. However, between 2000 and 2005, unionist frustration with the political changes forced by the British Government led enough of those unionists to set aside their dislike for Paisley, and to place the future of Ulster unionism in the hands of the DUP.

This chapter highlights three stepping stones for success in interventions for violent intergroup conflicts: investigating when and how intergroup contact results in reduced prejudice and improved intergroup relations; promoting intergroup forgiveness to replace bitterness and vengeance; and building trust across the sectarian divide. It highlights some of the contributions of social psychology to building the postconflict society envisaged by the Belfast Agreement. The chapter begins by reviewing the historical and social background to the political violence in Northern Ireland. It considers the segregated nature of society in Northern Ireland, and highlights intergroup contact as a means to overcome the problems of segregation. It then considers the neglected topic of forgiveness, arguing that a distinct form of intergroup forgiveness is relevant in cases of intergroup conflict.

This chapter is concerned with the impact of the Belfast Agreement on judicial constitutionalism in Northern Ireland. The Agreement has introduced a new constitutional landscape because of its unusual basis in rights, equality, and partnership. The chapter highlights the importance of the Northern Ireland constitution for the wider British constitutional context and suggests that the anti-foundationalist foundations of the Northern Ireland constitution can perhaps indicate how a new, post-Diceyean constitution might develop beyond the sovereignty mode.

This chapter examines some of the limitations of the Belfast Agreement and highlights how the social reality of enduring segregation maintains ethno–sectarian relationship. Such relationships undermine the development of shared space. Territorial entrapment remains and is a forceful reminder that the political process may be advancing but not in the manner required to challenge the nature of spatial separation, and thus much of what constitutes identity formation.

This chapter looks at the resolution of ethnic conflict. The significance of civil society as critical in satisfying the peace promised by the Good Friday Agreement, or the Belfast Agreement, of 1998 is highlighted. Political elites managed the Agreement on behalf of the communities they presented. The Agreement has essentially altered the way violence is sensed by the public and politicians in Northern Ireland. It offered a framework for governing based on power sharing without presenting the incentive for political elites to make concessions linked with democratic bargaining and compromise that are part of the legislative and governing process. It is noted that trust is significant in developing social capital and peace for civil society. In general, the peace process and the Agreement have decreased the level of violence in Northern Ireland, producing a first step for civil society to develop.

This chapter examines radical democracy through the case of Northern Ireland, once thought of as an example of intractable conflict. Northern Ireland, at least since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, has often been analysed in terms of liberal democratic consensus-driven models of democracy. The discussion argues that this is a mistake. The repeated suspensions of the democratic institutions and outbreaks of disagreement that have marked the post-Agreement period are better interpreted through the ‘paradigm of radical democracy’, with its emphasis on democracy as a fragile, contingent and always-incomplete project. Although radical democracy has undoubted strengths as an interpretive frame, particularly for divided societies in the midst of political transformation, and as a critique of liberal democracy, the chapter argues it needs to be clearer in its critique of democracy.

Devolution in Northern Ireland differs markedly from that which operates in Scotland and Wales. But devolution was never seen as an end in itself but as part of a complex constitutional structure. If there was concern in London about devolving power to Scotland and Wales, at times it seemed that London could not wait to devolve the penury of responsibility for Northern Ireland back to Stormont. The delay of eighteen months between the Belfast Agreement being signed and formal transfer of power as well as its discontinuous operation led to Wilson and Wilford referring to devolution in Northern Ireland as ‘an event rather than a process’.

The Belfast Agreement acknowledges the importance of protecting rights and securing equality of opportunity for all persons throughout the island of Ireland. However, structural and deeply-embedded inequalities continue to affect everyday life north and south of the border. The Agreement requires the Republic of Ireland to provide an equivalent level of protection for human rights as applies in Northern Ireland. This 'equivalence' requirement should have made it possible for a process of cross-border learning to take place, and for a serious debate to be opened up north and south of the border as to how best to combat the deeply embedded patterns of inequality that disfigure both societies. However, that opportunity was wasted. In microcosm, this shows both how potentially transformative of everyday life the Agreement could be, and also how this potential remains mired in neglect.

