Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals ...
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John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals in reality are “names”: the common terms of our language and the common concepts of our minds. But these items are universal only in their signification; they are just as singular entities themselves as are any other items in reality. This book critically examines what is most intriguing to contemporary readers in Buridan’s medieval philosophical system: his nominalist account of the relationships among language, thought, and reality. The main focus of the discussion is Buridan’s deployment of the Ockhamist conception of a “mental language” for mapping the complex structures of written and spoken human languages onto a parsimoniously construed reality. Concerning these linguistic structures themselves, the book carefully analyzes Buridan’s conception of the radical conventionality of written and spoken languages, in contrast to the natural semantic features of concepts. The discussion pays special attention to Buridan’s token-based semantics of terms and propositions, his conception of existential import, ontological commitment, truth, and logical validity. Finally, the book presents a detailed discussion of how these logical devices allow Buridan to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism, always relating the discussion to contemporary concerns with these issues.Less
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals in reality are “names”: the common terms of our language and the common concepts of our minds. But these items are universal only in their signification; they are just as singular entities themselves as are any other items in reality. This book critically examines what is most intriguing to contemporary readers in Buridan’s medieval philosophical system: his nominalist account of the relationships among language, thought, and reality. The main focus of the discussion is Buridan’s deployment of the Ockhamist conception of a “mental language” for mapping the complex structures of written and spoken human languages onto a parsimoniously construed reality. Concerning these linguistic structures themselves, the book carefully analyzes Buridan’s conception of the radical conventionality of written and spoken languages, in contrast to the natural semantic features of concepts. The discussion pays special attention to Buridan’s token-based semantics of terms and propositions, his conception of existential import, ontological commitment, truth, and logical validity. Finally, the book presents a detailed discussion of how these logical devices allow Buridan to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism, always relating the discussion to contemporary concerns with these issues.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
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The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on ...
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Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.Less
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.
Ruth Glasner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567737
- eISBN:
- 9780191721472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567737.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The three turning points that were studied in chapters 6‐8 are facets of a major turning point in Averroes' thought that led to the consolidation of his ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Chapter 9 examines the ...
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The three turning points that were studied in chapters 6‐8 are facets of a major turning point in Averroes' thought that led to the consolidation of his ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Chapter 9 examines the arguments that were made in the previous three chapters about dating of this turning potint, and whether it was associated with the writing of the middle commentary or with the writing of the long. The data is very confusing. The conclusion, stated in Chapter 9, is that the turning point could have been influenced by his arguments with the mutakallimūn around 1180 and that Averroes worked out his new physics when he was writing the long commentary. At this stage he looked for the writings of Alexander and tried to find support in them. The revisions of all three commentaries were made after the writing of the long commentary.Less
The three turning points that were studied in chapters 6‐8 are facets of a major turning point in Averroes' thought that led to the consolidation of his ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Chapter 9 examines the arguments that were made in the previous three chapters about dating of this turning potint, and whether it was associated with the writing of the middle commentary or with the writing of the long. The data is very confusing. The conclusion, stated in Chapter 9, is that the turning point could have been influenced by his arguments with the mutakallimūn around 1180 and that Averroes worked out his new physics when he was writing the long commentary. At this stage he looked for the writings of Alexander and tried to find support in them. The revisions of all three commentaries were made after the writing of the long commentary.
C. D. C. Reeve
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235651
- eISBN:
- 9780191679094
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235651.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that ...
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This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that scientific-knowledge (episteme) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding (nous) play essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom (phronēsis) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as best to promote happiness (eudaimonia) in particular circumstances and to ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, the book develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. It argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom — when it is for the sake of primary happiness — is happiness of a second kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.Less
This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that scientific-knowledge (episteme) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding (nous) play essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom (phronēsis) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as best to promote happiness (eudaimonia) in particular circumstances and to ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, the book develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. It argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom — when it is for the sake of primary happiness — is happiness of a second kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.
Richard Cross
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269748
- eISBN:
- 9780191683787
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269748.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
Duns Scotus, along with Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, was one of the three most talented and influential of the medieval schoolmen, and a highly original and ...
