Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental ...
More
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.Less
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.
Walter Ott
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570430
- eISBN:
- 9780191722394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0029
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The ...
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This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The question itself is wrong. For the Aristotelian conception of power was not discarded so much as reinvented during the modern period, issuing in the cognitive and geometrical models of causation and hence in the top‐down and bottom‐up conceptions of laws. It is a mistake to think of the scholastic concept of power as lingering on without justification, long after it was unmoored by the “new” philosophy. Instead, it was adopted and transformed. This chapter draws together the themes of the book and extends its argument to the contemporary debate over laws of nature. Roughly, the argument is that the top‐down conception of laws is unintelligible in the absence of the theological underpinnings moderns like Descartes provide. It should thus be jettisoned in a version of a bottom‐up theory, one which is not hamstrung by Hume's unreasonable limitations on intentionality.Less
This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The question itself is wrong. For the Aristotelian conception of power was not discarded so much as reinvented during the modern period, issuing in the cognitive and geometrical models of causation and hence in the top‐down and bottom‐up conceptions of laws. It is a mistake to think of the scholastic concept of power as lingering on without justification, long after it was unmoored by the “new” philosophy. Instead, it was adopted and transformed. This chapter draws together the themes of the book and extends its argument to the contemporary debate over laws of nature. Roughly, the argument is that the top‐down conception of laws is unintelligible in the absence of the theological underpinnings moderns like Descartes provide. It should thus be jettisoned in a version of a bottom‐up theory, one which is not hamstrung by Hume's unreasonable limitations on intentionality.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained ...
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A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained and justified. Different systems of ontological categories are compared and contrasted with the four-category ontology: a one-category ontology of modes or tropes, a two-category ontology of particulars and universals, and a two-category ontology of substantial particulars and modes. The ontological status of states of affairs and natural laws, and the ontological implications of the truthmaker principle as advocated by D. M. Armstrong are discussed.Less
A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained and justified. Different systems of ontological categories are compared and contrasted with the four-category ontology: a one-category ontology of modes or tropes, a two-category ontology of particulars and universals, and a two-category ontology of substantial particulars and modes. The ontological status of states of affairs and natural laws, and the ontological implications of the truthmaker principle as advocated by D. M. Armstrong are discussed.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the ...
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The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.Less
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. ...
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The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.Less
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth ...
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A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.Less
A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.
Jeffrey Magee
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195090222
- eISBN:
- 9780199871469
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195090222.001.0001
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
If Benny Goodman was the “King of Swing”, then Fletcher Henderson might be considered the power behind the throne. Not only did Henderson arrange the music that fueled Goodman's success, he also ...
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If Benny Goodman was the “King of Swing”, then Fletcher Henderson might be considered the power behind the throne. Not only did Henderson arrange the music that fueled Goodman's success, he also helped to launch the careers of several other key figures in jazz history, including Louis Armstrong and Coleman Hawkins, and their work, in turn, shaped Henderson's. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources, including sound recordings, stock arrangements, and score manuscripts available only since Goodman's death, this book traces Henderson's life and work from his youth in the deep South, to his early work as a New York bandleader, to his pivotal role in building the Kingdom of Swing. Henderson, standing at the forefront of the New York jazz scene in the 1920s and 1930s, assembled many of the era's best musicians, forging a distinctive jazz style within the stylistic framework of popular song and dance music. Henderson's style grew out of collaboration with many key players. It also grew out of a deft combination of written and improvised music, of commercial and artistic impulses, and of racial cooperation and competition, and thus stands as an exemplar of musical activity in the Harlem Renaissance. As Henderson's career stalled in the midst of the Depression, record producer John Hammond brought together Henderson and Goodman in a fortuitous collaboration that shaped the history of American music.Less
If Benny Goodman was the “King of Swing”, then Fletcher Henderson might be considered the power behind the throne. Not only did Henderson arrange the music that fueled Goodman's success, he also helped to launch the careers of several other key figures in jazz history, including Louis Armstrong and Coleman Hawkins, and their work, in turn, shaped Henderson's. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources, including sound recordings, stock arrangements, and score manuscripts available only since Goodman's death, this book traces Henderson's life and work from his youth in the deep South, to his early work as a New York bandleader, to his pivotal role in building the Kingdom of Swing. Henderson, standing at the forefront of the New York jazz scene in the 1920s and 1930s, assembled many of the era's best musicians, forging a distinctive jazz style within the stylistic framework of popular song and dance music. Henderson's style grew out of collaboration with many key players. It also grew out of a deft combination of written and improvised music, of commercial and artistic impulses, and of racial cooperation and competition, and thus stands as an exemplar of musical activity in the Harlem Renaissance. As Henderson's career stalled in the midst of the Depression, record producer John Hammond brought together Henderson and Goodman in a fortuitous collaboration that shaped the history of American music.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter commences with the claim — which originates with Shoemaker — that fundamental natural properties are potencies, i.e., they have dispositional essences. Following Swoyer, it is explained ...
