Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on ...
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Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.Less
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245544
- eISBN:
- 9780191680878
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245544.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses two of the three Aristotelian Ethics, which are the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics have been considered as the ethics of Aristotle for many ...
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This chapter discusses two of the three Aristotelian Ethics, which are the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics have been considered as the ethics of Aristotle for many centuries, while the Eudemian Ethics were once regarded as false by scholars in the 19th century. Several ancient writers and their respective quotations and commentaries of the Ethics of Aristotle are discussed in detail in the final sections of this chapter.Less
This chapter discusses two of the three Aristotelian Ethics, which are the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics have been considered as the ethics of Aristotle for many centuries, while the Eudemian Ethics were once regarded as false by scholars in the 19th century. Several ancient writers and their respective quotations and commentaries of the Ethics of Aristotle are discussed in detail in the final sections of this chapter.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
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The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines philosopher John Finnis' attempted reconstruction of natural law moral theory. It suggests that Finnis has undercut the functional view of Aristotelian ethics by suggesting that ...
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This chapter examines philosopher John Finnis' attempted reconstruction of natural law moral theory. It suggests that Finnis has undercut the functional view of Aristotelian ethics by suggesting that the metaphysical support normally used to interpret natural law theories of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas is misguided. In his Natural Law and Natural Rights and Fundamentals of Ethics, Finnis has proposed a view of natural law ethics that denies the importance of the functional view of essence as a necessary condition for explaining natural law theory.Less
This chapter examines philosopher John Finnis' attempted reconstruction of natural law moral theory. It suggests that Finnis has undercut the functional view of Aristotelian ethics by suggesting that the metaphysical support normally used to interpret natural law theories of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas is misguided. In his Natural Law and Natural Rights and Fundamentals of Ethics, Finnis has proposed a view of natural law ethics that denies the importance of the functional view of essence as a necessary condition for explaining natural law theory.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This new critique of Aquinas' theory of natural law presents an incisive, new analysis of the central themes and relevant texts in the Summa Theologiae, which became the classical canon for natural ...
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This new critique of Aquinas' theory of natural law presents an incisive, new analysis of the central themes and relevant texts in the Summa Theologiae, which became the classical canon for natural law. The author discusses Aquinas' view of ethical naturalism within the context of the contemporary revival and recovery of Aristotelian ethics, arguing that Aquinas is fundamentally Aristotelian in the foundations of his moral theory. The book looks at the historical development of natural law themes in the twentieth century, and in particular demonstrates the important connections between Aquinas and contemporary legal philosophers. The book should be of considerable interest to scholars of jurisprudence as well as philosophers.Less
This new critique of Aquinas' theory of natural law presents an incisive, new analysis of the central themes and relevant texts in the Summa Theologiae, which became the classical canon for natural law. The author discusses Aquinas' view of ethical naturalism within the context of the contemporary revival and recovery of Aristotelian ethics, arguing that Aquinas is fundamentally Aristotelian in the foundations of his moral theory. The book looks at the historical development of natural law themes in the twentieth century, and in particular demonstrates the important connections between Aquinas and contemporary legal philosophers. The book should be of considerable interest to scholars of jurisprudence as well as philosophers.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the renewed interest in natural law theory in general and the natural law canon proposed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa ...
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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the renewed interest in natural law theory in general and the natural law canon proposed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This book aims to explore the metaphilosophy and the metaphysics needed to explain the Aristotelian meta-ethics as seen through the eyes of Aquinas. It examines Aquinas' appropriation of the important categories and concepts from the philosophy system of Aristotle.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the renewed interest in natural law theory in general and the natural law canon proposed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This book aims to explore the metaphilosophy and the metaphysics needed to explain the Aristotelian meta-ethics as seen through the eyes of Aquinas. It examines Aquinas' appropriation of the important categories and concepts from the philosophy system of Aristotle.
John Cottingham
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752349
- eISBN:
- 9780191597251
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752342.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues that the ethical excellences unfolded in the classical Aristotelian conception of the virtuous life presupposes a pre‐existing network of partialistic preferences, and that its resulting ...
