Search Results

Inside al-Qaʻida: The Ideological War

Sayed Khatab

in Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism: The Theological and Ideological Basis of al-Qa'ida's Political Tactics

This chapter investigates the ongoing ideological war within al-Qa'ida. It focuses on the theo-political and ideological disputes between the main ideologues of global jihad, and looks, among other ... More

This chapter investigates the ongoing ideological war within al-Qa'ida. It focuses on the theo-political and ideological disputes between the main ideologues of global jihad, and looks, among other examples, at the dispute between Dr. Fadl and Ayman al-Zawahiri. This final chapter is intended to bring the ideas of these two jihadist rivals face to face in an attempt to address a number of questions, for example: When, how, and why was the Jihad organization established in Egypt? When and how did it come into contact with al-Qa'ida? When and why did Jihad leave Egypt for Afghanistan? What were they doing there? What was their relationship with 'Abdullah 'Azzam, Bin Laden, and al-Qa'ida?Less

The Leadership Inspires a New Strategy

Michael W. S. Ryan

in Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America

This chapter describes the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, with a focus on the development of a post-9/11 strategy, by examining al-Zawahiri's brief strategic template, ... More

This chapter describes the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, with a focus on the development of a post-9/11 strategy, by examining al-Zawahiri's brief strategic template, which he offers in his post-9/11 book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner. Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda, the first organization dedicated to global jihad, in 1988, with the help of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Together they began a series of bombings in U.S. embassies, which eventually culminated in the 9/11 attack. The success of al-Qaeda efforts can be attributed to the organization's ideology and strategy. They believe they could defeat the U.S. using the same strategy they have used in defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The first task in their strategy was to convince their own members and allies that the United States was not all-powerful and impossible to defeat.Less

Ayman al-Zawahiri and the rise of ISIL

Donald Holbrook

in Jihadism Transformed: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Global Battle of Ideas

This chapter analyses statements released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the context of MENA uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State organization. The chapter traces Zawahiri’s aggregate narrative ... More

This chapter analyses statements released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the context of MENA uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State organization. The chapter traces Zawahiri’s aggregate narrative during this period, discussing how the Al-Qaeda leader framed these key events and how these framing efforts evolved. This discussion highlights issues regarding legitimate leadership of jihadist vanguards, the role of public opinion in that equation and the way in which al-Zawahiri has sought to exploit and address those challenges in his efforts to retain momentum and relevancy within a complex jihadi universe. The chapter concludes by considering the particulars of al-Zawahiri’s most recent discursive emphases in light of his public rhetoric to date in order to highlight the evolution and, at times, contradictions of this narrative.Less

Jihad and Al‐Qaeda's Just Cause

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman ... More

This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al‐Zawahiri, consistently maintain that aggression is both wrong and illegal, and that in using violence al‐Qaeda is merely repelling America's attacks. However, since the United States had launched no invasion of bin Laden's country before 11 September, be it Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Afghanistan, it was incumbent upon him to redefine the concept of ‘aggression’. This attempt was contested a series of Muslim leaders who described al‐Qaeda as the belligerent party on 9/11.Less

Jus in Bello, Suicide Bombing, and Killing Civilians

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This ... More

In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This chapter explores issues raised by al‐Qaeda's conduct during its war against the United States in the light of Islamic ideas about jus in bello. The first section of this chapter briefly introduces the jus in bello tradition in Islam. The second section discusses the legitimacy of suicide attacks and the place of martyrdom in the Islamic tradition. The final section examines bin Laden's attempts to overturn the robust Islamic protections for civilians in war. Bin Laden himself subscribes to the principle of non‐combatant immunity and employs it in levelling virulent criticism against the US's policies—yet his acceptance of the principle leads him into an unclear and uncomfortable moral position with regard to al‐Qaeda's attacks.Less

Jus Ad Bellum in Al Qaeda's Jihad

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. ... More

This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. In setting out al‐Qaeda's case for war, bin Laden does not depend solely on faith‐based statements about good versus evil. Instead, he offers a series of sometimes intricate arguments that connect with the jihad tradition and endeavour to present al‐Qaeda's cause as authorized, necessary, and practical. Despite his best efforts, however, the legacy of bin Laden's case for the resort to war is that of innovation.Less

