Jochen Prantl
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287680
- eISBN:
- 9780191603723
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287686.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the question of what triggered the emergence of informal groups of states in the form of the advisory committees in the 1950s, and argues that their establishment has to be seen ...
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This chapter examines the question of what triggered the emergence of informal groups of states in the form of the advisory committees in the 1950s, and argues that their establishment has to be seen against the background of great power tensions in the Security Council. The early stages of UN peacekeeping saw a shift of governance from the Security Council to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, which fostered the emergence of informal ad hoc groupings of states. The formation of advisory committees reflected the desire of the Secretary-General to strengthen his voice vis-á-vis the Security Council. When the lack of unanimity of the permanent members prevented the Council from assuming its responsibilities, the General Assembly took charge by recommending collective measures. However, when the Security Council was able to act, its resolutions and mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General often reflected a political compromise based on the lowest common denominator among its members. The workings of the two advisory committees established in the context of crises at the Suez Canal (1956-67) and in the Congo (1960-4) illustrate these points further.Less
This chapter examines the question of what triggered the emergence of informal groups of states in the form of the advisory committees in the 1950s, and argues that their establishment has to be seen against the background of great power tensions in the Security Council. The early stages of UN peacekeeping saw a shift of governance from the Security Council to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, which fostered the emergence of informal ad hoc groupings of states. The formation of advisory committees reflected the desire of the Secretary-General to strengthen his voice vis-á-vis the Security Council. When the lack of unanimity of the permanent members prevented the Council from assuming its responsibilities, the General Assembly took charge by recommending collective measures. However, when the Security Council was able to act, its resolutions and mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General often reflected a political compromise based on the lowest common denominator among its members. The workings of the two advisory committees established in the context of crises at the Suez Canal (1956-67) and in the Congo (1960-4) illustrate these points further.
Shane J. Maddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807833551
- eISBN:
- 9781469604220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807895849_maddock.8
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter traces Eisenhower's nonproliferation policy and the evolution of nuclear apartheid. It observes that the president had grown frustrated with his advisers' resistance to a nuclear test ...
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This chapter traces Eisenhower's nonproliferation policy and the evolution of nuclear apartheid. It observes that the president had grown frustrated with his advisers' resistance to a nuclear test ban and other nonproliferation measures. The chapter notes that many administration officials viewed the spread of nuclear weapons as inevitable, saw nuclear weapons as the only guarantor of U.S. security, and sought technological solutions for both national security and propaganda challenges. It observes further that Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal increased the risk of proliferation and that by 1956, multiple converging factors—ignorance of the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, Cold War suspicions, internal administrative disagreement, and presidential inefficacy—together subordinated nonproliferation to other American policy goals.Less
This chapter traces Eisenhower's nonproliferation policy and the evolution of nuclear apartheid. It observes that the president had grown frustrated with his advisers' resistance to a nuclear test ban and other nonproliferation measures. The chapter notes that many administration officials viewed the spread of nuclear weapons as inevitable, saw nuclear weapons as the only guarantor of U.S. security, and sought technological solutions for both national security and propaganda challenges. It observes further that Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal increased the risk of proliferation and that by 1956, multiple converging factors—ignorance of the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, Cold War suspicions, internal administrative disagreement, and presidential inefficacy—together subordinated nonproliferation to other American policy goals.
Sean F. Johnston
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692118
- eISBN:
- 9780191740732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692118.003.0006
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
Segregation in national laboratories, like a boarding school for a privileged child, protected and shaped early nuclear specialists. Their coming of age, though, was marked inevitably by public ...
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Segregation in national laboratories, like a boarding school for a privileged child, protected and shaped early nuclear specialists. Their coming of age, though, was marked inevitably by public events and hinted at the further loosening of control by their parent governments. The adolescence for this emerging profession was signalled by new opportunities and relationships. The lowering of nuclear secrecy during the mid-1950s rapidly opened up the field of nuclear engineering and promoted stable identities for its experts. Nuclear engineering conferences, journals, and professional societies were founded—leading to conflicts with existing professions. And the new expertise was for the first time taught in open university and college environments. All of these opportunities were sustained by their governments and institutions.Less
Segregation in national laboratories, like a boarding school for a privileged child, protected and shaped early nuclear specialists. Their coming of age, though, was marked inevitably by public events and hinted at the further loosening of control by their parent governments. The adolescence for this emerging profession was signalled by new opportunities and relationships. The lowering of nuclear secrecy during the mid-1950s rapidly opened up the field of nuclear engineering and promoted stable identities for its experts. Nuclear engineering conferences, journals, and professional societies were founded—leading to conflicts with existing professions. And the new expertise was for the first time taught in open university and college environments. All of these opportunities were sustained by their governments and institutions.