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Argues that the ethical excellences unfolded in the classical Aristotelian conception of the virtuous life presupposes a pre‐existing network of partialistic preferences, and that its resulting rootedness in the real world gives virtue theory a decisive edge over its more abstract competitors. The ‘autocentric’ perspective of virtue ethics need not, however, imply a complacent and unfeeling social conservatism. Finally, charts the shift between such autocentric conceptions of ethics and more universalist accounts of morality, with special reference to Cartesian ethics, where we find an uneasy blend of traditional ‘aretic’ and proto‐Kantian elements.Less
Argues that the ethical excellences unfolded in the classical Aristotelian conception of the virtuous life presupposes a pre‐existing network of partialistic preferences, and that its resulting rootedness in the real world gives virtue theory a decisive edge over its more abstract competitors. The ‘autocentric’ perspective of virtue ethics need not, however, imply a complacent and unfeeling social conservatism. Finally, charts the shift between such autocentric conceptions of ethics and more universalist accounts of morality, with special reference to Cartesian ethics, where we find an uneasy blend of traditional ‘aretic’ and proto‐Kantian elements.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245544
- eISBN:
- 9780191680878
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245544.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. While the references to happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics are brief and at times ...
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This chapter discusses happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. While the references to happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics are brief and at times cryptic, happiness is treated and presented differently in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics.Less
This chapter discusses happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. While the references to happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics are brief and at times cryptic, happiness is treated and presented differently in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245544
- eISBN:
- 9780191680878
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245544.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses a study that looks separately at the phronesis-theory of each of the three treatises. It also compares the phronēsis-theory of the Aristotelian Ethics with that of the ...
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This chapter discusses a study that looks separately at the phronesis-theory of each of the three treatises. It also compares the phronēsis-theory of the Aristotelian Ethics with that of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. The contrasts that can be drawn between the theory of the latter two are studied in this chapter as well.Less
This chapter discusses a study that looks separately at the phronesis-theory of each of the three treatises. It also compares the phronēsis-theory of the Aristotelian Ethics with that of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. The contrasts that can be drawn between the theory of the latter two are studied in this chapter as well.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198790938
- eISBN:
- 9780191836282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790938.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses two of the three Aristotelian Ethics, which are the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics have been considered as the ethics of Aristotle for many ...
More
This chapter discusses two of the three Aristotelian Ethics, which are the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics have been considered as the ethics of Aristotle for many centuries, while the Eudemian Ethics were once regarded as false by scholars in the 19th century. Several ancient writers and their respective quotations and commentaries of the Ethics of Aristotle are discussed in detail in the final sections of this chapter.Less
This chapter discusses two of the three Aristotelian Ethics, which are the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics have been considered as the ethics of Aristotle for many centuries, while the Eudemian Ethics were once regarded as false by scholars in the 19th century. Several ancient writers and their respective quotations and commentaries of the Ethics of Aristotle are discussed in detail in the final sections of this chapter.
Philip S. Gorski
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814738726
- eISBN:
- 9780814738733
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814738726.003.0004
- Subject:
- Sociology, Politics, Social Movements and Social Change
This chapter examines what Émile Durkheim could have meant by his statement that sociology is a “moral science” and whether the project it implied is a defensible one. Durkheim's goal was not only to ...
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This chapter examines what Émile Durkheim could have meant by his statement that sociology is a “moral science” and whether the project it implied is a defensible one. Durkheim's goal was not only to study morality scientifically; he also proposed to put morality on a scientific footing—a goal that most contemporary sociologists would be uncomfortable with. This chapter argues that Durkheim's vision of “moral science” was inspired primarily by Aristotelian ethics and that it anticipated many of the ideas of virtue ethics and related schools of thought and research. It considers a number of reasons why there is a connection between Durkheim and Aristotle and why that connection has received so little attention. Finally, it explains why Aristotelian ethics was much better suited to Durkheim's purposes than was Kantianism or utilitarianism.Less
This chapter examines what Émile Durkheim could have meant by his statement that sociology is a “moral science” and whether the project it implied is a defensible one. Durkheim's goal was not only to study morality scientifically; he also proposed to put morality on a scientific footing—a goal that most contemporary sociologists would be uncomfortable with. This chapter argues that Durkheim's vision of “moral science” was inspired primarily by Aristotelian ethics and that it anticipated many of the ideas of virtue ethics and related schools of thought and research. It considers a number of reasons why there is a connection between Durkheim and Aristotle and why that connection has received so little attention. Finally, it explains why Aristotelian ethics was much better suited to Durkheim's purposes than was Kantianism or utilitarianism.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245544
- eISBN:
- 9780191680878
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245544.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the style of ethical treatises in the three ethical books of Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. It pays particular attention ...
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This chapter discusses the style of ethical treatises in the three ethical books of Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. It pays particular attention to the pronouns, adverbs, and prepositions in these treatises, since these provide abundant material for a statistical study of style.Less
This chapter discusses the style of ethical treatises in the three ethical books of Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. It pays particular attention to the pronouns, adverbs, and prepositions in these treatises, since these provide abundant material for a statistical study of style.