Support for Islam Document: August 2012 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

In this short, but important document, published during Ramadan in 2012 (1433 according to the Islamic calendar), Zawahiri identifies four key issues that are wrong with the current international ... More

In this short, but important document, published during Ramadan in 2012 (1433 according to the Islamic calendar), Zawahiri identifies four key issues that are wrong with the current international order (the five permanent members of the Security Council, rule by majority, the legitimization of usurped land, and subjugation of Muslims) and presents a seven-part pathway to upturning this order, around which he urges coreligionists to unify. The document is an opportunity to reiterate the relevance of Al-Qaeda in a rapidly changing world, both locally and globallyLess

Emancipation from the Cycle of Failure and Frivolity: February 2014 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

This publication is typical of Zawahiri’s ‘big films’. Like a contemporary Hollywood blockbuster, it is repetitive and overlong. Yet it comes at an important time in the aftermath of the toppling of ... More

This publication is typical of Zawahiri’s ‘big films’. Like a contemporary Hollywood blockbuster, it is repetitive and overlong. Yet it comes at an important time in the aftermath of the toppling of Mohammed Morsi as the Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt. Here, therefore, Zawahiri moves on from his focus on reshaping or reframing the Arab Spring according to his framework and agenda to dissecting the reasons for its failure. He presents Chechnya as an example for Arabs to follow, whereby the enclave persevered in protracted conflict against the Russian state. Zawahiri seeks to construct an uninterrupted rhetorical thread where the current struggle of believers echoes that of the first generation of Muslims, including the venerated battles they fought and won during the formative years of Islam. He uses the aftermath of the Arab Spring to re-illustrate the fallacy of the democratic method, reiterating his demand that Sharia becomes that which governs the affairs of men, as oppose to that which is governed by man. He speaks about the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt, warning its leadership against shoring up secular authoritarianism, whilst noting his desire to avoid direct confrontation with normal members of that faith community.Less

The Seventh Interview with Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri Reality Between Pain and Hope: May 2014 Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Sahab

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

This is the seventh ‘interview’ between Al-Sahab, Al-Qaeda’s media production department, and Zawahiri, a tradition which started in 2005. This format gives Zawahiri the opportunity to discuss a wide ... More

This is the seventh ‘interview’ between Al-Sahab, Al-Qaeda’s media production department, and Zawahiri, a tradition which started in 2005. This format gives Zawahiri the opportunity to discuss a wide variety of matters in great detail, whilst giving the impression that critical issues have been addressed and approached from different viewpoints. This is the first significant statement about infighting among jihadis in Syria and whilst Zawahiri seems keen to blame the turmoil on ‘external’ factors such as criminality or alleged infiltration by the Assad regime, two key historical analogies that subsequently became prominent in his denunciation of this ‘fitna’ [sedition/strife] emerge. These are comparisons with the fate of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) that fought in the civil war in Algeria and became widely condemned as a jihadi outcast and the infighting that spread throughout Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal in 1989.Less

The ‘Islamic State’ and al-Qaeda

Nelly Lahoud

in Jihadism Transformed: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Global Battle of Ideas

The Iraq-based group that was once led by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and called “Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad” is the only regional jihadi group that was brought under Al-Qaeda’s fold by Osama bin Laden. ... More

The Iraq-based group that was once led by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and called “Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad” is the only regional jihadi group that was brought under Al-Qaeda’s fold by Osama bin Laden. Judging by primary sources internal to AQ, bin Laden and other AQ leaders lived to regret that decision. The same group, which now calls itself the Islamic State, has over the years changed its name to reflect its gradual and ultimate separation from Al-Qaeda. Much like a trying relationship between a parent and a rebellious adolescent, the group’s years under Al-Qaeda were difficult on both. This chapter examines the evolution of the Islamic State in relation to AQ, its claim to statehood since 2006, and the growing ideological divide that separates it from AQ.Less

