Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sørli (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ...
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This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete “doyen of ordinary language philosophy”, the contributors show how Austin’s work can be brought to bear on issues that are on the top of today’s philosophical agenda, such as scepticism and contextualism, the epistemology of testimony, the generality of the conceptual, the viability of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, and issues in philosophical methodology. The connections made between Austin’s philosophy and current debates provide new interpretations of his views and aim to demonstrate that his work deserves a more central place in mainstream philosophical discussion than it currently has. The collection also contains a substantial introduction that situates Austin’s thought in its original intellectual milieu and provides an overview of the many different ways in which his ideas have influenced later developments, in philosophy and elsewhere. Contributors are Avner Baz, Simon Glendinning, Martin Gustafsson, Mark Kaplan, Adam Leite, Benjamin McMyler, Jean-Philippe Narboux, and Charles Travis.Less
This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete “doyen of ordinary language philosophy”, the contributors show how Austin’s work can be brought to bear on issues that are on the top of today’s philosophical agenda, such as scepticism and contextualism, the epistemology of testimony, the generality of the conceptual, the viability of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, and issues in philosophical methodology. The connections made between Austin’s philosophy and current debates provide new interpretations of his views and aim to demonstrate that his work deserves a more central place in mainstream philosophical discussion than it currently has. The collection also contains a substantial introduction that situates Austin’s thought in its original intellectual milieu and provides an overview of the many different ways in which his ideas have influenced later developments, in philosophy and elsewhere. Contributors are Avner Baz, Simon Glendinning, Martin Gustafsson, Mark Kaplan, Adam Leite, Benjamin McMyler, Jean-Philippe Narboux, and Charles Travis.
Martin Gustafsson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates ...
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This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates Austin’s philosophy in its original intellectual milieu, focusing in particular on the significance of his immediate predecessors, G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard. It then looks at the various ways in which Austin’s ideas have been appropriated by speech act theorists (via Grice and Searle), by performativity theorists (via Derrida and Butler), in discussions of pornography and free speech (via Hornsby and Langton), and by others such as Quentin Skinner, H. L. A. Hart, Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and Mark Kaplan. Finally it provides an overview of the remaining chapters of the book.Less
This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates Austin’s philosophy in its original intellectual milieu, focusing in particular on the significance of his immediate predecessors, G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard. It then looks at the various ways in which Austin’s ideas have been appropriated by speech act theorists (via Grice and Searle), by performativity theorists (via Derrida and Butler), in discussions of pornography and free speech (via Hornsby and Langton), and by others such as Quentin Skinner, H. L. A. Hart, Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and Mark Kaplan. Finally it provides an overview of the remaining chapters of the book.
Jean-Philippe Narboux
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The question as to whether our words, as used in a given ordinary situation, satisfactorily engage with that situation or have some meaningful grip on it, has been construed, classically, as a ...
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The question as to whether our words, as used in a given ordinary situation, satisfactorily engage with that situation or have some meaningful grip on it, has been construed, classically, as a yes‐or‐no question. This chapter argues that Austin’s philosophy contains a systematic attack on the idea that the ‘harmony’ between words and world is an all‐or‐nothing matter conditioning the very possibility of assessment as such and therefore not itself subject to assessment. To the extent that they construe ‘aboutness’ as a relation that either obtains or not, modern notions of the intentionality of language and thought, and of the distinction between sense and nonsense, have their roots into the ‘harmony fallacy’ criticized by Austin.Less
The question as to whether our words, as used in a given ordinary situation, satisfactorily engage with that situation or have some meaningful grip on it, has been construed, classically, as a yes‐or‐no question. This chapter argues that Austin’s philosophy contains a systematic attack on the idea that the ‘harmony’ between words and world is an all‐or‐nothing matter conditioning the very possibility of assessment as such and therefore not itself subject to assessment. To the extent that they construe ‘aboutness’ as a relation that either obtains or not, modern notions of the intentionality of language and thought, and of the distinction between sense and nonsense, have their roots into the ‘harmony fallacy’ criticized by Austin.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical ...
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The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.Less
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.
Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.
Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.