This chapter compares and contrasts the 1973 and 1998 Agreements that, on the face of it, are remarkably similar: both involve power-sharing and an institutional link between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The phrase ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’, attributed to Seamus Mallon, masks a misunderstanding of the fundamental differences between the two Agreements. The former Agreement looked to establish a Council of Ireland with executive powers that had the potential to evolve into an embryonic all-Ireland government; the latter Agreement established a consultative North-South Ministerial Council with no executive powers that could not evolve into a united Ireland by incremental moves. This was the key to Unionist acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in comparison to Unionist rejection of the Sunningdale Agreement. In constitutional terms the GFA was a Unionist settlement that secured Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom, recognised British sovereignty in Northern Ireland and established that a united Ireland could only be achieved on the basis of the principle of consent. In contrast the Sunningdale Agreement was, in constitutional terms, a Nationalist settlement that did not recognise Northern Ireland was part of the UK and attempted to bypass the principle of consent by establishing powerful North-South bodies. The chapter argues that the only thing the two Agreements has in common was a power-sharing element for the government of Northern Ireland.

This section summarises the key findings of the book, but also engages with one of the key comparative debates surrounding the establishment of the first power-sharing administration. It argues that the 1972 to 1975 period does not represent a ‘lost peace process’. The high levels of violence during this time, and the exclusion of paramilitaries from the power-sharing negotiations, means that this analysis is flawed. However, this conclusion demonstrates that the Sunningdale package - based on power-sharing, an Irish dimension, and the principle of consent - did provide the template for the current on-going peace process in Northern Ireland.

Radical groups often agree to trade in their revolutionary ways in return for democratic reforms which give them a greater stake in power or increased opportunities to gain power. As part of the peace process, republicans engaged in democratic bargaining over the design of new institutions to govern Northern Ireland. In this process it is possible to identify clear stages in republican strategy that entailed extensive moderation in return for what republicans perceived as the democratisation of political opportunities for nationalists. This process brought republicans into increasing contact with mainstream nationalism and republicans agreed to make themselves ‘coalitionable’ to build an alliances with these groups. During the negotiations republicans compromised their revolutionary positions and use of violence in return for institutional and credible guarantees that their goals could be pursued through political channels. Republicans aspired to use the peace process to transition to a united Ireland and the implementation phase was about trying to balance accepting the new power-sharing institutions as providing a system of political order but limiting their permanence and only accepting them on condition that they allowed for an opportunity to transition to a united Ireland.

Developing Michel Foucault’s famous remark about cutting off the King’s head this Chapter considers the persistence of sovereignty in constitutional discussion, particularly in the area of devolution. It suggests that sovereignty can be put aside in order to develop an alternative way of looking at how power actually operates within the changing constitution in the UK. This involves developing a governmentality analysis where sovereignty and the state are demoted from the centre of analysis. It is argued that such an approach offers a better understanding of how constitutional power actually operates within a wider and more complex idea of governance than is appreciated in traditional constitutional theory. Using the example of the transition in Northern Ireland, where power can be seen in a range of constitutional spaces beneath the formal architecture of the Belfast Agreement, the Chapter argues for the value of a “non-sovereignty” approach for understanding devolution more generally.

This Chapter is the first of two that describe efforts to understand the mental health and related impacts of the conflict in Northern Ireland, often referred to as The Troubles. The Chapter covers the period from the outbreak of violence in the late 1960’s up until the period around the peace accord, the Belfast Agreement (or Good Friday Agreement) of April 1998. The early studies reveal little, if any, major effects on the wellbeing and mental health of the population, but as the years go by, evidence starts to build of the impact of the violence, particularly as the ceasefires of the early and mid 1990’s take hold. The developing understanding of the impact was due in part to the evolution of methods and approaches being used by researchers - which is discussed in more detail at the end of Chapter 5.