Epilogue

James Toth

in Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual

Chapter twelve examines Qutb’s recent impact. Islamic activists used his writings to promote a campaign which today is called terrorism. This is documented in the movement’s emergence in southern ... More

Chapter twelve examines Qutb’s recent impact. Islamic activists used his writings to promote a campaign which today is called terrorism. This is documented in the movement’s emergence in southern Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s and its transformation from small charity groups into the violence of al-Jihad and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. These two exhibited important tactical and organizational distinctions that together contrasted considerably with the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Yet by the 1990s, the government had soundly defeated these militants. Many were jailed indefinitely while others escaped abroad. In the 1990s, the imprisoned leaders renounced violence and published the four-volume Revised Concepts. Those committed to violence moved to Afghanistan and under the leadership of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri created al-Qa’ida. Yet it is significant that even after the turn of the century, the milder Muslim Brothers continued to be accused of promoting Qutbism. The 2011 uprising did not dispel this suspicion; if anything, the rise of legitimate religious political parties streamlined the Brotherhood and purified its ranks.Less

Testimony to Preserve the Blood of the Mujahidin in Al-Sham²²: May 2014 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

Here Zawahiri addresses the turmoil and infighting in Syria more directly, emphasizing that ISIS is subordinate to his organization. He traces the origin of the Islamic State of Iraq, highlighting ... More

Here Zawahiri addresses the turmoil and infighting in Syria more directly, emphasizing that ISIS is subordinate to his organization. He traces the origin of the Islamic State of Iraq, highlighting the fact that whilst that group at also operated in objectionable ways, it still pledged allegiance to bin Ladin. Zawahiri claims to have inherited this fealty. He details correspondence between the two organizations at the outbreak of civil war in Syria that he seeks to use to demonstrate his overall control. He accuses Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of being driven predominantly by power, thus preparing the ground for more direct public denunciation of the ISIS leadershipLess

The Noble Knight Dismounted: May 2011 Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s first statement as leader of Al-Qaeda. Issued weeks after Osama bin Ladin was killed by US special forces in his Abbottabad compound in north-east Pakistan, Zawahiri seeks to ... More

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s first statement as leader of Al-Qaeda. Issued weeks after Osama bin Ladin was killed by US special forces in his Abbottabad compound in north-east Pakistan, Zawahiri seeks to combine his eulogy of the fallen leader—heavily reliant on poetry—with his vision regarding the challenges the ummah [nation or community] is facing and how to address them. He reiterates bin Ladin’s ‘oath’, promising to inflict casualties on the oppressors as long as they make the Muslims suffer. Reflecting on bin Ladin’s objectives, he argues that the late leader had been successful in rousing the ummah, which he claims was his principal goal.Less

General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad: September 2013 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

In addition to the ‘Support for Islam’ document, Zawahiri frequently referred to his ‘General Guidelines’ on subsequent occasions as key texts defining the way in which he sought—via Al-Qaeda—to ... More

In addition to the ‘Support for Islam’ document, Zawahiri frequently referred to his ‘General Guidelines’ on subsequent occasions as key texts defining the way in which he sought—via Al-Qaeda—to chart a sustainable and ultimately successful course for Islamist militancy worldwide. In his Guidelines, Zawahiri sets out his strategic and tactical priorities, emphasizing the need to target America as ‘the head of unbelief’. The main focus of the document is to rein in fighters who were seen to have engaged in excessive violence, avoiding the reputational hazards such targeting would incur. The document is thus interesting not only in relation to Al-Qaeda’s immediate prehistory at this point, where allies and affiliates had carried out mass-scale attacks against civilians that ultimately undermined Al-Qaeda, but also of course in relation to what came after: where the sectarian bloodshed inflicted by ISIS/IS became a major theme in Zawahiri’s attempts to delegitimize that group. Zawahiri referred to his Guidelines on many subsequent occasions, pointing out that had it been heeded more widely the turmoil and infighting between groups in Syria and beyond could have been avoided.Less

Scent of Paradise A Study on the Most Honourable Sacrifices of Worshippers; Death and Martyrdom Campaigns: November 2013 By Ayman al-Zawahiri Second Edition

