Sayed Khatab
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9789774164996
- eISBN:
- 9781617971075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- American University in Cairo Press
- DOI:
- 10.5743/cairo/9789774164996.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter investigates the ongoing ideological war within al-Qa'ida. It focuses on the theo-political and ideological disputes between the main ideologues of global jihad, and looks, among other ...
More
This chapter investigates the ongoing ideological war within al-Qa'ida. It focuses on the theo-political and ideological disputes between the main ideologues of global jihad, and looks, among other examples, at the dispute between Dr. Fadl and Ayman al-Zawahiri. This final chapter is intended to bring the ideas of these two jihadist rivals face to face in an attempt to address a number of questions, for example: When, how, and why was the Jihad organization established in Egypt? When and how did it come into contact with al-Qa'ida? When and why did Jihad leave Egypt for Afghanistan? What were they doing there? What was their relationship with 'Abdullah 'Azzam, Bin Laden, and al-Qa'ida?Less
This chapter investigates the ongoing ideological war within al-Qa'ida. It focuses on the theo-political and ideological disputes between the main ideologues of global jihad, and looks, among other examples, at the dispute between Dr. Fadl and Ayman al-Zawahiri. This final chapter is intended to bring the ideas of these two jihadist rivals face to face in an attempt to address a number of questions, for example: When, how, and why was the Jihad organization established in Egypt? When and how did it come into contact with al-Qa'ida? When and why did Jihad leave Egypt for Afghanistan? What were they doing there? What was their relationship with 'Abdullah 'Azzam, Bin Laden, and al-Qa'ida?
Michael W. S. Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231163842
- eISBN:
- 9780231533270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231163842.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter describes the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, with a focus on the development of a post-9/11 strategy, by examining al-Zawahiri's brief strategic template, ...
More
This chapter describes the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, with a focus on the development of a post-9/11 strategy, by examining al-Zawahiri's brief strategic template, which he offers in his post-9/11 book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner. Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda, the first organization dedicated to global jihad, in 1988, with the help of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Together they began a series of bombings in U.S. embassies, which eventually culminated in the 9/11 attack. The success of al-Qaeda efforts can be attributed to the organization's ideology and strategy. They believe they could defeat the U.S. using the same strategy they have used in defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The first task in their strategy was to convince their own members and allies that the United States was not all-powerful and impossible to defeat.Less
This chapter describes the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, with a focus on the development of a post-9/11 strategy, by examining al-Zawahiri's brief strategic template, which he offers in his post-9/11 book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner. Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda, the first organization dedicated to global jihad, in 1988, with the help of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Together they began a series of bombings in U.S. embassies, which eventually culminated in the 9/11 attack. The success of al-Qaeda efforts can be attributed to the organization's ideology and strategy. They believe they could defeat the U.S. using the same strategy they have used in defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The first task in their strategy was to convince their own members and allies that the United States was not all-powerful and impossible to defeat.
Donald Holbrook
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190650292
- eISBN:
- 9780190686499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190650292.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter analyses statements released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the context of MENA uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State organization. The chapter traces Zawahiri’s aggregate narrative ...
More
This chapter analyses statements released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the context of MENA uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State organization. The chapter traces Zawahiri’s aggregate narrative during this period, discussing how the Al-Qaeda leader framed these key events and how these framing efforts evolved. This discussion highlights issues regarding legitimate leadership of jihadist vanguards, the role of public opinion in that equation and the way in which al-Zawahiri has sought to exploit and address those challenges in his efforts to retain momentum and relevancy within a complex jihadi universe. The chapter concludes by considering the particulars of al-Zawahiri’s most recent discursive emphases in light of his public rhetoric to date in order to highlight the evolution and, at times, contradictions of this narrative.Less
This chapter analyses statements released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the context of MENA uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State organization. The chapter traces Zawahiri’s aggregate narrative during this period, discussing how the Al-Qaeda leader framed these key events and how these framing efforts evolved. This discussion highlights issues regarding legitimate leadership of jihadist vanguards, the role of public opinion in that equation and the way in which al-Zawahiri has sought to exploit and address those challenges in his efforts to retain momentum and relevancy within a complex jihadi universe. The chapter concludes by considering the particulars of al-Zawahiri’s most recent discursive emphases in light of his public rhetoric to date in order to highlight the evolution and, at times, contradictions of this narrative.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman ...
