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Information, Equilibrium, and Efficiency Concepts

Markus K. Brunnermeier

in Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198296980
eISBN:
9780191596025
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198296983.003.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Ch. 1 shows the reader how to model asymmetric information and knowledge in theoretical economics. It also introduces the concept of higher‐order knowledge. For the analysis of bubbles it is ... More


An Introduction to Auction Theory

Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199275984
eISBN:
9780191602214
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927598X.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated ... More


Preliminaries

Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

in An Introduction to Auction Theory

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199275984
eISBN:
9780191602214
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927598X.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter presents the concept of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as defined by Harsanyi (1967). His approach was to transform a game of incomplete information into one of imperfect information; any ... More


Classification of Market Microstructure Models

Markus K. Brunnermeier

in Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198296980
eISBN:
9780191596025
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198296983.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

The third chapter contrasts different market microstructure models. In the first group of models, all market participants submit whole demand schedules simultaneously. The traders either act ... More


An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers

Jean‐Jacques Laffont

in Incentives and Political Economy

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199248681
eISBN:
9780191596575
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199248680.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

The design of a complete Constitution is further augmented by focusing on the need for separation of powers to avoid regulatory capture. The economic concepts used are yardstick competition and ... More


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