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This chapter commences with the claim — which originates with Shoemaker — that fundamental natural properties are potencies, i.e., they have dispositional essences. Following Swoyer, it is explained how this dispositional essentialism about properties leads to necessitarianism about laws. Strong necessitarianism — the view that all possible laws hold in all possible worlds — is explored in detail and an ante rem conception of universals is defended against Armstrong's criticisms. It is shown how dispositional essentialism can account for ceteris paribus laws, and the question whether the fundamental laws of nature are strict or ceteris paribus is raised in the light of the earlier discussion of dispositions.Less
This chapter commences with the claim — which originates with Shoemaker — that fundamental natural properties are potencies, i.e., they have dispositional essences. Following Swoyer, it is explained how this dispositional essentialism about properties leads to necessitarianism about laws. Strong necessitarianism — the view that all possible laws hold in all possible worlds — is explored in detail and an ante rem conception of universals is defended against Armstrong's criticisms. It is shown how dispositional essentialism can account for ceteris paribus laws, and the question whether the fundamental laws of nature are strict or ceteris paribus is raised in the light of the earlier discussion of dispositions.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a ...
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This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a Meinongian commitment to non-actual possibilia. It is shown that Armstrong's view is likewise committed to such entities; consequently any sensible view (i.e., not modal realism nor Megarian actualism) must accept them. Armstrong gives a similar criticism to the effect that dispositional essentialism takes properties to possess something very like intentionality, while Ellis and Place are happy to accept this. It is argued that dispositionally essential properties do not have any kind of intentionality.Less
This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a Meinongian commitment to non-actual possibilia. It is shown that Armstrong's view is likewise committed to such entities; consequently any sensible view (i.e., not modal realism nor Megarian actualism) must accept them. Armstrong gives a similar criticism to the effect that dispositional essentialism takes properties to possess something very like intentionality, while Ellis and Place are happy to accept this. It is argued that dispositionally essential properties do not have any kind of intentionality.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is often claimed (e.g., by Swinburne, Armstrong, and Lowe) that the view that all natural properties are potencies leads to a vicious regress or circularity. The possible interpretations of this ...
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It is often claimed (e.g., by Swinburne, Armstrong, and Lowe) that the view that all natural properties are potencies leads to a vicious regress or circularity. The possible interpretations of this argument are examined, and the most pressing is that the regress leaves the identity of potencies indeterminate. This argument is equivalent to the claim that when the network of properties is represented as a graph, that graph has non-trivial automorphisms. It is shown that a graph can suitably represent the network of essentially dispositional properties while having no non-trivial automorphisms; and so the identity of each member of a set of potencies can supervene solely on the structure of relations among those potencies.Less
It is often claimed (e.g., by Swinburne, Armstrong, and Lowe) that the view that all natural properties are potencies leads to a vicious regress or circularity. The possible interpretations of this argument are examined, and the most pressing is that the regress leaves the identity of potencies indeterminate. This argument is equivalent to the claim that when the network of properties is represented as a graph, that graph has non-trivial automorphisms. It is shown that a graph can suitably represent the network of essentially dispositional properties while having no non-trivial automorphisms; and so the identity of each member of a set of potencies can supervene solely on the structure of relations among those potencies.
Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284375
- eISBN:
- 9780191713743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284375.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter defends Platonism about types: the thesis that all types exist at all times. Following Nicholas Wolterstorff, the associate-function is introduced: a one-to-one mapping of properties ...