More
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al‐Zawahiri, consistently maintain that aggression is both wrong and illegal, and that in using violence al‐Qaeda is merely repelling America's attacks. However, since the United States had launched no invasion of bin Laden's country before 11 September, be it Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Afghanistan, it was incumbent upon him to redefine the concept of ‘aggression’. This attempt was contested a series of Muslim leaders who described al‐Qaeda as the belligerent party on 9/11.Less
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al‐Zawahiri, consistently maintain that aggression is both wrong and illegal, and that in using violence al‐Qaeda is merely repelling America's attacks. However, since the United States had launched no invasion of bin Laden's country before 11 September, be it Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Afghanistan, it was incumbent upon him to redefine the concept of ‘aggression’. This attempt was contested a series of Muslim leaders who described al‐Qaeda as the belligerent party on 9/11.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This ...
More
In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This chapter explores issues raised by al‐Qaeda's conduct during its war against the United States in the light of Islamic ideas about jus in bello. The first section of this chapter briefly introduces the jus in bello tradition in Islam. The second section discusses the legitimacy of suicide attacks and the place of martyrdom in the Islamic tradition. The final section examines bin Laden's attempts to overturn the robust Islamic protections for civilians in war. Bin Laden himself subscribes to the principle of non‐combatant immunity and employs it in levelling virulent criticism against the US's policies—yet his acceptance of the principle leads him into an unclear and uncomfortable moral position with regard to al‐Qaeda's attacks.Less
In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This chapter explores issues raised by al‐Qaeda's conduct during its war against the United States in the light of Islamic ideas about jus in bello. The first section of this chapter briefly introduces the jus in bello tradition in Islam. The second section discusses the legitimacy of suicide attacks and the place of martyrdom in the Islamic tradition. The final section examines bin Laden's attempts to overturn the robust Islamic protections for civilians in war. Bin Laden himself subscribes to the principle of non‐combatant immunity and employs it in levelling virulent criticism against the US's policies—yet his acceptance of the principle leads him into an unclear and uncomfortable moral position with regard to al‐Qaeda's attacks.
Donald Holbrook
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
On 16 June 2011, three days before his sixtieth birthday, Ayman al-Zawahiri was declared the new leader of Al-Qaeda, replacing the fallen Osama bin Laden. The veteran Egyptian jihadist had little of ...
More
On 16 June 2011, three days before his sixtieth birthday, Ayman al-Zawahiri was declared the new leader of Al-Qaeda, replacing the fallen Osama bin Laden. The veteran Egyptian jihadist had little of his predecessor's charisma and enjoyed much less popularity, respect and celebrity. Yet, as scores of jihadi commanders from different organizations have succumbed to their enemies' missiles, bombs and bullets, Zawahiri has soldiered on. His tenure as Al-Qaeda's leader has been marked by some of its darkest and most challenging moments, which have threatened the viability and future of Al-Qaeda's central leadership. The gravest such development has been the emergence of Islamic State as a separate and rival jihadist entity. The best way to gauge Zawahiri's response to these threats is by studying the official statements and public communiqués that he has issued since taking the reins. This book provides the reader with professional translations of Zawahiri's key statements during his first five years as leader of Al-Qaeda. These official communications are introduced and contextualized to provide the reader with a comprehensive sourcebook, outlining the Al-Qaeda leadership's stance on the challenges to its existence since the death of bin Laden.Less
On 16 June 2011, three days before his sixtieth birthday, Ayman al-Zawahiri was declared the new leader of Al-Qaeda, replacing the fallen Osama bin Laden. The veteran Egyptian jihadist had little of his predecessor's charisma and enjoyed much less popularity, respect and celebrity. Yet, as scores of jihadi commanders from different organizations have succumbed to their enemies' missiles, bombs and bullets, Zawahiri has soldiered on. His tenure as Al-Qaeda's leader has been marked by some of its darkest and most challenging moments, which have threatened the viability and future of Al-Qaeda's central leadership. The gravest such development has been the emergence of Islamic State as a separate and rival jihadist entity. The best way to gauge Zawahiri's response to these threats is by studying the official statements and public communiqués that he has issued since taking the reins. This book provides the reader with professional translations of Zawahiri's key statements during his first five years as leader of Al-Qaeda. These official communications are introduced and contextualized to provide the reader with a comprehensive sourcebook, outlining the Al-Qaeda leadership's stance on the challenges to its existence since the death of bin Laden.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. ...