Ian Bellany
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719067969
- eISBN:
- 9781781701324
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719067969.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to ...
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The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to whether in particular instances the exigencies of the moment outweighed the force of the general principle. The starting point or the rough first draft for the U.S. policy of hostility towards the spread of nuclear weapons is the Baruch Plan, presented in 1946 to the newly created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the U.S. representative on the Commission, Bernard M. Baruch. The Baruch Plan aimed to harmonise an anticipated widespread international interest in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a new anti-proliferation initiative at the end of 1953 in the form of Atoms for Peace. This chapter discusses U.S. policy on non-proliferation and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, counter-proliferation and U.S. President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative.Less
The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to whether in particular instances the exigencies of the moment outweighed the force of the general principle. The starting point or the rough first draft for the U.S. policy of hostility towards the spread of nuclear weapons is the Baruch Plan, presented in 1946 to the newly created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the U.S. representative on the Commission, Bernard M. Baruch. The Baruch Plan aimed to harmonise an anticipated widespread international interest in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a new anti-proliferation initiative at the end of 1953 in the form of Atoms for Peace. This chapter discusses U.S. policy on non-proliferation and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, counter-proliferation and U.S. President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804758079
- eISBN:
- 9780804768467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804758079.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter concentrates on one great speech, “Atoms for Peace.” The so-called New Look in the U.S. approach to the world was determined by new economic, political, geopolitical, and military ...
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This chapter concentrates on one great speech, “Atoms for Peace.” The so-called New Look in the U.S. approach to the world was determined by new economic, political, geopolitical, and military realities, and was also the strategy and discourse of apocalypse management. Its policies would preserve the discourse of national insecurity, and its most conspicuous characteristic was nuclearization of military policy. To attain its strategic goals, the New Look depended on its linguistic promise of “massive retaliation.” It is noted that the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower was gearing up to its most famous image of cooperation—“Atoms for Peace”—while the New Look was being developed. The speech, which was born from the unforeseen conjunction of the New Look and Operation Candor, had to aim at evoking greater cold war fear at home while keeping that fear at a controlled level because it had came out of Operation Candor.Less
This chapter concentrates on one great speech, “Atoms for Peace.” The so-called New Look in the U.S. approach to the world was determined by new economic, political, geopolitical, and military realities, and was also the strategy and discourse of apocalypse management. Its policies would preserve the discourse of national insecurity, and its most conspicuous characteristic was nuclearization of military policy. To attain its strategic goals, the New Look depended on its linguistic promise of “massive retaliation.” It is noted that the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower was gearing up to its most famous image of cooperation—“Atoms for Peace”—while the New Look was being developed. The speech, which was born from the unforeseen conjunction of the New Look and Operation Candor, had to aim at evoking greater cold war fear at home while keeping that fear at a controlled level because it had came out of Operation Candor.
Harold A. Feiveson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027748
- eISBN:
- 9780262319188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027748.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
The 1953 U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative launched the dissemination of nuclear technologies to non-weapon states. It also led to the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency ...
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The 1953 U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative launched the dissemination of nuclear technologies to non-weapon states. It also led to the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970. The spread of nuclear power programs also has led to the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies which has given some non-weapon states the means of producing fissile material and thereby a “latent” proliferation capability, where a state could quickly produce nuclear weapons should it decide to do so. Even a small nuclear power program can provide a nuclear weapon breakout potential. The proliferation dangers associated with today’s dominant nuclear fuel cycle come from the fact that the uranium enrichment plants that produce low-enriched uranium for fuel could be rapidly converted to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons and that some countries reprocess spent fuel to recover plutonium, a weapons material, to recycle as fuel.Less
The 1953 U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative launched the dissemination of nuclear technologies to non-weapon states. It also led to the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970. The spread of nuclear power programs also has led to the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies which has given some non-weapon states the means of producing fissile material and thereby a “latent” proliferation capability, where a state could quickly produce nuclear weapons should it decide to do so. Even a small nuclear power program can provide a nuclear weapon breakout potential. The proliferation dangers associated with today’s dominant nuclear fuel cycle come from the fact that the uranium enrichment plants that produce low-enriched uranium for fuel could be rapidly converted to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons and that some countries reprocess spent fuel to recover plutonium, a weapons material, to recycle as fuel.