Simon Glendinning
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This essay is concerned with the relationship between J. L. Austin’s work in linguistic phenomenology and the philosophical tradition which comes into view in that work. Two features of this ...
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This essay is concerned with the relationship between J. L. Austin’s work in linguistic phenomenology and the philosophical tradition which comes into view in that work. Two features of this relationship are highlighted. First, in contrast to Stanley Cavell’s interpretation of Austin’s work as calling into question the authenticity of particular philosophers, it is argued that the texts Austin selects are ones that he judges to be particularly representative of traditional philosophy. Second, in contrast to Jonathan Bennett’s interpretation of Austin’s work as almost irrelevant to traditional concerns, it is argued that Austin deliberately avoids situating his own work squarely within the problematic field explored in the texts he selects. This mode of engagement—this avoidance of the traditional field of engagement—is described as the ‘Disengagement Strategy’, and it is shown that it characterizes a typically Austinian approach to philosophical criticism.Less
This essay is concerned with the relationship between J. L. Austin’s work in linguistic phenomenology and the philosophical tradition which comes into view in that work. Two features of this relationship are highlighted. First, in contrast to Stanley Cavell’s interpretation of Austin’s work as calling into question the authenticity of particular philosophers, it is argued that the texts Austin selects are ones that he judges to be particularly representative of traditional philosophy. Second, in contrast to Jonathan Bennett’s interpretation of Austin’s work as almost irrelevant to traditional concerns, it is argued that Austin deliberately avoids situating his own work squarely within the problematic field explored in the texts he selects. This mode of engagement—this avoidance of the traditional field of engagement—is described as the ‘Disengagement Strategy’, and it is shown that it characterizes a typically Austinian approach to philosophical criticism.
Benjamin McMyler
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Inspired by Austin’s ‘Other Minds’, this paper argues that what is said by means of ‘indicative’ sentences featuring ‘know that’ or one of its cognates is inseparable from what is done with them. As ...
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Inspired by Austin’s ‘Other Minds’, this paper argues that what is said by means of ‘indicative’ sentences featuring ‘know that’ or one of its cognates is inseparable from what is done with them. As opposed to contemporary contextualists who also draw their inspiration from Austin and who argue that the truth conditions (and value) of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context in which they are made, however, this paper argues that in a central range of contexts in which knowledge ascriptions are made the question of their truth and falsity is out of place. In another central range of contexts the question does naturally arise, but in a form that does not fit common contextualist accounts. Forcing the question of truth and falsity unnaturally and from a purely theoretical position, the paper concludes, has prevented both contextualism and invariantism from coming up with a truly satisfying response to traditional scepticism.Less
Inspired by Austin’s ‘Other Minds’, this paper argues that what is said by means of ‘indicative’ sentences featuring ‘know that’ or one of its cognates is inseparable from what is done with them. As opposed to contemporary contextualists who also draw their inspiration from Austin and who argue that the truth conditions (and value) of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context in which they are made, however, this paper argues that in a central range of contexts in which knowledge ascriptions are made the question of their truth and falsity is out of place. In another central range of contexts the question does naturally arise, but in a form that does not fit common contextualist accounts. Forcing the question of truth and falsity unnaturally and from a purely theoretical position, the paper concludes, has prevented both contextualism and invariantism from coming up with a truly satisfying response to traditional scepticism.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230334
- eISBN:
- 9780191710605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter explores the views of John Cook Wilson, J. L. Austin, and John McDowell. Some stances aim at the world: if all goes well, stance and world match. Some stances contain the world: for one ...
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This chapter explores the views of John Cook Wilson, J. L. Austin, and John McDowell. Some stances aim at the world: if all goes well, stance and world match. Some stances contain the world: for one to have that stance towards something is for that thing to be so (or there). Some of these simply contain their object: taking them is not aiming at their object (which then, happily, is there to hit). John Cook Wilson saw knowledge as a stance of this last sort. John McDowell showed why knowledge needs to be like that. But it was J. L. Austin who made the idea viable. He did it by showing how a sense of occasion is required for proper ascription of epistemic notions.Less
This chapter explores the views of John Cook Wilson, J. L. Austin, and John McDowell. Some stances aim at the world: if all goes well, stance and world match. Some stances contain the world: for one to have that stance towards something is for that thing to be so (or there). Some of these simply contain their object: taking them is not aiming at their object (which then, happily, is there to hit). John Cook Wilson saw knowledge as a stance of this last sort. John McDowell showed why knowledge needs to be like that. But it was J. L. Austin who made the idea viable. He did it by showing how a sense of occasion is required for proper ascription of epistemic notions.