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Duns Scotus, along with Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, was one of the three most talented and influential of the medieval schoolmen, and a highly original and creative thinker. Natural philosophy, or physics, is one of the areas of his system which has not received detailed attention in modern literature. But it is important, both for understanding Scotus's contributions in theology, and in tracing some important developments in the basically Aristotelian world-view which Scotus and his contemporaries espoused. This book contains discussion and analysis of Scotus's accounts of the nature of matter; the structure of material substance; mass; the nature of space, time, and motion; quantitative and qualitative change; and the various sorts of unity which can be exhibited by different kinds of whole. It also includes discussion of Scotus's accounts of chemical composition, organic unity, and nutrition. Scotus's views on these matters are philosophically sophisticated, and often highly original.Less
Duns Scotus, along with Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, was one of the three most talented and influential of the medieval schoolmen, and a highly original and creative thinker. Natural philosophy, or physics, is one of the areas of his system which has not received detailed attention in modern literature. But it is important, both for understanding Scotus's contributions in theology, and in tracing some important developments in the basically Aristotelian world-view which Scotus and his contemporaries espoused. This book contains discussion and analysis of Scotus's accounts of the nature of matter; the structure of material substance; mass; the nature of space, time, and motion; quantitative and qualitative change; and the various sorts of unity which can be exhibited by different kinds of whole. It also includes discussion of Scotus's accounts of chemical composition, organic unity, and nutrition. Scotus's views on these matters are philosophically sophisticated, and often highly original.
Stephen R.L. Clark
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245162
- eISBN:
- 9780191680847
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245162.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated assumptions, and all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given material. This book addresses what is man's place in the ...
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Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated assumptions, and all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given material. This book addresses what is man's place in the Aristotelian world. It also describes man's abilities and prospects in managing his life, and considers how far Aristotle's treatment of time and history licenses the sort of dynamic interpretation of his doctrines that have been given. The ontological model that explains much of Aristotle's conclusions and methods is one of life-worlds, in which the material universe of scientific myth is no more than an abstraction from lived reality, not its transcendent ground.Less
Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated assumptions, and all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given material. This book addresses what is man's place in the Aristotelian world. It also describes man's abilities and prospects in managing his life, and considers how far Aristotle's treatment of time and history licenses the sort of dynamic interpretation of his doctrines that have been given. The ontological model that explains much of Aristotle's conclusions and methods is one of life-worlds, in which the material universe of scientific myth is no more than an abstraction from lived reality, not its transcendent ground.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245544
- eISBN:
- 9780191680878
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245544.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is an attempt to solve a long-standing problem of Aristotelian scholarship on the basis of historical and philosophical arguments and a statistical study of features of style. It presents a ...
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This book is an attempt to solve a long-standing problem of Aristotelian scholarship on the basis of historical and philosophical arguments and a statistical study of features of style. It presents a detailed study of the relationship between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The book provides a synthesis of three disciplines: philosophy, classical studies, and statistics.Less
This book is an attempt to solve a long-standing problem of Aristotelian scholarship on the basis of historical and philosophical arguments and a statistical study of features of style. It presents a detailed study of the relationship between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The book provides a synthesis of three disciplines: philosophy, classical studies, and statistics.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142555
- eISBN:
- 9781400866359
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142555.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
From the turn of the fifth century to the beginning of the eighteenth, Christian writers were fascinated and troubled by the ‘Problem of Paganism’, which this book identifies and examines for the ...
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From the turn of the fifth century to the beginning of the eighteenth, Christian writers were fascinated and troubled by the ‘Problem of Paganism’, which this book identifies and examines for the first time. How could the wisdom and virtue of the great thinkers of antiquity be reconciled with the fact that they were pagans and, many thought, damned? Related questions were raised by encounters with contemporary pagans in northern Europe, Mongolia, and, later, America and China. This book explores how writers — philosophers and theologians, but also poets such as Dante, Chaucer, and Langland, and travellers such as Las Casas and Ricci — tackled the Problem of Paganism. Augustine and Boethius set its terms, while Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury were important early advocates of pagan wisdom and virtue. University theologians such as Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Bradwardine, and later thinkers such as Ficino, Valla, More, Bayle, and Leibniz, explored the difficulty in depth. Meanwhile, Albert the Great inspired Boethius of Dacia and others to create a relativist conception of scientific knowledge that allowed Christian teachers to remain faithful Aristotelians. At the same time, early anthropologists such as John of Piano Carpini, John Mandeville, and Montaigne developed other sorts of relativism in response to the issue. A sweeping and original account of an important but neglected chapter in Western intellectual history, the book provides a new perspective on nothing less than the entire period between the classical and the modern world.Less
From the turn of the fifth century to the beginning of the eighteenth, Christian writers were fascinated and troubled by the ‘Problem of Paganism’, which this book identifies and examines for the first time. How could the wisdom and virtue of the great thinkers of antiquity be reconciled with the fact that they were pagans and, many thought, damned? Related questions were raised by encounters with contemporary pagans in northern Europe, Mongolia, and, later, America and China. This book explores how writers — philosophers and theologians, but also poets such as Dante, Chaucer, and Langland, and travellers such as Las Casas and Ricci — tackled the Problem of Paganism. Augustine and Boethius set its terms, while Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury were important early advocates of pagan wisdom and virtue. University theologians such as Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Bradwardine, and later thinkers such as Ficino, Valla, More, Bayle, and Leibniz, explored the difficulty in depth. Meanwhile, Albert the Great inspired Boethius of Dacia and others to create a relativist conception of scientific knowledge that allowed Christian teachers to remain faithful Aristotelians. At the same time, early anthropologists such as John of Piano Carpini, John Mandeville, and Montaigne developed other sorts of relativism in response to the issue. A sweeping and original account of an important but neglected chapter in Western intellectual history, the book provides a new perspective on nothing less than the entire period between the classical and the modern world.