More
This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. In setting out al‐Qaeda's case for war, bin Laden does not depend solely on faith‐based statements about good versus evil. Instead, he offers a series of sometimes intricate arguments that connect with the jihad tradition and endeavour to present al‐Qaeda's cause as authorized, necessary, and practical. Despite his best efforts, however, the legacy of bin Laden's case for the resort to war is that of innovation.Less
This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. In setting out al‐Qaeda's case for war, bin Laden does not depend solely on faith‐based statements about good versus evil. Instead, he offers a series of sometimes intricate arguments that connect with the jihad tradition and endeavour to present al‐Qaeda's cause as authorized, necessary, and practical. Despite his best efforts, however, the legacy of bin Laden's case for the resort to war is that of innovation.
Michael Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231163842
- eISBN:
- 9780231533270
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231163842.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist ...
More
This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations. It constructs a counter narrative to the West's supposed “war on Islam,” finding that jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. The book examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. It also looks at the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. It shows that these authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap, and also shows that they incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on “fourth-generation warfare.” The book argues that al-Qaeda's political-military strategy is a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad. In this way, the book adds new dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.Less
This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations. It constructs a counter narrative to the West's supposed “war on Islam,” finding that jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. The book examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. It also looks at the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. It shows that these authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap, and also shows that they incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on “fourth-generation warfare.” The book argues that al-Qaeda's political-military strategy is a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad. In this way, the book adds new dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
In this short, but important document, published during Ramadan in 2012 (1433 according to the Islamic calendar), Zawahiri identifies four key issues that are wrong with the current international ...
More
In this short, but important document, published during Ramadan in 2012 (1433 according to the Islamic calendar), Zawahiri identifies four key issues that are wrong with the current international order (the five permanent members of the Security Council, rule by majority, the legitimization of usurped land, and subjugation of Muslims) and presents a seven-part pathway to upturning this order, around which he urges coreligionists to unify. The document is an opportunity to reiterate the relevance of Al-Qaeda in a rapidly changing world, both locally and globallyLess
In this short, but important document, published during Ramadan in 2012 (1433 according to the Islamic calendar), Zawahiri identifies four key issues that are wrong with the current international order (the five permanent members of the Security Council, rule by majority, the legitimization of usurped land, and subjugation of Muslims) and presents a seven-part pathway to upturning this order, around which he urges coreligionists to unify. The document is an opportunity to reiterate the relevance of Al-Qaeda in a rapidly changing world, both locally and globally
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This publication is typical of Zawahiri’s ‘big films’. Like a contemporary Hollywood blockbuster, it is repetitive and overlong. Yet it comes at an important time in the aftermath of the toppling of ...
More
This publication is typical of Zawahiri’s ‘big films’. Like a contemporary Hollywood blockbuster, it is repetitive and overlong. Yet it comes at an important time in the aftermath of the toppling of Mohammed Morsi as the Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt. Here, therefore, Zawahiri moves on from his focus on reshaping or reframing the Arab Spring according to his framework and agenda to dissecting the reasons for its failure. He presents Chechnya as an example for Arabs to follow, whereby the enclave persevered in protracted conflict against the Russian state. Zawahiri seeks to construct an uninterrupted rhetorical thread where the current struggle of believers echoes that of the first generation of Muslims, including the venerated battles they fought and won during the formative years of Islam. He uses the aftermath of the Arab Spring to re-illustrate the fallacy of the democratic method, reiterating his demand that Sharia becomes that which governs the affairs of men, as oppose to that which is governed by man. He speaks about the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt, warning its leadership against shoring up secular authoritarianism, whilst noting his desire to avoid direct confrontation with normal members of that faith community.Less
This publication is typical of Zawahiri’s ‘big films’. Like a contemporary Hollywood blockbuster, it is repetitive and overlong. Yet it comes at an important time in the aftermath of the toppling of Mohammed Morsi as the Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt. Here, therefore, Zawahiri moves on from his focus on reshaping or reframing the Arab Spring according to his framework and agenda to dissecting the reasons for its failure. He presents Chechnya as an example for Arabs to follow, whereby the enclave persevered in protracted conflict against the Russian state. Zawahiri seeks to construct an uninterrupted rhetorical thread where the current struggle of believers echoes that of the first generation of Muslims, including the venerated battles they fought and won during the formative years of Islam. He uses the aftermath of the Arab Spring to re-illustrate the fallacy of the democratic method, reiterating his demand that Sharia becomes that which governs the affairs of men, as oppose to that which is governed by man. He speaks about the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt, warning its leadership against shoring up secular authoritarianism, whilst noting his desire to avoid direct confrontation with normal members of that faith community.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This is the seventh ‘interview’ between Al-Sahab, Al-Qaeda’s media production department, and Zawahiri, a tradition which started in 2005. This format gives Zawahiri the opportunity to discuss a wide ...