Adam Leite
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Austin maintained that standard waking experience is phenomenologically distinguishable from dreaming. In unpublished lectures delivered at UC Berkeley (one source for Sense and Sensibilia), Austin ...
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Austin maintained that standard waking experience is phenomenologically distinguishable from dreaming. In unpublished lectures delivered at UC Berkeley (one source for Sense and Sensibilia), Austin supported this claim by citing contingent, empirical facts about dreams. This chapter argues that if these factual claims and Austin’s broader epistemological framework are correct, then Austin provides a compelling empirical response to external world scepticism. Given Austin’s account of epistemic reasons and epistemic priority requirements, there is nothing problematic about making use of empirical background knowledge about dreams in the course of determining that we are awake. It might be thought that familiar sceptical arguments would undercut Austin’s position. However, using Barry Stroud’s reconstruction of Descartes’s dream argument as a stalking horse, this chapter argues that if Austin’s factual claims about dreams and his broader epistemological framework are correct, then the dream argument for external world scepticism—and, by extension, several other prominent sceptical arguments—won’t even get off the ground. Any compelling sceptical argument will be an empirical matter.Less
Austin maintained that standard waking experience is phenomenologically distinguishable from dreaming. In unpublished lectures delivered at UC Berkeley (one source for Sense and Sensibilia), Austin supported this claim by citing contingent, empirical facts about dreams. This chapter argues that if these factual claims and Austin’s broader epistemological framework are correct, then Austin provides a compelling empirical response to external world scepticism. Given Austin’s account of epistemic reasons and epistemic priority requirements, there is nothing problematic about making use of empirical background knowledge about dreams in the course of determining that we are awake. It might be thought that familiar sceptical arguments would undercut Austin’s position. However, using Barry Stroud’s reconstruction of Descartes’s dream argument as a stalking horse, this chapter argues that if Austin’s factual claims about dreams and his broader epistemological framework are correct, then the dream argument for external world scepticism—and, by extension, several other prominent sceptical arguments—won’t even get off the ground. Any compelling sceptical argument will be an empirical matter.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative ...
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Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.Less
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.
Mark Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Suppose you want to question my claim to know that the bird in my garden is a goldfinch. Austin held that you cannot legitimately demand that I do more than ‘enough to show that (within reason, and ...
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Suppose you want to question my claim to know that the bird in my garden is a goldfinch. Austin held that you cannot legitimately demand that I do more than ‘enough to show that (within reason, and for the present intents and purposes) it “can’t” be anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing, description of it’, where it is understood that ‘[e]nough is enough […]. It does not mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch’. But why not? This chapter argues that (i) the standard answers are not available to Austin, (ii) Austin’s writings and methods (including his characteristic way of arguing for philosophical conclusions via appeal to what we would say when) make available a different and novel diagnosis of what goes wrong with scepticism based on arguments from ignorance, and (iii) these methods—comprising Austin’s ‘ordinary language philosophy‘—have been misunderstood, and their power underestimated.Less
Suppose you want to question my claim to know that the bird in my garden is a goldfinch. Austin held that you cannot legitimately demand that I do more than ‘enough to show that (within reason, and for the present intents and purposes) it “can’t” be anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing, description of it’, where it is understood that ‘[e]nough is enough […]. It does not mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch’. But why not? This chapter argues that (i) the standard answers are not available to Austin, (ii) Austin’s writings and methods (including his characteristic way of arguing for philosophical conclusions via appeal to what we would say when) make available a different and novel diagnosis of what goes wrong with scepticism based on arguments from ignorance, and (iii) these methods—comprising Austin’s ‘ordinary language philosophy‘—have been misunderstood, and their power underestimated.
Avner Baz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues that one cannot understand Austin’s response to the philosophical problem of other minds without appreciating the centrality to this response of issues concerning the epistemology ...