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

Here we have an introduction to a book which Zawahiri published initially in 2004 on the topic of martyrdom and martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide attacks) in particular. Written initially in the ... More

Here we have an introduction to a book which Zawahiri published initially in 2004 on the topic of martyrdom and martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide attacks) in particular. Written initially in the aftermath of the 9/11 suicide-hijackings, Zawahiri began his first edition with references to the asymmetric qualities of martyrdom operations, that rendered the material prowess of the West—acquired through treachery—meaningless. He condemned those who spoke against that tactic, warning against the consequences such criticism would have for the Muslim nation. Nine years later, Zawahiri’s second edition of his book comes at a time when martyrdom operations and the excessive casualties they inflict had become something of a liability. In this edition, therefore, Zawahiri warns against ‘deviation’ and ‘exaggeration’ in the application of the tactic, arguing that some have not respected the parameters defined by proper reading of scripture. The two introductions, therefore, shed interesting light on ongoing debates about the boundaries of legitimate and sustainable militancy from the perspective of public opinion, which is a recurring theme in this discourse.Less

The Islamic Spring, Part 5: September 2015 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

In the fifth episode of the ‘Islamic Spring’ series Zawahiri continues to explore the conditions necessary to establish a Caliphate. In doing so he seeks to undermine the appeal of IS’s leadership by ... More

In the fifth episode of the ‘Islamic Spring’ series Zawahiri continues to explore the conditions necessary to establish a Caliphate. In doing so he seeks to undermine the appeal of IS’s leadership by lauding Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which IS recognizes as its forefather, and other leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq, whom Zawahiri had of course criticized in the past. He demonstrates their apparent loyalty towards the Al-Qaeda leadership (represented, of course, at that time by bin Ladin), whilst reiterating his vision for the creation of a Caliphate through solidifying existing ‘emirates’ in Afghanistan and the Caucasus, that are loyal to Al-Qaeda.Less

Let us unite to Liberate Al-Quds [Jerusalem]: November 2015 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

In times of crisis and turmoil, Zawahiri revisits a traditional rallying call to make the case for Al-Qaeda’s continued relevance: the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem. This process, he argues, will have ... More

In times of crisis and turmoil, Zawahiri revisits a traditional rallying call to make the case for Al-Qaeda’s continued relevance: the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem. This process, he argues, will have two components; the first would be to target the West, especially in the United States and their interests across the world as it is this support that is key to Israel’s survival. The second component is the establishment of an Islamic state, centered in Egypt and the Levant to create powerful staging posts to conquer Palestine. The purpose, of course, is to remind audiences that the major jihadi objectives remain unfulfilled and have become side-tracked due to the infighting in Syria.Less

March Forth to Sham [Syria]!: May 2016 By Ayman al-Zawahiri

Cerwyn Moore

Donald Holbrook (ed.)

in Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader

Zawahiri has noted that he did not want Al-Qaeda’s presence on the ground in Syria to become known, as this would distract from the goal of toppling the Assad regime and serve as a propaganda victory ... More

Zawahiri has noted that he did not want Al-Qaeda’s presence on the ground in Syria to become known, as this would distract from the goal of toppling the Assad regime and serve as a propaganda victory for local Shia forces seeking to present the conflict in a more international light. This was part of his publicly articulated frustration with al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the ISIS, initially as a merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, which Zawahiri rejected. In this statement, Zawahiri insists that he does not desire material or political power, in Syria and elsewhere. This goes back to his previous conceptualizations of Al-Qaeda as a ‘mode’, message and mission, which he presented as bin Ladin’s legacy and ultimately his own legacy too. If the people of Syria and its mujahidin fighters came to an agreement regarding their Islamic leadership that would end the infighting, Zawahiri insisted, he would be happy to offer the consensus his backing. At the same time he continues to present IS and al-Baghdadi as illegitimate, praising instead the Nusra Front. The latter declared its independence from Al-Qaeda, with Zawahiri’s acquiescence, in July 2016, potentially giving it more freedom to maneuver within Syria and garner local support.Less