More
This is the seventh ‘interview’ between Al-Sahab, Al-Qaeda’s media production department, and Zawahiri, a tradition which started in 2005. This format gives Zawahiri the opportunity to discuss a wide variety of matters in great detail, whilst giving the impression that critical issues have been addressed and approached from different viewpoints. This is the first significant statement about infighting among jihadis in Syria and whilst Zawahiri seems keen to blame the turmoil on ‘external’ factors such as criminality or alleged infiltration by the Assad regime, two key historical analogies that subsequently became prominent in his denunciation of this ‘fitna’ [sedition/strife] emerge. These are comparisons with the fate of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) that fought in the civil war in Algeria and became widely condemned as a jihadi outcast and the infighting that spread throughout Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal in 1989.Less
This is the seventh ‘interview’ between Al-Sahab, Al-Qaeda’s media production department, and Zawahiri, a tradition which started in 2005. This format gives Zawahiri the opportunity to discuss a wide variety of matters in great detail, whilst giving the impression that critical issues have been addressed and approached from different viewpoints. This is the first significant statement about infighting among jihadis in Syria and whilst Zawahiri seems keen to blame the turmoil on ‘external’ factors such as criminality or alleged infiltration by the Assad regime, two key historical analogies that subsequently became prominent in his denunciation of this ‘fitna’ [sedition/strife] emerge. These are comparisons with the fate of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) that fought in the civil war in Algeria and became widely condemned as a jihadi outcast and the infighting that spread throughout Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
Nelly Lahoud
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190650292
- eISBN:
- 9780190686499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190650292.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
The Iraq-based group that was once led by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and called “Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad” is the only regional jihadi group that was brought under Al-Qaeda’s fold by Osama bin Laden. ...
More
The Iraq-based group that was once led by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and called “Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad” is the only regional jihadi group that was brought under Al-Qaeda’s fold by Osama bin Laden. Judging by primary sources internal to AQ, bin Laden and other AQ leaders lived to regret that decision. The same group, which now calls itself the Islamic State, has over the years changed its name to reflect its gradual and ultimate separation from Al-Qaeda. Much like a trying relationship between a parent and a rebellious adolescent, the group’s years under Al-Qaeda were difficult on both. This chapter examines the evolution of the Islamic State in relation to AQ, its claim to statehood since 2006, and the growing ideological divide that separates it from AQ.Less
The Iraq-based group that was once led by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and called “Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad” is the only regional jihadi group that was brought under Al-Qaeda’s fold by Osama bin Laden. Judging by primary sources internal to AQ, bin Laden and other AQ leaders lived to regret that decision. The same group, which now calls itself the Islamic State, has over the years changed its name to reflect its gradual and ultimate separation from Al-Qaeda. Much like a trying relationship between a parent and a rebellious adolescent, the group’s years under Al-Qaeda were difficult on both. This chapter examines the evolution of the Islamic State in relation to AQ, its claim to statehood since 2006, and the growing ideological divide that separates it from AQ.
James Toth
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199790883
- eISBN:
- 9780199332601
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790883.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Chapter twelve examines Qutb’s recent impact. Islamic activists used his writings to promote a campaign which today is called terrorism. This is documented in the movement’s emergence in southern ...