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This chapter defends Platonism about types: the thesis that all types exist at all times. Following Nicholas Wolterstorff, the associate-function is introduced: a one-to-one mapping of properties onto types. It is then argued that Platonism follows from two premises: that a type exists at a time, if the property of which it is the associate exists at that time; and that all properties exist at all times. The chapter goes on to defend these two premises (notably against Armstrong's rival account of the existence-conditions of properties, and against the objections to both premises raised by Robert Howell) before arguing that Platonism about types is, in fact, far less disruptive of our intuitions than may, at first, be supposed.Less
This chapter defends Platonism about types: the thesis that all types exist at all times. Following Nicholas Wolterstorff, the associate-function is introduced: a one-to-one mapping of properties onto types. It is then argued that Platonism follows from two premises: that a type exists at a time, if the property of which it is the associate exists at that time; and that all properties exist at all times. The chapter goes on to defend these two premises (notably against Armstrong's rival account of the existence-conditions of properties, and against the objections to both premises raised by Robert Howell) before arguing that Platonism about types is, in fact, far less disruptive of our intuitions than may, at first, be supposed.
Jeffrey Magee
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195090222
- eISBN:
- 9780199871469
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195090222.003.0005
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
Louis Armstrong's brief tenure in Henderson's band forms a crucial moment in the history of jazz. Many jazz historians have argued that Armstrong's hot solos caused Henderson's band to sound passé, ...
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Louis Armstrong's brief tenure in Henderson's band forms a crucial moment in the history of jazz. Many jazz historians have argued that Armstrong's hot solos caused Henderson's band to sound passé, but his recordings with the band, on which they play Redman's arrangements, show the sophisticated versatility inherent in Redman's work and his consistent tendencies toward variety, contrast, novelty, and parody. With the addition of the adept jazz-oriented clarinetist “Buster” Bailey, Redman was able to exploit a three-part reed section, which led him to develop the clarinet trio, one of his trademark devices. Redman also began to figure Armstrong's story-like solos into the band's arrangements, demonstrated by their recordings during this time period, including “Copenhagen”, “Sugar Foot Stomp”, “TNT”, and others. Analysis of these recordings, in comparison with the songs' stock arrangements, shows the manner in which Redman deliberately molded each song to stress Armstrong's difference. Meanwhile, these recordings also chart a change in the band's playing, marked by a stronger inclination toward hot jazz.Less
Louis Armstrong's brief tenure in Henderson's band forms a crucial moment in the history of jazz. Many jazz historians have argued that Armstrong's hot solos caused Henderson's band to sound passé, but his recordings with the band, on which they play Redman's arrangements, show the sophisticated versatility inherent in Redman's work and his consistent tendencies toward variety, contrast, novelty, and parody. With the addition of the adept jazz-oriented clarinetist “Buster” Bailey, Redman was able to exploit a three-part reed section, which led him to develop the clarinet trio, one of his trademark devices. Redman also began to figure Armstrong's story-like solos into the band's arrangements, demonstrated by their recordings during this time period, including “Copenhagen”, “Sugar Foot Stomp”, “TNT”, and others. Analysis of these recordings, in comparison with the songs' stock arrangements, shows the manner in which Redman deliberately molded each song to stress Armstrong's difference. Meanwhile, these recordings also chart a change in the band's playing, marked by a stronger inclination toward hot jazz.
Jeffrey Magee
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195090222
- eISBN:
- 9780199871469
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195090222.003.0006
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
After Armstrong's departure from the band in late 1925, his music still represented a musical and social challenge in that his style presented an exciting but perhaps threatening foil to the Paul ...
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After Armstrong's departure from the band in late 1925, his music still represented a musical and social challenge in that his style presented an exciting but perhaps threatening foil to the Paul Whiteman sound. Henderson, with Redman's arrangements, continued to negotiate between the two approaches, reflecting the intersection of the New Orleans and New York traditions. This can be heard in the band's revival of earlier jazz hits such as “Clarinet Marmalade” and “Wang Wang Blues”, and in Henderson's original blues compositions that represented a New York stylization of the raw, earthy southern style. Songs like “‘D’ Natural Blues”, “The Stampede”, “Rocky Mountain Blues”, and “Whiteman's Stomp” exemplify how Henderson's band tailored its music for widely contrasting purposes and continued to absorb Armstrong's legacy.Less
After Armstrong's departure from the band in late 1925, his music still represented a musical and social challenge in that his style presented an exciting but perhaps threatening foil to the Paul Whiteman sound. Henderson, with Redman's arrangements, continued to negotiate between the two approaches, reflecting the intersection of the New Orleans and New York traditions. This can be heard in the band's revival of earlier jazz hits such as “Clarinet Marmalade” and “Wang Wang Blues”, and in Henderson's original blues compositions that represented a New York stylization of the raw, earthy southern style. Songs like “‘D’ Natural Blues”, “The Stampede”, “Rocky Mountain Blues”, and “Whiteman's Stomp” exemplify how Henderson's band tailored its music for widely contrasting purposes and continued to absorb Armstrong's legacy.