Derek Drinkwater
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273850
- eISBN:
- 9780191602344
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273855.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Sir Harold Nicolson’s approach to the questions of inter-war European security represented an evolution from an idealist outlook at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to a more measured degree of ...
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Sir Harold Nicolson’s approach to the questions of inter-war European security represented an evolution from an idealist outlook at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to a more measured degree of idealism during the late 1920s. As the 1930s advanced, and the League of Nations and action based on the principles of collective security proved unable to quell the Japanese, Italian, and German aggression, Nicolson sought to devise new methods of resolving the major questions of peace and war. His solution was liberal realism, a fusion of idealism and realism. It was an amalgam of Aristotelian and Thucydidean principles of statecraft and diplomacy. By the late 1930s, with Germany rejecting reasonable revisions of the Treaty of Versailles, he began to believe that war could only be avoided if the democracies and the USSR initiated a cohesive strategy of alliance diplomacy while pursuing dialogue with the dictators. The Munich Agreement of 1938 and the steady unravelling of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement finally convinced Nicolson that war was inevitable.Less
Sir Harold Nicolson’s approach to the questions of inter-war European security represented an evolution from an idealist outlook at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to a more measured degree of idealism during the late 1920s. As the 1930s advanced, and the League of Nations and action based on the principles of collective security proved unable to quell the Japanese, Italian, and German aggression, Nicolson sought to devise new methods of resolving the major questions of peace and war. His solution was liberal realism, a fusion of idealism and realism. It was an amalgam of Aristotelian and Thucydidean principles of statecraft and diplomacy. By the late 1930s, with Germany rejecting reasonable revisions of the Treaty of Versailles, he began to believe that war could only be avoided if the democracies and the USSR initiated a cohesive strategy of alliance diplomacy while pursuing dialogue with the dictators. The Munich Agreement of 1938 and the steady unravelling of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement finally convinced Nicolson that war was inevitable.
Michael J. White
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239529
- eISBN:
- 9780191679940
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239529.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Part I of this study closely examines both Aristotle's analysis of the physical properties of spatial magnitude, time, and locomotion, and the metaphysical view underlying this analysis. At the heart ...
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Part I of this study closely examines both Aristotle's analysis of the physical properties of spatial magnitude, time, and locomotion, and the metaphysical view underlying this analysis. At the heart of Aristotle's metaphysical view is a conception of ‘happening’ — ‘motion’ or process — as a fundamental ontological category. This part of the book looks first to Aristotle's formal structural analysis of physical continua such as spatial magnitude and local motion, and then to the metaphysical underpinnings of his analysis of these continua.Less
Part I of this study closely examines both Aristotle's analysis of the physical properties of spatial magnitude, time, and locomotion, and the metaphysical view underlying this analysis. At the heart of Aristotle's metaphysical view is a conception of ‘happening’ — ‘motion’ or process — as a fundamental ontological category. This part of the book looks first to Aristotle's formal structural analysis of physical continua such as spatial magnitude and local motion, and then to the metaphysical underpinnings of his analysis of these continua.
Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247998
- eISBN:
- 9780191597756
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which ...
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On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.Less
On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.