More
Chapter twelve examines Qutb’s recent impact. Islamic activists used his writings to promote a campaign which today is called terrorism. This is documented in the movement’s emergence in southern Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s and its transformation from small charity groups into the violence of al-Jihad and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. These two exhibited important tactical and organizational distinctions that together contrasted considerably with the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Yet by the 1990s, the government had soundly defeated these militants. Many were jailed indefinitely while others escaped abroad. In the 1990s, the imprisoned leaders renounced violence and published the four-volume Revised Concepts. Those committed to violence moved to Afghanistan and under the leadership of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri created al-Qa’ida. Yet it is significant that even after the turn of the century, the milder Muslim Brothers continued to be accused of promoting Qutbism. The 2011 uprising did not dispel this suspicion; if anything, the rise of legitimate religious political parties streamlined the Brotherhood and purified its ranks.Less
Chapter twelve examines Qutb’s recent impact. Islamic activists used his writings to promote a campaign which today is called terrorism. This is documented in the movement’s emergence in southern Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s and its transformation from small charity groups into the violence of al-Jihad and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. These two exhibited important tactical and organizational distinctions that together contrasted considerably with the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Yet by the 1990s, the government had soundly defeated these militants. Many were jailed indefinitely while others escaped abroad. In the 1990s, the imprisoned leaders renounced violence and published the four-volume Revised Concepts. Those committed to violence moved to Afghanistan and under the leadership of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri created al-Qa’ida. Yet it is significant that even after the turn of the century, the milder Muslim Brothers continued to be accused of promoting Qutbism. The 2011 uprising did not dispel this suspicion; if anything, the rise of legitimate religious political parties streamlined the Brotherhood and purified its ranks.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Here Zawahiri addresses the turmoil and infighting in Syria more directly, emphasizing that ISIS is subordinate to his organization. He traces the origin of the Islamic State of Iraq, highlighting ...
More
Here Zawahiri addresses the turmoil and infighting in Syria more directly, emphasizing that ISIS is subordinate to his organization. He traces the origin of the Islamic State of Iraq, highlighting the fact that whilst that group at also operated in objectionable ways, it still pledged allegiance to bin Ladin. Zawahiri claims to have inherited this fealty. He details correspondence between the two organizations at the outbreak of civil war in Syria that he seeks to use to demonstrate his overall control. He accuses Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of being driven predominantly by power, thus preparing the ground for more direct public denunciation of the ISIS leadershipLess
Here Zawahiri addresses the turmoil and infighting in Syria more directly, emphasizing that ISIS is subordinate to his organization. He traces the origin of the Islamic State of Iraq, highlighting the fact that whilst that group at also operated in objectionable ways, it still pledged allegiance to bin Ladin. Zawahiri claims to have inherited this fealty. He details correspondence between the two organizations at the outbreak of civil war in Syria that he seeks to use to demonstrate his overall control. He accuses Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of being driven predominantly by power, thus preparing the ground for more direct public denunciation of the ISIS leadership
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s first statement as leader of Al-Qaeda. Issued weeks after Osama bin Ladin was killed by US special forces in his Abbottabad compound in north-east Pakistan, Zawahiri seeks to ...
More
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s first statement as leader of Al-Qaeda. Issued weeks after Osama bin Ladin was killed by US special forces in his Abbottabad compound in north-east Pakistan, Zawahiri seeks to combine his eulogy of the fallen leader—heavily reliant on poetry—with his vision regarding the challenges the ummah [nation or community] is facing and how to address them. He reiterates bin Ladin’s ‘oath’, promising to inflict casualties on the oppressors as long as they make the Muslims suffer. Reflecting on bin Ladin’s objectives, he argues that the late leader had been successful in rousing the ummah, which he claims was his principal goal.Less
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s first statement as leader of Al-Qaeda. Issued weeks after Osama bin Ladin was killed by US special forces in his Abbottabad compound in north-east Pakistan, Zawahiri seeks to combine his eulogy of the fallen leader—heavily reliant on poetry—with his vision regarding the challenges the ummah [nation or community] is facing and how to address them. He reiterates bin Ladin’s ‘oath’, promising to inflict casualties on the oppressors as long as they make the Muslims suffer. Reflecting on bin Ladin’s objectives, he argues that the late leader had been successful in rousing the ummah, which he claims was his principal goal.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
In addition to the ‘Support for Islam’ document, Zawahiri frequently referred to his ‘General Guidelines’ on subsequent occasions as key texts defining the way in which he sought—via Al-Qaeda—to ...