Ashok Kapur
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195667547
- eISBN:
- 9780199081790
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195667547.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Indian Politics
This chapter discusses the aspect of the diplomatic base of India's nuclear behaviour. It notes that Indian diplomacy holds high the importance of peace diplomacy, socio-economic development, and ...
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This chapter discusses the aspect of the diplomatic base of India's nuclear behaviour. It notes that Indian diplomacy holds high the importance of peace diplomacy, socio-economic development, and international negotiations. It then lists the primary fault lines between India and the West, before focusing on the challenge posed by post-war US disarmament strategy on Indian security. Next, this chapter considers India's interest in nuclear affairs and its early interest in the development of its own nuclear power capability. It also studies Nehru's thoughts on nuclear matters, the premise of the disarmament and nuclear policy of India, and India's atomic energy arrangements with Canada and the US. The Indian reactions after President Eisenhower summarized the ‘Atoms for Peace’ plan are also considered.Less
This chapter discusses the aspect of the diplomatic base of India's nuclear behaviour. It notes that Indian diplomacy holds high the importance of peace diplomacy, socio-economic development, and international negotiations. It then lists the primary fault lines between India and the West, before focusing on the challenge posed by post-war US disarmament strategy on Indian security. Next, this chapter considers India's interest in nuclear affairs and its early interest in the development of its own nuclear power capability. It also studies Nehru's thoughts on nuclear matters, the premise of the disarmament and nuclear policy of India, and India's atomic energy arrangements with Canada and the US. The Indian reactions after President Eisenhower summarized the ‘Atoms for Peace’ plan are also considered.
Daniel A. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- October 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199394012
- eISBN:
- 9780190274467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199394012.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century, Political History
By the mid-1950s, oil was clearly essential to US economic growth. Improvements to solar technology led to its inclusion in technical assistance regimes looking to encourage economic development in ...
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By the mid-1950s, oil was clearly essential to US economic growth. Improvements to solar technology led to its inclusion in technical assistance regimes looking to encourage economic development in the global south. A number of conferences and studies looked to solar house heating on these terms. There was even a memo proposing a World Solar Energy Project to address the failures of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program in 1952. Maria Telkes again played a major role, getting grants from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations that encouraged development of solar technologies, often with the intent of leaving the oil of these regions available for extraction by US corporations. By the end of the decade, numerous associations were forming—spearheaded by UNESCO and other international non-governmental organizations—to explore alternative trajectories for economic development that were reliant on renewable rather than extractive resources. A number of solar houses resulted from these discussions.Less
By the mid-1950s, oil was clearly essential to US economic growth. Improvements to solar technology led to its inclusion in technical assistance regimes looking to encourage economic development in the global south. A number of conferences and studies looked to solar house heating on these terms. There was even a memo proposing a World Solar Energy Project to address the failures of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program in 1952. Maria Telkes again played a major role, getting grants from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations that encouraged development of solar technologies, often with the intent of leaving the oil of these regions available for extraction by US corporations. By the end of the decade, numerous associations were forming—spearheaded by UNESCO and other international non-governmental organizations—to explore alternative trajectories for economic development that were reliant on renewable rather than extractive resources. A number of solar houses resulted from these discussions.
Matthew Fuhrmann
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801450907
- eISBN:
- 9780801465758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801450907.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines whether and how peaceful nuclear cooperation increases the likelihood that states will successfully build the bomb. Using qualitative historical analysis, it considers ten cases ...