George E. Karamanolis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199264568
- eISBN:
- 9780191603990
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199264562.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Ammonius Saccas held the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is in agreement with that of Plato on most essential philosophical issues. It is argued that Ammonius was an independent thinker who, ...
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Ammonius Saccas held the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is in agreement with that of Plato on most essential philosophical issues. It is argued that Ammonius was an independent thinker who, though a Platonist, had a weaker commitment to Plato than most of his contemporary Platonists, and hence was uninterested in interschool polemics. Rather, his concern was to search for the truth in philosophy, which led him to study the works of both Plato and Aristotle, and appreciate them according to their merits. Focusing on the underlying thought behind the texts, Ammonius set aside doctrines forged by later philosophers, points of detail, and also certain flaws of the philosophers themselves, and reached an understanding of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, concluding that their basic doctrines are essentially the same.Less
Ammonius Saccas held the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is in agreement with that of Plato on most essential philosophical issues. It is argued that Ammonius was an independent thinker who, though a Platonist, had a weaker commitment to Plato than most of his contemporary Platonists, and hence was uninterested in interschool polemics. Rather, his concern was to search for the truth in philosophy, which led him to study the works of both Plato and Aristotle, and appreciate them according to their merits. Focusing on the underlying thought behind the texts, Ammonius set aside doctrines forged by later philosophers, points of detail, and also certain flaws of the philosophers themselves, and reached an understanding of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, concluding that their basic doctrines are essentially the same.
Isaiah Berlin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199249893
- eISBN:
- 9780191598807
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924989X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Berlin’s presidential address to the Aristotelian Society dealt with one important gap in his conceptual wall against totalitarianism. If to be free implied knowledge and the exercise of reason, then ...
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Berlin’s presidential address to the Aristotelian Society dealt with one important gap in his conceptual wall against totalitarianism. If to be free implied knowledge and the exercise of reason, then the distinction between negative and positive views of liberty might be hard to maintain. Berlin argued that knowledge does not always liberate, which implies that freedom does not always depend on knowledge.Less
Berlin’s presidential address to the Aristotelian Society dealt with one important gap in his conceptual wall against totalitarianism. If to be free implied knowledge and the exercise of reason, then the distinction between negative and positive views of liberty might be hard to maintain. Berlin argued that knowledge does not always liberate, which implies that freedom does not always depend on knowledge.
Michael J. Sandel
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294962
- eISBN:
- 9780191598708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294964.003.0025
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
There are reasons to doubt that the civic aspirations of the republican tradition will be realized in our time, but there are equally compelling reasons to reject the alternative: a public life that ...
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There are reasons to doubt that the civic aspirations of the republican tradition will be realized in our time, but there are equally compelling reasons to reject the alternative: a public life that gives up on the project of freedom as self-government, that abandons the aim of calling economic power to democratic account, that fails to form in citizens the qualities of character that equip them for self-rule. Of the two versions of republicanism–the modest, instrumental one and the strong, intrinsic, Aristotelian one–the second seems most persuasive. Unless citizens have reason to believe that sharing in self-government is intrinsically important, their willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the common good may be eroded by instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of political participation. The republican tradition has long considered an excessive preoccupation with consumption a moral and civic vice, inimical to self-government; from the standpoint of procedural liberalism, what matters is fair access to the fruits of consumption. Since imagining ways of reorganizing the relation between family and work so that the distinctive goods of each are accorded the social recognition and prestige they deserve requires explicit social choices about the place of family and work in a good life, it is unlikely to be advanced within the terms of procedural liberalism. The best response to the intolerance that fuels the culture wars is not to deconstruct the identities of the combatants but to challenge the economic forces and cultural tendencies that enervate citizenship and erode the dispositions that equip us for self-rule.Less
There are reasons to doubt that the civic aspirations of the republican tradition will be realized in our time, but there are equally compelling reasons to reject the alternative: a public life that gives up on the project of freedom as self-government, that abandons the aim of calling economic power to democratic account, that fails to form in citizens the qualities of character that equip them for self-rule. Of the two versions of republicanism–the modest, instrumental one and the strong, intrinsic, Aristotelian one–the second seems most persuasive. Unless citizens have reason to believe that sharing in self-government is intrinsically important, their willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the common good may be eroded by instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of political participation. The republican tradition has long considered an excessive preoccupation with consumption a moral and civic vice, inimical to self-government; from the standpoint of procedural liberalism, what matters is fair access to the fruits of consumption. Since imagining ways of reorganizing the relation between family and work so that the distinctive goods of each are accorded the social recognition and prestige they deserve requires explicit social choices about the place of family and work in a good life, it is unlikely to be advanced within the terms of procedural liberalism. The best response to the intolerance that fuels the culture wars is not to deconstruct the identities of the combatants but to challenge the economic forces and cultural tendencies that enervate citizenship and erode the dispositions that equip us for self-rule.