Carol Bonomo Albright and Joanna Clapps Herman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823229109
- eISBN:
- 9780823241057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823229109.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 20th Century Literature
This 1991 poem by Brian McCormick is about “the night Neil Armstrong impressed the thin dust on the moon, I made my meld in diamonds, playing pinochle, two decks cut and sussed with my foster family, ...
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This 1991 poem by Brian McCormick is about “the night Neil Armstrong impressed the thin dust on the moon, I made my meld in diamonds, playing pinochle, two decks cut and sussed with my foster family, Italian Americans, all now dead...”Less
This 1991 poem by Brian McCormick is about “the night Neil Armstrong impressed the thin dust on the moon, I made my meld in diamonds, playing pinochle, two decks cut and sussed with my foster family, Italian Americans, all now dead...”
Williams Martin
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195083491
- eISBN:
- 9780199853205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195083491.003.0001
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
Earl Hines was one of the few contemporary pianists who molded the history of jazz music. In a cold Friday evening in 1964, Earl Hines performed the first on a multiple series of concerts held at ...
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Earl Hines was one of the few contemporary pianists who molded the history of jazz music. In a cold Friday evening in 1964, Earl Hines performed the first on a multiple series of concerts held at Broadway's Little Theatre. The concert was a success and the start of arguably the greatest comeback in the history of jazz. He was featured on an influential profile by Whitney Balliett as a famous jazz performer. He was chosen to represent the United States on a visit to Soviet Republic. And he was enacted in Down Beat's Jazz “Hall of Fame”, joining other famous musicians such as Charlie Parker, Duke Ellington, Count Basic, Coleman Hawkins, and Louis Armstrong.Less
Earl Hines was one of the few contemporary pianists who molded the history of jazz music. In a cold Friday evening in 1964, Earl Hines performed the first on a multiple series of concerts held at Broadway's Little Theatre. The concert was a success and the start of arguably the greatest comeback in the history of jazz. He was featured on an influential profile by Whitney Balliett as a famous jazz performer. He was chosen to represent the United States on a visit to Soviet Republic. And he was enacted in Down Beat's Jazz “Hall of Fame”, joining other famous musicians such as Charlie Parker, Duke Ellington, Count Basic, Coleman Hawkins, and Louis Armstrong.
Williams Martin
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195083491
- eISBN:
- 9780199853205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195083491.003.0028
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
As Lonnie Johnson and Eddie Lang emerged during the 1920s, and Charlie Christian emerged in 1939, Django Reinhardt was the “jazz” guitar soloist. He learned jazz music initially from phonograph ...
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As Lonnie Johnson and Eddie Lang emerged during the 1920s, and Charlie Christian emerged in 1939, Django Reinhardt was the “jazz” guitar soloist. He learned jazz music initially from phonograph records from the United States. Yet by the mid-1930s, he had performed with the best American jazz artists such as Louis Armstrong, Coleman Hawkins, and Benny Carter. And his own records manifested not only how well he had learned from his jazz lessons, but also how magnificent were his guitar solos. Django Reinhardt was a Belgian-born, French-raised musician whose passion was in American jazz.Less
As Lonnie Johnson and Eddie Lang emerged during the 1920s, and Charlie Christian emerged in 1939, Django Reinhardt was the “jazz” guitar soloist. He learned jazz music initially from phonograph records from the United States. Yet by the mid-1930s, he had performed with the best American jazz artists such as Louis Armstrong, Coleman Hawkins, and Benny Carter. And his own records manifested not only how well he had learned from his jazz lessons, but also how magnificent were his guitar solos. Django Reinhardt was a Belgian-born, French-raised musician whose passion was in American jazz.
Williams Martin
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195083491
- eISBN:
- 9780199853205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195083491.003.0046
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
A night divided between Sonny Rollins and John Lewis sounds promising. Rollins and his quartet were to play for the first half of the program. Lewis was to premiere his score for a new Italian film, ...
