Barbara M. Sattler
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198805762
- eISBN:
- 9780191843679
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805762.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This paper has two main goals: first, it reconstructs Aristotle’s account of measurement in the Metaphysics and shows how it connects to modern notions of measurement. Second, it demonstrates that ...
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This paper has two main goals: first, it reconstructs Aristotle’s account of measurement in the Metaphysics and shows how it connects to modern notions of measurement. Second, it demonstrates that Aristotle’s notion of measurement works only for simple measures, and leads him into a dilemma once it comes to measuring complex phenomena, such as motion, where two or more different aspects, such as time and space, have to be taken into account. This is shown with the help of Aristotle’s reaction to one of the problems that Zeno’s dichotomy paradox raises: Aristotle implicitly employs a complex measure of motion when solving this problem, while he explicitly characterizes the measure of motion as a simple measure in the Physics.Less
This paper has two main goals: first, it reconstructs Aristotle’s account of measurement in the Metaphysics and shows how it connects to modern notions of measurement. Second, it demonstrates that Aristotle’s notion of measurement works only for simple measures, and leads him into a dilemma once it comes to measuring complex phenomena, such as motion, where two or more different aspects, such as time and space, have to be taken into account. This is shown with the help of Aristotle’s reaction to one of the problems that Zeno’s dichotomy paradox raises: Aristotle implicitly employs a complex measure of motion when solving this problem, while he explicitly characterizes the measure of motion as a simple measure in the Physics.
Michel Crubellier
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198830993
- eISBN:
- 9780191868948
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198830993.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter starts the discussion about principles that runs throughout book I, as well as the discussion about Melissus and Parmenides that continues in chapter 3. It raises the paradoxical ...
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This chapter starts the discussion about principles that runs throughout book I, as well as the discussion about Melissus and Parmenides that continues in chapter 3. It raises the paradoxical question of how to arrive at the principles of natural philosophy and how to establish that these are indeed the sought-after principles. In order to do so, Aristotle inquires into Eleatism, the position that denies the very existence of nature: this means that the best way to the principles might be discovered by taking on those who utterly reject them. That explains the equally paradoxical move of discussing the theses of people with whom it would seem impossible to discuss since they do not agree on the basics. Yet that can be done through the specific dialectical tactics of lusis. Certain ancient attempts at squaring the circle, mentioned in the course of the argument, are dealt with in Appendix I.Less
This chapter starts the discussion about principles that runs throughout book I, as well as the discussion about Melissus and Parmenides that continues in chapter 3. It raises the paradoxical question of how to arrive at the principles of natural philosophy and how to establish that these are indeed the sought-after principles. In order to do so, Aristotle inquires into Eleatism, the position that denies the very existence of nature: this means that the best way to the principles might be discovered by taking on those who utterly reject them. That explains the equally paradoxical move of discussing the theses of people with whom it would seem impossible to discuss since they do not agree on the basics. Yet that can be done through the specific dialectical tactics of lusis. Certain ancient attempts at squaring the circle, mentioned in the course of the argument, are dealt with in Appendix I.