Thomas Hurka
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195101164
- eISBN:
- 9780199833276
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195101162.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This concluding chapter summarizes the book and wonders whether what is most plausible is a pure perfectionism of the kind the book has described or a pluralist view that gives independent value to ...
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This concluding chapter summarizes the book and wonders whether what is most plausible is a pure perfectionism of the kind the book has described or a pluralist view that gives independent value to pleasure, virtue, and other goods, which the Aristotelian theory does not accommodate.Less
This concluding chapter summarizes the book and wonders whether what is most plausible is a pure perfectionism of the kind the book has described or a pluralist view that gives independent value to pleasure, virtue, and other goods, which the Aristotelian theory does not accommodate.
Christopher Gill
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198152682
- eISBN:
- 9780191710131
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This book examines ideas about personality and self in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, and the possible influence of these ideas on Greek and Roman literature. The book is subdivided into three ...
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This book examines ideas about personality and self in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, and the possible influence of these ideas on Greek and Roman literature. The book is subdivided into three parts. The first part focuses on the question of what is new and distinctive in the Hellenistic philosophical conception of self, especially in Stoicism and Epicureanism. A shared or converging set of ideas (the structured self) is analyzed in these two theories, centred on a combination of radical (Socratic) ethical claims and on psychophysical and psychological holism. This view of selfhood is contrasted with the non-holistic, part-based conception of personality found in the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition in this period. The second part illustrates this broad contrast with special reference to the Stoic theory of passions and its critical reception by thinkers in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, such as Plutarch and Galen. It is suggested that the Stoic theory and its critics are both influenced by different strands in Plato’s thought about psychology. The third part of the book discusses theoretical issues about concepts of selfhood. It argues against the common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a subjective-individualistic notion of self. This part also considers the possible influence of the philosophical ideas discussed here on literature in this period. It identifies contrasting Platonic-Aristotelian and Stoic-Epicurean ways of thinking about collapse of character, and traces the possible influence of these patterns in Plutarch’s biography, Senecan tragedy, and Virgilian epic.Less
This book examines ideas about personality and self in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, and the possible influence of these ideas on Greek and Roman literature. The book is subdivided into three parts. The first part focuses on the question of what is new and distinctive in the Hellenistic philosophical conception of self, especially in Stoicism and Epicureanism. A shared or converging set of ideas (the structured self) is analyzed in these two theories, centred on a combination of radical (Socratic) ethical claims and on psychophysical and psychological holism. This view of selfhood is contrasted with the non-holistic, part-based conception of personality found in the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition in this period. The second part illustrates this broad contrast with special reference to the Stoic theory of passions and its critical reception by thinkers in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, such as Plutarch and Galen. It is suggested that the Stoic theory and its critics are both influenced by different strands in Plato’s thought about psychology. The third part of the book discusses theoretical issues about concepts of selfhood. It argues against the common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a subjective-individualistic notion of self. This part also considers the possible influence of the philosophical ideas discussed here on literature in this period. It identifies contrasting Platonic-Aristotelian and Stoic-Epicurean ways of thinking about collapse of character, and traces the possible influence of these patterns in Plutarch’s biography, Senecan tragedy, and Virgilian epic.
Michael Ruse
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780691195957
- eISBN:
- 9781400888603
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691195957.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Can we live without the idea of purpose? Should we even try to? Kant thought we were stuck with it, and even Darwin, who profoundly shook the idea, was unable to kill it. Indeed, purpose seems to be ...
