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Starts by pointing out that if the Berlin and Brussels Acts and the experience of the Congo Free State (as discussed in the last chapter) are understood as representing the internationalization of the idea of trusteeship, then the League of Nations mandates system might be understood as representing its institutionalization in international society. Examines the current of ideas from which the institutionalization of trusteeship arose out of the debates concerning the disposal of German colonies conquered during the First World War, and the subsequent compromise that resulted in the creation of the mandates system, which stands as a response to the problem of ordering relations of Europeans and non‐Europeans by reconciling the obligations of trusteeship and the search for national security in a single institutional arrangement. The victorious Allied powers divided Germany's colonial possessions amongst themselves, in no small part for reasons of national security, but in assuming administrative responsibility for these territories they also accepted the oversight of ‘international machinery’ to ensure that the work of civilization was being done. The seven sections of the chapter are: War and the Old Diplomacy; Trusteeship or Annexation?; From the New World—the effect of the Russian revolution and the entry into the First World War of the US on the French and British annexation policy and Woodrow Wilson's ideas for peace; The Mandates System—the birth of the League of Nations; Impasse at Versailles—the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Versailles Peace Treaty; Trusteeship or Deception—the obligations and defects of the League of Nations Covenant; and Novelty and Tradition—the compromise of the League of Nations system.

This chapter discusses the constitutional provisions of Article 22 of the Indian Constitution; judicial prescriptions of procedural safeguards; judicial philosophy in preventive detention cases; the need to review certain aberrations from the commendable judicial philosophy; and executive apathy in enforcing amendments made to Article 22 of the Constitution. Viewed in the right perspective, procedural safeguards incorporated in the Constitution and the decisional law pertaining to them are obviously not meant to let off the hook a detained person, notwithstanding strong grounds of suspicion against him, but to give him a fair chance to make his representation considered.

This chapter discusses the constitutional provisions in cases of arrest and detention; Article 22 in the light of the ‘composite code’ approach; judicial prescriptions of procedural safeguards; internal safeguards in the procedure of arrest; transparency and accountability in adhering to the law; and the revamp of the police system. The discussion suggests that Article 22(1) and (2), though they were copied from the then existing CrPC, 1898, encompass a wide gamut of procedural rights when viewed in the perspective of the Indian Constitution as a composite whole. Most of these rights have received due exposition either as judicial pronouncements or as recommendations of the Law Commission and these have been now incorporated in the CrPC by The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008.

This chapter argues that the ‘composite code’ approach to the Indian Constitution would obligate reading together Articles 19, 21, and 22. It is clear that detention could be constitutionally valid in case of a citizen only when made in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India and/or public order. Any detention apart from being an encroachment on the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 would drastically affect the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. However, the discussion notes that there is no incompatibility between Articles 19, 21, and 22 of the Constitution and, in fact, they would together effectively channelize the exercise of arrest and detention powers of the State with regard to the people's liberties. The chapter concludes that it is bounden duty of the State to explore ways and means to control crime and criminality within the constitutionally permissible parameters.

This chapter focuses on Articles 22 and 25 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679). It examines how these provisions will impact automated decisional systems. Article 22 gives a person a qualified right ‘not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her’. Article 25 imposes a duty on controllers of personal data to implement technical and organizational measures so that the processing of the data will meet the Regulation’s requirements and otherwise ensure protection of the data subject’s rights. Both sets of rules are aimed squarely at subjecting automated decisional systems to greater accountability. The chapter argues that the rules suffer from significant weaknesses that are likely to hamper their ability to meet this aim.