More
In addition to the ‘Support for Islam’ document, Zawahiri frequently referred to his ‘General Guidelines’ on subsequent occasions as key texts defining the way in which he sought—via Al-Qaeda—to chart a sustainable and ultimately successful course for Islamist militancy worldwide. In his Guidelines, Zawahiri sets out his strategic and tactical priorities, emphasizing the need to target America as ‘the head of unbelief’. The main focus of the document is to rein in fighters who were seen to have engaged in excessive violence, avoiding the reputational hazards such targeting would incur. The document is thus interesting not only in relation to Al-Qaeda’s immediate prehistory at this point, where allies and affiliates had carried out mass-scale attacks against civilians that ultimately undermined Al-Qaeda, but also of course in relation to what came after: where the sectarian bloodshed inflicted by ISIS/IS became a major theme in Zawahiri’s attempts to delegitimize that group. Zawahiri referred to his Guidelines on many subsequent occasions, pointing out that had it been heeded more widely the turmoil and infighting between groups in Syria and beyond could have been avoided.Less
In addition to the ‘Support for Islam’ document, Zawahiri frequently referred to his ‘General Guidelines’ on subsequent occasions as key texts defining the way in which he sought—via Al-Qaeda—to chart a sustainable and ultimately successful course for Islamist militancy worldwide. In his Guidelines, Zawahiri sets out his strategic and tactical priorities, emphasizing the need to target America as ‘the head of unbelief’. The main focus of the document is to rein in fighters who were seen to have engaged in excessive violence, avoiding the reputational hazards such targeting would incur. The document is thus interesting not only in relation to Al-Qaeda’s immediate prehistory at this point, where allies and affiliates had carried out mass-scale attacks against civilians that ultimately undermined Al-Qaeda, but also of course in relation to what came after: where the sectarian bloodshed inflicted by ISIS/IS became a major theme in Zawahiri’s attempts to delegitimize that group. Zawahiri referred to his Guidelines on many subsequent occasions, pointing out that had it been heeded more widely the turmoil and infighting between groups in Syria and beyond could have been avoided.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Here we have an introduction to a book which Zawahiri published initially in 2004 on the topic of martyrdom and martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide attacks) in particular. Written initially in the ...
More
Here we have an introduction to a book which Zawahiri published initially in 2004 on the topic of martyrdom and martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide attacks) in particular. Written initially in the aftermath of the 9/11 suicide-hijackings, Zawahiri began his first edition with references to the asymmetric qualities of martyrdom operations, that rendered the material prowess of the West—acquired through treachery—meaningless. He condemned those who spoke against that tactic, warning against the consequences such criticism would have for the Muslim nation. Nine years later, Zawahiri’s second edition of his book comes at a time when martyrdom operations and the excessive casualties they inflict had become something of a liability. In this edition, therefore, Zawahiri warns against ‘deviation’ and ‘exaggeration’ in the application of the tactic, arguing that some have not respected the parameters defined by proper reading of scripture. The two introductions, therefore, shed interesting light on ongoing debates about the boundaries of legitimate and sustainable militancy from the perspective of public opinion, which is a recurring theme in this discourse.Less
Here we have an introduction to a book which Zawahiri published initially in 2004 on the topic of martyrdom and martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide attacks) in particular. Written initially in the aftermath of the 9/11 suicide-hijackings, Zawahiri began his first edition with references to the asymmetric qualities of martyrdom operations, that rendered the material prowess of the West—acquired through treachery—meaningless. He condemned those who spoke against that tactic, warning against the consequences such criticism would have for the Muslim nation. Nine years later, Zawahiri’s second edition of his book comes at a time when martyrdom operations and the excessive casualties they inflict had become something of a liability. In this edition, therefore, Zawahiri warns against ‘deviation’ and ‘exaggeration’ in the application of the tactic, arguing that some have not respected the parameters defined by proper reading of scripture. The two introductions, therefore, shed interesting light on ongoing debates about the boundaries of legitimate and sustainable militancy from the perspective of public opinion, which is a recurring theme in this discourse.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0016
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
In the fifth episode of the ‘Islamic Spring’ series Zawahiri continues to explore the conditions necessary to establish a Caliphate. In doing so he seeks to undermine the appeal of IS’s leadership by ...