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Can we live without the idea of purpose? Should we even try to? Kant thought we were stuck with it, and even Darwin, who profoundly shook the idea, was unable to kill it. Indeed, purpose seems to be making a comeback today, as both religious advocates of intelligent design and some prominent secular philosophers argue that any explanation of life without the idea of purpose is missing something essential. This book explores the history of purpose in philosophical, religious, scientific, and historical thought, from ancient Greece to the present. The book traces how Platonic, Aristotelian, and Kantian ideas of purpose continue to shape Western thought. Along the way, it also takes up tough questions about the purpose of life—and whether it's possible to have meaning without purpose.Less
Can we live without the idea of purpose? Should we even try to? Kant thought we were stuck with it, and even Darwin, who profoundly shook the idea, was unable to kill it. Indeed, purpose seems to be making a comeback today, as both religious advocates of intelligent design and some prominent secular philosophers argue that any explanation of life without the idea of purpose is missing something essential. This book explores the history of purpose in philosophical, religious, scientific, and historical thought, from ancient Greece to the present. The book traces how Platonic, Aristotelian, and Kantian ideas of purpose continue to shape Western thought. Along the way, it also takes up tough questions about the purpose of life—and whether it's possible to have meaning without purpose.
Piero Boitani
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264133
- eISBN:
- 9780191734649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264133.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, 16th-century and Renaissance Literature
This chapter examines Petrarch's thoughts on the people he called ‘barbari Britanni’. It charts the humanist's changing view of those whom he initially termed ‘timidissimi barbarorum’ and whom he ...
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This chapter examines Petrarch's thoughts on the people he called ‘barbari Britanni’. It charts the humanist's changing view of those whom he initially termed ‘timidissimi barbarorum’ and whom he criticised since Britain was the home of Aristotelian logic and highlights his admiration for his bookish English contemporary and correspondent Richard de Bury. It also discusses Petrarch's admiration for English military superiority over the French.Less
This chapter examines Petrarch's thoughts on the people he called ‘barbari Britanni’. It charts the humanist's changing view of those whom he initially termed ‘timidissimi barbarorum’ and whom he criticised since Britain was the home of Aristotelian logic and highlights his admiration for his bookish English contemporary and correspondent Richard de Bury. It also discusses Petrarch's admiration for English military superiority over the French.
David Hopkins
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264706
- eISBN:
- 9780191734557
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264706.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies
This chapter discusses John Milton's acquaintance with classical literature, which began early and continued throughout his lifetime. Between 1615 and 1620, Milton entered St. Paul's, which was ...
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This chapter discusses John Milton's acquaintance with classical literature, which began early and continued throughout his lifetime. Between 1615 and 1620, Milton entered St. Paul's, which was founded by John Colet, a friend and disciple of Erasmus. St. Paul's was heavily influenced by Erasmus's humanist principles, which centred on a thorough and actively practical engagement with classical literature and civilization. Prior to his education in St. Paul's, Milton was home tutored, which centred on the elements of classical learning. From 1625, Milton continued his studies at Christ's College, Cambridge. During these periods of educational quest, Milton honed his knowledge of classical literature and languages. He mastered Greek and Latin, and acquainted himself with the works of Latin and Greek poets. Even at the onset of his blindness, Milton maintained his acquaintance with the classical literature; he taught his daughter Greek and Latin so she could read to him in those languages. His convictions were centrally grounded in the classics; for instance, his republicanism was grounded in Roman precedent. Milton worked in Latin, and his English poems were steeped in classical forms such as imagery, rhetoric, and allusions. Three of his major works were written in mainstream classical genres: twelve-book epic, pastoral, and Aristotelian tragedy. Milton's poetic language was saturated at the local level of vocabulary, syntax, and metaphorical resonance with Greek and Latin languages.Less
This chapter discusses John Milton's acquaintance with classical literature, which began early and continued throughout his lifetime. Between 1615 and 1620, Milton entered St. Paul's, which was founded by John Colet, a friend and disciple of Erasmus. St. Paul's was heavily influenced by Erasmus's humanist principles, which centred on a thorough and actively practical engagement with classical literature and civilization. Prior to his education in St. Paul's, Milton was home tutored, which centred on the elements of classical learning. From 1625, Milton continued his studies at Christ's College, Cambridge. During these periods of educational quest, Milton honed his knowledge of classical literature and languages. He mastered Greek and Latin, and acquainted himself with the works of Latin and Greek poets. Even at the onset of his blindness, Milton maintained his acquaintance with the classical literature; he taught his daughter Greek and Latin so she could read to him in those languages. His convictions were centrally grounded in the classics; for instance, his republicanism was grounded in Roman precedent. Milton worked in Latin, and his English poems were steeped in classical forms such as imagery, rhetoric, and allusions. Three of his major works were written in mainstream classical genres: twelve-book epic, pastoral, and Aristotelian tragedy. Milton's poetic language was saturated at the local level of vocabulary, syntax, and metaphorical resonance with Greek and Latin languages.
