Search Results

The semi‐presidential regime in Bulgaria is of recent origin: it was established in July 1991, when a Great National Assembly adopted a new constitution, which proclaims that ‘Bulgaria shall be a republic with a parliamentary form of government’; the emphasis on ‘parliamentary’ highlights the subordinate role of the president, who is elected directly by the voters for period five years. Even though the framers of the constitution deliberately created a dual structure of the executive branch, the text of the fundamental law envisages a mode of distribution of prerogatives that is heavily skewed in favour of the legislature and a cabinet accountable to the deputies. It is difficult, however, to sustain a claim that a general pattern of leadership is beginning to emerge under Bulgarian semi‐presidentialism, since the country has only had two presidents under its new constitution; the closest to a valid generalization which may be ventured in the light of the evidence is that, while parliament enjoys supremacy over law‐making and the government remains the primary site of executive decision‐making, the rapports between these two institutions and the presidency have varied dramatically, with the influence of the head of state running the gamut from almost complete exclusion to a palpable ability to shape agendas. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse the ways in which constitutionally designed patterns of institutional interaction shift in response to changes in the social and economic environment rather than to chronicle events—the analysis is conceived as a chronology of the successive problems with which political actors had to cope. The three sections of the chapter are: Constitutional Balance of Power; Presidential/Parliamentary Relations; and Conclusion.

How safe was the largely unbridled balance of power of the 17^th and 18^th centuries for the small state? This chapter shows that the balance of power system was in fact rather permissive and allowed small states to survive in historically large numbers. The loose and fairly unrestrained balance of power system turned out to be a surprisingly safe environment for the small state. The chapter covers the era of the classic balance of power, which is bookended by two major peace summits, the Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, and the Congress of Vienna, held in 1814/15. During this era, the particular balance-of-power that defined it was also the main cause of the moderate decline in small states numbers.

Bipolar alliances did not deter war in 1914, they made war seem possible if not inevitable. In that year great powers had at least two motivations: not to lose a war and to maintain their alliances. But the second might involve supporting an ally in a conflict that the Great Power could not win. In fact, an overbalance of power would have been a better preventative and it existed in the Concert of Europe until 1848 and in foreshortened form in Bismarck’s alliances of 1871-1890. It also produced the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Despite the growing quantity of linkages between both sides, EU-China ties remain derivate of relations with the US. The EU and China are not each other's foreign policy priorities. A close analysis of five key 'lenses' of understanding Sino-European affairs reveals the extent to which US interests and alliance commitments mediate, shape, and influence the relationship between Europe and China. The controversy surrounding the attempts to lift the EU's arms embargo on China is a case in point. China's ability to exploit differences among EU member states has been reduced not only by better coordination among the EU but also by the formation of EU-US transatlantic dialogues on the rise of China.

In all great powers, European militaries had great influence before 1914. This was especially true in Germany, Austria and Russia, less so in Britain and France. Most believed in the “cult of the offensive” and a short war. Civilians were less convinced. For them the war was inadvertent. Today there is no similar problem in China, but there is in Pakistan.

World War I was not inevitable, but the balance of power allowed war to occur. Local conflicts were allowed to escalate into more general conflict, globalization did not prevent conflict, and there were no general or local institutions which contained the crisis. Today, however, globalization is stronger, but Chinese disputes with its neighbors are chronic and Beijing does not accept the restraints of the Western international system. New regional and international institutions bringing China and the United States together are sorely needed.

This introductory chapter explores the changing complexion of security agendas in the Persian Gulf in the turbulent aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the twin shocks of the oil price collapse and sudden rise of ISIS in 2014. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen argues that new sources of insecurity emerged at the national, regional, and international levels after 2011 for the countries of the Persian Gulf. Domestic developments in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran’s partial rapprochement with world powers interfered with the balance of power and threat perception in the Gulf and contributed to the internationalization of the Yemen war in 2015 and greater volatility in decision-making. A muscular new approach to policymaking at the regional level emerged just as officials grappled with new challenges domestically as oil prices fell and greater unpredictability internationally with the election of Donald Trump in 2016.