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A night divided between Sonny Rollins and John Lewis sounds promising. Rollins and his quartet were to play for the first half of the program. Lewis was to premiere his score for a new Italian film, The Milano Story. For Rollins, the promise was fulfilled successfully. From his opening choruses on Three Little Words, it was obvious that he was going to play with authority and with a penetrating humour which included a self-parody. His masterwork of the evening was a cadenza on “Love Letters”, which had a kind of truly artistic feel that jazz has not heard since the Louis Armstrong of the early 1930s. Lewis' five-part piece was a disappointment. It seemed raw in its scoring, in development of its ideas, and in weird transitions from jazz to quasi-Italian schmaltz and back.Less
A night divided between Sonny Rollins and John Lewis sounds promising. Rollins and his quartet were to play for the first half of the program. Lewis was to premiere his score for a new Italian film, The Milano Story. For Rollins, the promise was fulfilled successfully. From his opening choruses on Three Little Words, it was obvious that he was going to play with authority and with a penetrating humour which included a self-parody. His masterwork of the evening was a cadenza on “Love Letters”, which had a kind of truly artistic feel that jazz has not heard since the Louis Armstrong of the early 1930s. Lewis' five-part piece was a disappointment. It seemed raw in its scoring, in development of its ideas, and in weird transitions from jazz to quasi-Italian schmaltz and back.
Shaun A. Casey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195374483
- eISBN:
- 9780199871896
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374483.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter focuses on Nixon's strategy for addressing Kennedy's Catholicism. It describes former Missouri Congressman Orlando K. Armstrong's off-the-record role as organizer of anti-Catholic forces ...
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This chapter focuses on Nixon's strategy for addressing Kennedy's Catholicism. It describes former Missouri Congressman Orlando K. Armstrong's off-the-record role as organizer of anti-Catholic forces for Nixon. It also details the efforts of the POAU—a national organization with a large grassroots membership drawn from all sectors of American Protestantism—to beat Kennedy.Less
This chapter focuses on Nixon's strategy for addressing Kennedy's Catholicism. It describes former Missouri Congressman Orlando K. Armstrong's off-the-record role as organizer of anti-Catholic forces for Nixon. It also details the efforts of the POAU—a national organization with a large grassroots membership drawn from all sectors of American Protestantism—to beat Kennedy.
Neil Rennie
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198186274
- eISBN:
- 9780191674471
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198186274.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 18th Century and Early American Literature
As Samuel Taylor Coleridge noticed, the missionaries who came to the South Seas at the end of the 18th century had changed the image of the South Sea savage. This change he understood as fact ...
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As Samuel Taylor Coleridge noticed, the missionaries who came to the South Seas at the end of the 18th century had changed the image of the South Sea savage. This change he understood as fact replacing fiction. The kind of image Coleridge believed to be fact can be represented by the report of an American missionary, Richard Armstrong, who spent eight months in an attempt to establish a mission on the island of Nukuhiva in the Marquesas. Much of Armstrong's own experience could not be given as evidence, because ‘the scenes of licentiousness’ he observed ‘were too shocking ever to be narrated by either pen or tongue’. Even the most mundane facts could not be written or read. In the first half of the 19th century, hoever, savages from the same islands were described very differently. And so fact about the savages replaced fiction — ‘frightful tales’. Herman Melville was aware of an affinity between the Typees and that ‘Red race’ of American Indians whom the Puritans had misread in terms of the Bible, as ‘types’.Less
As Samuel Taylor Coleridge noticed, the missionaries who came to the South Seas at the end of the 18th century had changed the image of the South Sea savage. This change he understood as fact replacing fiction. The kind of image Coleridge believed to be fact can be represented by the report of an American missionary, Richard Armstrong, who spent eight months in an attempt to establish a mission on the island of Nukuhiva in the Marquesas. Much of Armstrong's own experience could not be given as evidence, because ‘the scenes of licentiousness’ he observed ‘were too shocking ever to be narrated by either pen or tongue’. Even the most mundane facts could not be written or read. In the first half of the 19th century, hoever, savages from the same islands were described very differently. And so fact about the savages replaced fiction — ‘frightful tales’. Herman Melville was aware of an affinity between the Typees and that ‘Red race’ of American Indians whom the Puritans had misread in terms of the Bible, as ‘types’.
Marian David
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. ...
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Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal.Less
Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal.