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This chapter discusses investment liberalization among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It focuses on the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which came into effect on 29 March 2012, and the investment agreements of ASEAN with neighboring countries such as China, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. It argues that although ASEAN has had considerable success in obtaining agreement to the concept of investment liberalization within ASEAN, it has been less successful in implementing its agenda through regional agreements. The content of the ACIA and of ASEAN's regional agreements suggests that while it is possible to achieve some degree of investment liberalization within the jurisdiction of a strong regional organization such as ASEAN, the degree to which investment liberalization can generally be achieved through bilateral and plurilateral agreements is likely to be limited.

This chapter examines the context and dynamics of promoting responsibility to protect (RtoP) in the Asia Pacific, focusing on China and Southeast Asia and the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A discussion of other Asia Pacific countries' positions on the the RtoP debate in the United Nations in July 2009 is also presented to show whether there is an emerging consensus in the region about the principle and its application. It is argued that, notwithstanding a number of challenges and constraints, a stronger commitment in protecting peoples against mass atrocities is possible in the long run. This would depend largely on how the RtoP is adapted and operationalized in the context of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, which is still valued by many states in the region. At the same time, there is a need to promote constituency-building around RtoP at both regional and domestic levels.

This chapter examines Southeast Asia’s imperial transition from Anglo-American predominance to U.S. hegemony between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, a product of British decolonization strategies in Singapore and the growing stability of the arc of containment. As Britain’s military withdrew from Singapore, London established the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), a security framework for Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, that thwarted the Soviet Union’s hopes of expanding its regional influence beyond Vietnam. At the same time, Southeast Asia’s anticommunist statesmen founded ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 1967 and forged increasingly intimate political, economic and military ties with America, stabilizing their regimes and effectively containing Vietnam and China. Moscow and Beijing were cognizant of U.S. dominance in Southeast Asia and keen to thaw relations with Washington, the de facto hegemon despite U.S. policy failures in Indochina.

This chapter contributes to the ongoing debates regarding Cambodia's position on the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. It talks about how Cambodia balances between ASEAN, the West, and China on the contentious issue of the SCS. It also mentions how China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has put ASEAN states, other actors, and Cambodia in a challenging strategic situation. The chapter points out how the SCS is not of direct concern to Cambodia as it is a non-claimant state, but it still holds great relevance to the country as a member of ASEAN and as a nation that is a significant beneficiary of Chinese aid and investment. It assesses the foreign policy approach that Cambodia has pursued to align with China on the issue of the South China Sea, which presents both opportunities and challenges.

This chapter addresses Singapore's South China Sea (SCS) portfolio by mainly addressing development-oriented issues. It talks about how Singapore has re-postulated the SCS issue in the broader context of great-power wrestling and regional terrorist attack, while preferring to maintain flexibility as much as possible in handling it. It also notes that the overriding national interests would post daunting challenges to future Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) integration. The chapter views the SCS issue as an integral part of the reconfiguration of a transnational order in Southeast Asia, noting that its discussions can only be comprehensive when various aspects are factored into the deliberation. It argues that the transnational order is mainly economic-oriented, while regionalization has been a major push force.

This chapter implies that the actions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimants and non-claimants in the South China Sea (SCS) are driven by their respective strategic national interest in the dispute, amid various historical narratives and legal arguments. It elaborates that the effort to maintain a balance of power in the region creates a dilemma for individual ASEAN countries as they attempt to navigate between the strategic dependence on the US and the economic opportunities presented by China. It also talks about the challenges and constraints the ASEAN will face for playing a role in managing security in the SCS as the Sino-American strategic rivalry intensifies. The chapter traces the evolution of ASEAN's intervention in the disputes and accounts for ASEAN's achievements and failures. It describes the divisions within ASEAN that prevented a unified response to the SCS and highlights the implications for ASEAN centrality within the fast-evolving regional security architecture.

This chapter summarizes the political and security challenges that arise from highly divergent national views on the South China Sea (SCS). It recounts how the rise in Chinese economic power allowed the People's Republic of China (PRC) to devote funding to building a blue-water navy and expand islands to build on extensive naval, coast guard, and air force installations. It looks at the economic inter-dependence between the economies in the SCS region, such as between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, China and the United States, China and trading partners Japan, Australia, and even Taiwan. The chapter mentions two principal antagonists in the geopolitical differences over the SCS: China, the principal claimant, and the United States, the most powerful external stakeholder. It points out one positive aspect of the rising tensions in the SCS, which is the research and debates they have stimulated among analysts and scholars in the countries concerned.

This chapter explores the influence of the Regional Ethnic Chinese on business in present-day China. The varying formulae of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan as possible influences on the homeland's business systems are illustrated. Then, it evaluates the role of ethnic-Chinese entrepreneurship in the other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. It begins on the Chinese traders of the southern ocean. The new immigrants from China in the late 1940s and early 1950s included a high proportion of Chinese bourgeois. The four main destinations in the exodus from China are presented. Discussions on nationalism in economic policy, historical influences, and modern era of Chinese business are provided as well. It is seen that the economies of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and — not so strongly but still significantly — the ASEAN countries, have become fused together. The ‘sojourners of the southern ocean’ have come home, bearing capital and know-how.

This chapter notes that the South China Sea (SCS) disputes are multidimensional and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is selectively involved in some aspects of these dimensions. The chapter addresses the major pillars of conflict and geostrategic interest in the SCS, beginning with territorial sovereignty disputes among claimant parties over various land features in the South China Sea. It also covers maritime area claims and maritime rights claims by the disputant parties. The chapter reviews statements by ASEAN that suggest that it attempts to uphold certain principles on how a claimant should legally and legitimately claim maritime zones and rights, although ASEAN has made it clear that it does not want to be an arbiter for maritime boundary demarcations. It talks about the maintenance of peace and security in the SCS, such as the proposal for rules and norms to regulate various parties' policies.