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This chapter argues that one cannot understand Austin’s response to the philosophical problem of other minds without appreciating the centrality to this response of issues concerning the epistemology of testimony, of issues concerning the way in which we acquire knowledge and justification from the word of others. Austin argues that a speaker’s avowals of her own conscious psychological states are speech acts that can serve both to express these states and to provide an audience with a distinctive testimonial reason for believing that the speaker is in these states. He thus takes the philosophical problem of other minds to be motivated in large part by general worries about believing and trusting others, by an inability or unwillingness to believe others and to trust them for the truth about themselves.Less
This chapter argues that one cannot understand Austin’s response to the philosophical problem of other minds without appreciating the centrality to this response of issues concerning the epistemology of testimony, of issues concerning the way in which we acquire knowledge and justification from the word of others. Austin argues that a speaker’s avowals of her own conscious psychological states are speech acts that can serve both to express these states and to provide an audience with a distinctive testimonial reason for believing that the speaker is in these states. He thus takes the philosophical problem of other minds to be motivated in large part by general worries about believing and trusting others, by an inability or unwillingness to believe others and to trust them for the truth about themselves.
Maura Tumulty and Colgate University
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199855469
- eISBN:
- 9780199932788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that in some cultural contexts, women are not able to perform the illocutionary act of refusing sex by saying “No.” They argue that this illocutionary ...
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Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that in some cultural contexts, women are not able to perform the illocutionary act of refusing sex by saying “No.” They argue that this illocutionary disablement is a kind of silencing. The silencing happens because men sometimes do not hear “No” as a refusal of sex, and hence sometimes a woman who utters “No” cannot achieve uptake of her intended illocution. Hornsby and Langton follow J. L. Austin in taking uptake to be necessary to illocution. But this view of Austin's is controversial and has recently been criticized by Alexander Bird. I argue that while uptake isn’t necessary to every illocutionary act, a speaker's beliefs about the possibility of uptake play a key role in some kinds of illocutionary acts. Because refusal is an illocutionary act of such a kind, women can be silenced in contexts where they believe their refusals won’t be heard as refusals. We are therefore still able to acknowledge loss of expressive power as a harm women sometimes suffer.Less
Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that in some cultural contexts, women are not able to perform the illocutionary act of refusing sex by saying “No.” They argue that this illocutionary disablement is a kind of silencing. The silencing happens because men sometimes do not hear “No” as a refusal of sex, and hence sometimes a woman who utters “No” cannot achieve uptake of her intended illocution. Hornsby and Langton follow J. L. Austin in taking uptake to be necessary to illocution. But this view of Austin's is controversial and has recently been criticized by Alexander Bird. I argue that while uptake isn’t necessary to every illocutionary act, a speaker's beliefs about the possibility of uptake play a key role in some kinds of illocutionary acts. Because refusal is an illocutionary act of such a kind, women can be silenced in contexts where they believe their refusals won’t be heard as refusals. We are therefore still able to acknowledge loss of expressive power as a harm women sometimes suffer.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 2 focuses on the challenge to the sceptical reasoning that what Descartes says is a requirement for everyday knowledge of the world – and would destroy all everyday knowledge of the world if ...
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Chapter 2 focuses on the challenge to the sceptical reasoning that what Descartes says is a requirement for everyday knowledge of the world – and would destroy all everyday knowledge of the world if it were a genuine requirement because it cannot be fulfilled – is in fact no such requirement at all.A particularly persuasive and influential version of that line of criticism is found in the work of J. L. Austin, who in his paper ‘Other Minds’ tries to show how the traditional philosophical investigation of knowledge significantly deviates from our normal practices. Austin observes that in our ordinary assessments of claims to knowledge we always presuppose a specific doubt about some specific knowledge claim, and he insists that a specific doubt about a specific knowledge claim can only be raised if there is some reason to think that a specific possibility that would undermine that knowledge claim actually obtains; if so, it would seem that there is no room for doubts about knowledge claims that rest on purely abstract considerations about possiblities that might obtain, or cannot be excluded, and therefore no room for a completely general scepticism of the kind Descartes envisions.Drawing a distinction between conditions of assertion and conditions of truth, Stroud argues that even if we grant the point Austin makes about our ordinary assessments of knowledge it still does not follow that Descartes deviates in his reasoning from our everyday standards and procedures and changes or distorts the meaning of the word ‘know’. The requirement that there must be some ‘special reason’ for thinking a certain possibility might obtain should be seen as a requirement on the appropriate or reasonable assertion of knowledge, but not necessarily as a requirement on knowledge itself; and if the possibility that one is dreaming is a possibility that one must know not to obtain if one is to know something about the world, as the sceptic can plausibly insist it is, then one will simply not know that thing about the world if one has not been able to eliminate that possibility – even though it might be completely inappropriate or unreasonable on particular occasions in everyday life to insist on ruling out that possibility before saying that one knows.Less
Chapter 2 focuses on the challenge to the sceptical reasoning that what Descartes says is a requirement for everyday knowledge of the world – and would destroy all everyday knowledge of the world if it were a genuine requirement because it cannot be fulfilled – is in fact no such requirement at all.