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This chapter examines whether and how peaceful nuclear cooperation increases the likelihood that states will successfully build the bomb. Using qualitative historical analysis, it considers ten cases of nuclear weapons acquisition and another six cases where states did not build the bomb despite having an interest in developing nuclear weapons. The findings show that most of the states that built nuclear weapons after 1953, in the era of Atoms for Peace, benefited from atomic assistance, albeit to varying extents. Some countries used aid they received for peaceful purposes directly to enable bomb production, while others harnessed the knowledge base established as a result of assistance to build military facilities. These cases demonstrate that receiving large amounts of peaceful nuclear assistance does not necessarily translate to bomb acquisition.Less
This chapter examines whether and how peaceful nuclear cooperation increases the likelihood that states will successfully build the bomb. Using qualitative historical analysis, it considers ten cases of nuclear weapons acquisition and another six cases where states did not build the bomb despite having an interest in developing nuclear weapons. The findings show that most of the states that built nuclear weapons after 1953, in the era of Atoms for Peace, benefited from atomic assistance, albeit to varying extents. Some countries used aid they received for peaceful purposes directly to enable bomb production, while others harnessed the knowledge base established as a result of assistance to build military facilities. These cases demonstrate that receiving large amounts of peaceful nuclear assistance does not necessarily translate to bomb acquisition.
Gabrielle Hecht
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262515788
- eISBN:
- 9780262295710
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262515788.003.0004
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Technology and Society
This chapter deals with the superpower arms race and how it affected the technopolitics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries began to aim at becoming nuclear powers and gaining the ...
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This chapter deals with the superpower arms race and how it affected the technopolitics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries began to aim at becoming nuclear powers and gaining the knowledge to produce atomic bombs. During this time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the principal instruments of the technopolitics involving the Cold War– were formed;.the use of atomic energy for producing electricity was propounded at this time by President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” speech; India also stepped in to produce atomic power plants. The author maintains that apartheid in South Africa was a critical factor in the negotiations for the IAEA seat. South Africa is rich in uranium ore that is used in harnessing atomic energy and in nuclear technology. The presence of this source material was considered to be vital in gaining the IAEA seat, which was a post-colonial settlement.Less
This chapter deals with the superpower arms race and how it affected the technopolitics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries began to aim at becoming nuclear powers and gaining the knowledge to produce atomic bombs. During this time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the principal instruments of the technopolitics involving the Cold War– were formed;.the use of atomic energy for producing electricity was propounded at this time by President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” speech; India also stepped in to produce atomic power plants. The author maintains that apartheid in South Africa was a critical factor in the negotiations for the IAEA seat. South Africa is rich in uranium ore that is used in harnessing atomic energy and in nuclear technology. The presence of this source material was considered to be vital in gaining the IAEA seat, which was a post-colonial settlement.
Petra Goedde
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- February 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780195370836
- eISBN:
- 9780190936136
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195370836.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History, Political History
The last chapter examines the migration of a politics of peace from the margins to the centers of political power. As leading antinuclear and peace advocates became increasingly marginalized by the ...
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The last chapter examines the migration of a politics of peace from the margins to the centers of political power. As leading antinuclear and peace advocates became increasingly marginalized by the student and antiwar movements, their efforts were beginning to bear fruit in the arena of international politics. They were helped by a popular groundswell of sentiment that saw the arms race and the political ideology of nuclear deterrence as increasingly absurd. Absurdist writers, filmmakers, and philosophers of the 1950s and 1960s creatively underscored the absurdist nature of Cold War politics through works such as Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, Stanley Kubrick’s science fiction film Dr. Strangelove, and the fictional secret government Report from Iron Mountain. Together, they helped pave the way for political leaders, including Nixon in the United States, and Willy Brandt in West Germany, to develop a more pragmatic politics of peace.Less
The last chapter examines the migration of a politics of peace from the margins to the centers of political power. As leading antinuclear and peace advocates became increasingly marginalized by the student and antiwar movements, their efforts were beginning to bear fruit in the arena of international politics. They were helped by a popular groundswell of sentiment that saw the arms race and the political ideology of nuclear deterrence as increasingly absurd. Absurdist writers, filmmakers, and philosophers of the 1950s and 1960s creatively underscored the absurdist nature of Cold War politics through works such as Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, Stanley Kubrick’s science fiction film Dr. Strangelove, and the fictional secret government Report from Iron Mountain. Together, they helped pave the way for political leaders, including Nixon in the United States, and Willy Brandt in West Germany, to develop a more pragmatic politics of peace.