The second chapter reveals how and why the UUP took risks in negotiating the Belfast Agreement. This section documents the flaws and ambiguities which the leadership failed to resolve, notably in respect of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. The chapter details the rationale behind the decision of party leader David Trimble to ‘jump first’ into government in advance of IRA decommissioning and assesses the fallout within the UUP. Were internal divisions and disunity within the UUP inevitable and if so why? How important was the issue of paramilitary prisoner releases to Trimble? The chapter analyses whether and how the UUP could have extracted more from the Belfast Agreement and also assesses the structural difficulties confronting Trimble in terms of managing dissent within his own party.

This chapter provides essential context by describing the origins of Northern Ireland and its Police. It begins with the Partition of Ireland in 1921 and the creation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as the police force for Northern Ireland. It summarises key events during the Troubles from 1969 onwards, setting out not just the scale of the casualties but also their recognised attribution, noting that 58% of those who died did so at the hands of Republican paramilitary groups. It chronicles developments in the Peace Process, including documents drawn up by the British and Irish Governments, and talks with the political parties, leading to the historic Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998.

This chapter examines the British government's Northern Ireland policy after the UWCs strike. A number of options were considered, including repartition, withdrawal and total integration. However, all were reckoned too problematic. The Labour government's policy was consistent with its Conservative predecessor: that direct rule would continue until a power-sharing solution was implemented. Following the strike, the British-Irish relationship came under strain. Dublin authorities feared a possible British disengagement from Northern Ireland. These fears were compounded by the secret British discussions with paramilitary groups, including truce talks with the PIRA, in a tentative attempt to steer them away from violence. Notwithstanding these tensions, cross-border security co-operation appeared to improve steadily throughout 1974 and 1975, and while some challenges remained, British-Irish relations remained on a solid footing overall.

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was the dominant party in Northern Ireland from the 1920s until the end of the twentieth century. The twenty-first century has been much more of a struggle. The UUP was punished, not rewarded, by many in the Protestant Unionist British community for conceding too much to Irish nationalists in the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Those concerned about the deal defected to the more militant Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The story of the UUP during the peace process and in the decades since the 1998 Agreement is examined in subsequent chapters. The volume draws upon the first-ever dataset on UUP members constructed by the authors to examine who belongs to the UUP, explore what they think of their party and others, and assess their views on the political changes which have seen their party come under pressure.

This chapter assesses the nine specific clauses in the Sunningdale Agreement that dealt with the implications for security policy in Northern Ireland. It analyses the consequences that these clauses had in Britain’s war against terrorism, especially as the Conservative government sought to shift the operational focus away from military-led counter-insurgency to a law enforcement-led counter-terrorism strategy. Although the policy of ‘police primacy’ did not emerge as Britain’s preferred option for tackling terrorism until 1975-76, this chapter argues that the seeds were sown by the British Government’s approach to the Sunningdale Agreement and the urgency by which it sought a cross-border arrangement with the Republic of Ireland that would enhance the security forces’ powers of pursuit, arrest and extradition. Indeed, the chapter asks whether the Conservative Party’s return to power in 1979 finally heralded a renewed vision for ‘police primacy’ in a more systematic way than that enacted by the Labour Government between 1974 and 1979. The chapter also highlights the theme of democratic control over the military instrument that would remain constant right up to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and beyond. Indeed, it makes the case - pace Evelegh (1978) and Neumann (2003) – that the British government’s use of the military instrument as an option of last resort is fundamental to our understanding of Britain’s long war on Irish terrorism. This is relevant today, of course, particularly as Britain faces another (albeit much less sustained) armed challenge from dissident republicans. In conclusion, the chapter reflects on how liberal democracies more broadly have responded to the challenge posed by terrorism.