A particularly persuasive and influential version of that line of criticism is found in the work of J. L. Austin, who in his paper ‘Other Minds’ tries to show how the traditional philosophical investigation of knowledge significantly deviates from our normal practices. Austin observes that in our ordinary assessments of claims to knowledge we always presuppose a specific doubt about some specific knowledge claim, and he insists that a specific doubt about a specific knowledge claim can only be raised if there is some reason to think that a specific possibility that would undermine that knowledge claim actually obtains; if so, it would seem that there is no room for doubts about knowledge claims that rest on purely abstract considerations about possiblities that might obtain, or cannot be excluded, and therefore no room for a completely general scepticism of the kind Descartes envisions.
Drawing a distinction between conditions of assertion and conditions of truth, Stroud argues that even if we grant the point Austin makes about our ordinary assessments of knowledge it still does not follow that Descartes deviates in his reasoning from our everyday standards and procedures and changes or distorts the meaning of the word ‘know’. The requirement that there must be some ‘special reason’ for thinking a certain possibility might obtain should be seen as a requirement on the appropriate or reasonable assertion of knowledge, but not necessarily as a requirement on knowledge itself; and if the possibility that one is dreaming is a possibility that one must know not to obtain if one is to know something about the world, as the sceptic can plausibly insist it is, then one will simply not know that thing about the world if one has not been able to eliminate that possibility – even though it might be completely inappropriate or unreasonable on particular occasions in everyday life to insist on ruling out that possibility before saying that one knows.
Carla Bagnoli
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199289905
- eISBN:
- 9780191728471
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289905.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that Murdoch’s main and not yet fully acknowledged contribution to moral philosophy is to reclaim the concepts for exploring the activities of the mind, a topic that had become ...
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This chapter argues that Murdoch’s main and not yet fully acknowledged contribution to moral philosophy is to reclaim the concepts for exploring the activities of the mind, a topic that had become outcast with logical positivism. In contrast to current realist and particularist interpretations of Murdoch’s philosophy, Bagnoli argues that Murdoch’s project does not amount to a retrieval of metaphysics, but it requires a complex moral psychology. Murdoch shows that in order to explain the phenomena of moral change and progress, we need a conception of objectivity that recognizes the historicity and dynamicity of the moral life. According to Bagnoli, this account of objectivity does not presume the truth of moral realism, but it rather shows its inadequacy. The relevant progress that Murdoch underscores is from abstraction to concreteness in moral vision, and it requires that we focus on the constructive activity of the mind. While non-cognitivist and realist accounts of deliberation fail to acknowledge such essential constructive power of the mind, Murdoch offers the rudiments of a developmental account of agency.Less
This chapter argues that Murdoch’s main and not yet fully acknowledged contribution to moral philosophy is to reclaim the concepts for exploring the activities of the mind, a topic that had become outcast with logical positivism. In contrast to current realist and particularist interpretations of Murdoch’s philosophy, Bagnoli argues that Murdoch’s project does not amount to a retrieval of metaphysics, but it requires a complex moral psychology. Murdoch shows that in order to explain the phenomena of moral change and progress, we need a conception of objectivity that recognizes the historicity and dynamicity of the moral life. According to Bagnoli, this account of objectivity does not presume the truth of moral realism, but it rather shows its inadequacy. The relevant progress that Murdoch underscores is from abstraction to concreteness in moral vision, and it requires that we focus on the constructive activity of the mind. While non-cognitivist and realist accounts of deliberation fail to acknowledge such essential constructive power of the mind, Murdoch offers the rudiments of a developmental account of agency.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to ...