Helen Anne Curry
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226390086
- eISBN:
- 9780226390116
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226390116.003.0013
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter further elaborates on subjects introduced in the preceding chapter, considering in greater detail political aspects of mutation research at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In 1953, ...
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This chapter further elaborates on subjects introduced in the preceding chapter, considering in greater detail political aspects of mutation research at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In 1953, Brookhaven launched a formal cooperative research initiative that brought together its nuclear technologies and the expertise of agriculturalists stationed elsewhere explicitly to evaluate potential uses of radiation-induced mutation in plant breeding. This chapter suggests that the cooperative program and the ensuing renewed interest of Americans in mutation breeding are best understood as by-products of the large and growing technological system dedicated to U.S. atomic development. Within that system, the use of nuclear technologies in plant breeding satisfied multiple political needs. For one, it demonstrated the potential non-military benefits of atomic research and development, an outcome that became increasingly important as the U.S. government and Atomic Energy Commission pursued “Atoms for Peace” as an international program after 1953. In addition, successes in mutation breeding promised to counterbalance widespread concern about the harmful effects of atomic radiation and nuclear fallout on plants, animals, and especially humans. As awareness of the dangers of radiation exposure mounted in the postwar years, some plant breeders counter-claimed that radiation-induced mutation would prove beneficial, not least in improving important crops.Less
This chapter further elaborates on subjects introduced in the preceding chapter, considering in greater detail political aspects of mutation research at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In 1953, Brookhaven launched a formal cooperative research initiative that brought together its nuclear technologies and the expertise of agriculturalists stationed elsewhere explicitly to evaluate potential uses of radiation-induced mutation in plant breeding. This chapter suggests that the cooperative program and the ensuing renewed interest of Americans in mutation breeding are best understood as by-products of the large and growing technological system dedicated to U.S. atomic development. Within that system, the use of nuclear technologies in plant breeding satisfied multiple political needs. For one, it demonstrated the potential non-military benefits of atomic research and development, an outcome that became increasingly important as the U.S. government and Atomic Energy Commission pursued “Atoms for Peace” as an international program after 1953. In addition, successes in mutation breeding promised to counterbalance widespread concern about the harmful effects of atomic radiation and nuclear fallout on plants, animals, and especially humans. As awareness of the dangers of radiation exposure mounted in the postwar years, some plant breeders counter-claimed that radiation-induced mutation would prove beneficial, not least in improving important crops.
Scott Kaufman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451256
- eISBN:
- 9780801465833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451256.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This introductory chapter outlines how President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a more benign use for nuclear explosives, calling it Atoms for Peace. His proposal caught the attention of scientists at ...
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This introductory chapter outlines how President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a more benign use for nuclear explosives, calling it Atoms for Peace. His proposal caught the attention of scientists at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the University of California's Radiation Laboratory. Together, they developed a program called Project Plowshare. Those who support the program argue that “peaceful nuclear explosions,” or PNEs, could excavate harbors and canals, stimulate the production of gas and oil, provide storage facilities for water or fuel, help gain access to deeply buried ores, enhance power production, and generate new atomic elements and isotopes for general use. Plowshare survived as long as it did and received the funding it did despite intense, widespread opposition. In that respect, Project Plowshare is a story of the power of an idea—one advertised as innovative and beneficial to the United States, if not the world.Less
This introductory chapter outlines how President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a more benign use for nuclear explosives, calling it Atoms for Peace. His proposal caught the attention of scientists at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the University of California's Radiation Laboratory. Together, they developed a program called Project Plowshare. Those who support the program argue that “peaceful nuclear explosions,” or PNEs, could excavate harbors and canals, stimulate the production of gas and oil, provide storage facilities for water or fuel, help gain access to deeply buried ores, enhance power production, and generate new atomic elements and isotopes for general use. Plowshare survived as long as it did and received the funding it did despite intense, widespread opposition. In that respect, Project Plowshare is a story of the power of an idea—one advertised as innovative and beneficial to the United States, if not the world.