More
In the fifth episode of the ‘Islamic Spring’ series Zawahiri continues to explore the conditions necessary to establish a Caliphate. In doing so he seeks to undermine the appeal of IS’s leadership by lauding Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which IS recognizes as its forefather, and other leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq, whom Zawahiri had of course criticized in the past. He demonstrates their apparent loyalty towards the Al-Qaeda leadership (represented, of course, at that time by bin Ladin), whilst reiterating his vision for the creation of a Caliphate through solidifying existing ‘emirates’ in Afghanistan and the Caucasus, that are loyal to Al-Qaeda.Less
In the fifth episode of the ‘Islamic Spring’ series Zawahiri continues to explore the conditions necessary to establish a Caliphate. In doing so he seeks to undermine the appeal of IS’s leadership by lauding Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which IS recognizes as its forefather, and other leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq, whom Zawahiri had of course criticized in the past. He demonstrates their apparent loyalty towards the Al-Qaeda leadership (represented, of course, at that time by bin Ladin), whilst reiterating his vision for the creation of a Caliphate through solidifying existing ‘emirates’ in Afghanistan and the Caucasus, that are loyal to Al-Qaeda.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0018
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
In times of crisis and turmoil, Zawahiri revisits a traditional rallying call to make the case for Al-Qaeda’s continued relevance: the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem. This process, he argues, will have ...
More
In times of crisis and turmoil, Zawahiri revisits a traditional rallying call to make the case for Al-Qaeda’s continued relevance: the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem. This process, he argues, will have two components; the first would be to target the West, especially in the United States and their interests across the world as it is this support that is key to Israel’s survival. The second component is the establishment of an Islamic state, centered in Egypt and the Levant to create powerful staging posts to conquer Palestine. The purpose, of course, is to remind audiences that the major jihadi objectives remain unfulfilled and have become side-tracked due to the infighting in Syria.Less
In times of crisis and turmoil, Zawahiri revisits a traditional rallying call to make the case for Al-Qaeda’s continued relevance: the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem. This process, he argues, will have two components; the first would be to target the West, especially in the United States and their interests across the world as it is this support that is key to Israel’s survival. The second component is the establishment of an Islamic state, centered in Egypt and the Levant to create powerful staging posts to conquer Palestine. The purpose, of course, is to remind audiences that the major jihadi objectives remain unfulfilled and have become side-tracked due to the infighting in Syria.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0020
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Zawahiri has noted that he did not want Al-Qaeda’s presence on the ground in Syria to become known, as this would distract from the goal of toppling the Assad regime and serve as a propaganda victory ...
More
Zawahiri has noted that he did not want Al-Qaeda’s presence on the ground in Syria to become known, as this would distract from the goal of toppling the Assad regime and serve as a propaganda victory for local Shia forces seeking to present the conflict in a more international light. This was part of his publicly articulated frustration with al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the ISIS, initially as a merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, which Zawahiri rejected. In this statement, Zawahiri insists that he does not desire material or political power, in Syria and elsewhere. This goes back to his previous conceptualizations of Al-Qaeda as a ‘mode’, message and mission, which he presented as bin Ladin’s legacy and ultimately his own legacy too. If the people of Syria and its mujahidin fighters came to an agreement regarding their Islamic leadership that would end the infighting, Zawahiri insisted, he would be happy to offer the consensus his backing. At the same time he continues to present IS and al-Baghdadi as illegitimate, praising instead the Nusra Front. The latter declared its independence from Al-Qaeda, with Zawahiri’s acquiescence, in July 2016, potentially giving it more freedom to maneuver within Syria and garner local support.Less
Zawahiri has noted that he did not want Al-Qaeda’s presence on the ground in Syria to become known, as this would distract from the goal of toppling the Assad regime and serve as a propaganda victory for local Shia forces seeking to present the conflict in a more international light. This was part of his publicly articulated frustration with al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the ISIS, initially as a merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, which Zawahiri rejected. In this statement, Zawahiri insists that he does not desire material or political power, in Syria and elsewhere. This goes back to his previous conceptualizations of Al-Qaeda as a ‘mode’, message and mission, which he presented as bin Ladin’s legacy and ultimately his own legacy too. If the people of Syria and its mujahidin fighters came to an agreement regarding their Islamic leadership that would end the infighting, Zawahiri insisted, he would be happy to offer the consensus his backing. At the same time he continues to present IS and al-Baghdadi as illegitimate, praising instead the Nusra Front. The latter declared its independence from Al-Qaeda, with Zawahiri’s acquiescence, in July 2016, potentially giving it more freedom to maneuver within Syria and garner local support.