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This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to understand the generality that characterizes the conceptual. Frege thinks of it in terms of a function mapping objects onto truth‐values, such that once the function is determined it will not be left open how to apply it in a particular case. Austin rejects the very idea of such determinacy. For him, a concept does determine something, but what it determines leaves its application in particular cases negotiable. Still, he retains many of Frege’s central insights, such as the indefinability of truth, the shareability of content, and the notion of a fundamental distinction between the generality of the conceptual and particularity of the non‐conceptual. Frege’s and Austin’s views might even be fully reconcilable, given the different purposes for which they were proposed.Less
This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to understand the generality that characterizes the conceptual. Frege thinks of it in terms of a function mapping objects onto truth‐values, such that once the function is determined it will not be left open how to apply it in a particular case. Austin rejects the very idea of such determinacy. For him, a concept does determine something, but what it determines leaves its application in particular cases negotiable. Still, he retains many of Frege’s central insights, such as the indefinability of truth, the shareability of content, and the notion of a fundamental distinction between the generality of the conceptual and particularity of the non‐conceptual. Frege’s and Austin’s views might even be fully reconcilable, given the different purposes for which they were proposed.
Michèle Lowrie
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199545674
- eISBN:
- 9780191719950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545674.003.0003
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
The performance of Horace's Odes offers a test case for determining the interrelation between a poet's own self-definition and the actual reception of his poetry. Debate has raged in the 20th century ...
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The performance of Horace's Odes offers a test case for determining the interrelation between a poet's own self-definition and the actual reception of his poetry. Debate has raged in the 20th century over whether the language of song in this body of poetry is literal or metaphoric. Speech act theory starting with J. L. Austin offers a tool that helps understand the problematics of referentiality, but cannot in the end determine whether any particular utterance means what it says.Less
The performance of Horace's Odes offers a test case for determining the interrelation between a poet's own self-definition and the actual reception of his poetry. Debate has raged in the 20th century over whether the language of song in this body of poetry is literal or metaphoric. Speech act theory starting with J. L. Austin offers a tool that helps understand the problematics of referentiality, but cannot in the end determine whether any particular utterance means what it says.
J. Hillis Miller
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823225378
- eISBN:
- 9780823235391
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823225378.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The work of a master critic writing at the peak of his powers, this book draws on speech act theory, as it originated with J. L. Austin and was further developed by Paul de Man and ...
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The work of a master critic writing at the peak of his powers, this book draws on speech act theory, as it originated with J. L. Austin and was further developed by Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, to investigate the many dimensions of doing things with words in James's fiction. Three modes of speech act occur in James's novels. First, James's writing of his fictions is performative. He puts on paper words that have the power to raise in the reader the phantoms of imaginary persons. Second, James's writing does things with words that do other things in their turn, including conferring on the reader responsibility for further judgment and action: for example, teaching James's novels or writing about them. Finally, the narrators and characters in James's fictions utter speech acts that are forms of doing things with words—promises, declarations, excuses, denials, acts of bearing witness, lies, decisions publicly attested, and the like. The action of each work by James is brought about by its own idiosyncratic repertoire of speech acts. In careful readings of six major examples, The Aspern Papers, The Portrait of a Lady, The Awkward Age, The Wings of the Dove, The Golden Bowl, and The Sense of the Past, this book demonstrates the value of speech act theory for reading literature.Less
The work of a master critic writing at the peak of his powers, this book draws on speech act theory, as it originated with J. L. Austin and was further developed by Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, to investigate the many dimensions of doing things with words in James's fiction. Three modes of speech act occur in James's novels. First, James's writing of his fictions is performative. He puts on paper words that have the power to raise in the reader the phantoms of imaginary persons. Second, James's writing does things with words that do other things in their turn, including conferring on the reader responsibility for further judgment and action: for example, teaching James's novels or writing about them. Finally, the narrators and characters in James's fictions utter speech acts that are forms of doing things with words—promises, declarations, excuses, denials, acts of bearing witness, lies, decisions publicly attested, and the like. The action of each work by James is brought about by its own idiosyncratic repertoire of speech acts. In careful readings of six major examples, The Aspern Papers, The Portrait of a Lady, The Awkward Age, The Wings of the Dove, The Golden Bowl, and The Sense of the Past, this book demonstrates the value of speech act theory for reading literature.
W. H. Shearin
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780190202422
- eISBN:
- 9780190202446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190202422.003.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
After providing a brief survey of scholarship on Lucretius, this chapter suggests that a consideration of De rerum natura from the vantage point of speech act theory has the merit of mediating ...
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After providing a brief survey of scholarship on Lucretius, this chapter suggests that a consideration of De rerum natura from the vantage point of speech act theory has the merit of mediating between purely textual approaches to the poem and more cultural or historical ones. The chapter then considers a variety of linguistic evidence drawn from sources as diverse as Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius to study Epicurean concepts (known in Greek as prolepseis) and semantics. Reading this evidence alongside a number of modern philosophical and linguistic sources as well as Ciceronian evidence on Epicurean dialectic, I contend that it gives its best sense if it describes the rudiments of a theory of performative language, marking out in a detailed, technical way the ability of language to act as well as to describe.Less
After providing a brief survey of scholarship on Lucretius, this chapter suggests that a consideration of De rerum natura from the vantage point of speech act theory has the merit of mediating between purely textual approaches to the poem and more cultural or historical ones. The chapter then considers a variety of linguistic evidence drawn from sources as diverse as Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius to study Epicurean concepts (known in Greek as prolepseis) and semantics. Reading this evidence alongside a number of modern philosophical and linguistic sources as well as Ciceronian evidence on Epicurean dialectic, I contend that it gives its best sense if it describes the rudiments of a theory of performative language, marking out in a detailed, technical way the ability of language to act as well as to describe.
Sandra Laugier
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226470542
- eISBN:
- 9780226037554
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226037554.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a ...
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Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a unified, coherent, and inevitable advancement. This book questions this assumption, rethinking the very grounds that drove analytic philosophy to develop and uncovering its inherent tensions and confusions. Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it provides—and in doing so contributes to the philosophy of language and twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy as a whole.Less
Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a unified, coherent, and inevitable advancement. This book questions this assumption, rethinking the very grounds that drove analytic philosophy to develop and uncovering its inherent tensions and confusions. Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it provides—and in doing so contributes to the philosophy of language and twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy as a whole.
Andrew Norris
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190673949
- eISBN:
- 9780190673970
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190673949.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter evaluates Cavell’s reception of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy, showing it to be more critical than it has been understood to be. For Austin, the ordinary language philosopher ...
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This chapter evaluates Cavell’s reception of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy, showing it to be more critical than it has been understood to be. For Austin, the ordinary language philosopher speaks in the first-person plural to remind other philosophers of “what we say when” so as to correct the mistakes those philosophers have made in writing about ethics, epistemology, etc. But Austin cannot give a compelling explanation of why those other philosophers require such reminders: how can they have been wrong about their language and its implications, since they too are one of us who speak the language? On Cavell’s account, we forget what we say when—or, what comes to the same thing, fail to mean what we say—because we evade ourselves. Ordinary language philosophy does not correct mistakes but addresses the uncanny nature of the ordinary, that it is not yet what it is.Less
This chapter evaluates Cavell’s reception of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy, showing it to be more critical than it has been understood to be. For Austin, the ordinary language philosopher speaks in the first-person plural to remind other philosophers of “what we say when” so as to correct the mistakes those philosophers have made in writing about ethics, epistemology, etc. But Austin cannot give a compelling explanation of why those other philosophers require such reminders: how can they have been wrong about their language and its implications, since they too are one of us who speak the language? On Cavell’s account, we forget what we say when—or, what comes to the same thing, fail to mean what we say—because we evade ourselves. Ordinary language philosophy does not correct mistakes but addresses the uncanny nature of the ordinary, that it is not yet what it is.