Robert B. Louden
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195072921
- eISBN:
- 9780199852925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195072921.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly skeptical towards both morality and moral theory. The skepticism concerning morality stems from the argument that moral considerations are not always ...
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Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly skeptical towards both morality and moral theory. The skepticism concerning morality stems from the argument that moral considerations are not always the most important considerations and that it is not always good to be morally better. The skepticism concerning moral theory stems from the argument that moral theory is a radically misguided enterprise—one that does not illuminate moral practice and fulfills no useful functions. The succeeding chapters provide a response to the arguments of both “antimorality” and “antitheory” skeptics. The aim is to defuse such skepticism by putting forward alternative conceptions of morality and moral theory—conceptions that owe more to central texts within the canon of Western philosophical ethics (particularly Kantian and Aristotelian) than to sheer conceptual virtuosity.Less
Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly skeptical towards both morality and moral theory. The skepticism concerning morality stems from the argument that moral considerations are not always the most important considerations and that it is not always good to be morally better. The skepticism concerning moral theory stems from the argument that moral theory is a radically misguided enterprise—one that does not illuminate moral practice and fulfills no useful functions. The succeeding chapters provide a response to the arguments of both “antimorality” and “antitheory” skeptics. The aim is to defuse such skepticism by putting forward alternative conceptions of morality and moral theory—conceptions that owe more to central texts within the canon of Western philosophical ethics (particularly Kantian and Aristotelian) than to sheer conceptual virtuosity.
Cheryl Mattingly
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780520281196
- eISBN:
- 9780520959538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520281196.003.0002
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
Chapter 2 elaborates what is entailed in a first-person version of virtue ethics in an explicitly debating style. It argues that it is important to look at the contrasts between a first-person virtue ...
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Chapter 2 elaborates what is entailed in a first-person version of virtue ethics in an explicitly debating style. It argues that it is important to look at the contrasts between a first-person virtue ethics and a third-person discursive one inspired especially by Foucault. It examines ways that these positions challenge rather than support one another, despite their many areas of overlap. It particularly highlights conceptual divides regarding the status of the “self.” Although the chapter pays special attention to anthropological voices, the question raised—why we need a first-person version of virtue ethics—speaks to a much broader interdisciplinary conversation.Less
Chapter 2 elaborates what is entailed in a first-person version of virtue ethics in an explicitly debating style. It argues that it is important to look at the contrasts between a first-person virtue ethics and a third-person discursive one inspired especially by Foucault. It examines ways that these positions challenge rather than support one another, despite their many areas of overlap. It particularly highlights conceptual divides regarding the status of the “self.” Although the chapter pays special attention to anthropological voices, the question raised—why we need a first-person version of virtue ethics—speaks to a much broader interdisciplinary conversation.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199685905
- eISBN:
- 9780191765803
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter concerns whether the best account of virtue will involve the idea that an agent can ‘go beyond’ duty in a morally praiseworthy way. The chapter begins by outlining Henry Sidgwick’s view ...
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This chapter concerns whether the best account of virtue will involve the idea that an agent can ‘go beyond’ duty in a morally praiseworthy way. The chapter begins by outlining Henry Sidgwick’s view that supererogation involves an immoral paradox, since it seems to allow a morally blameless agent to do less morally than she might. The conditions of supererogatory action are set out, and the origins of the idea in Christian doctrine are explained. An Aristotelian account of virtue, relating duty to ‘fittingness’, is set out, and claimed to be preferable to an account allowing for supererogation. The chapter closes with responses to Urmson’s arguments in favour of supererogation in his famous paper ‘Saints and Heroes’.Less
This chapter concerns whether the best account of virtue will involve the idea that an agent can ‘go beyond’ duty in a morally praiseworthy way. The chapter begins by outlining Henry Sidgwick’s view that supererogation involves an immoral paradox, since it seems to allow a morally blameless agent to do less morally than she might. The conditions of supererogatory action are set out, and the origins of the idea in Christian doctrine are explained. An Aristotelian account of virtue, relating duty to ‘fittingness’, is set out, and claimed to be preferable to an account allowing for supererogation. The chapter closes with responses to Urmson’s arguments in favour of supererogation in his famous paper ‘Saints and Heroes’.
S. Min Chun
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199688968
- eISBN:
- 9780191768071
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688968.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies, Religion in the Ancient World
The Introduction outlines the aims, the object of the research, the methodology, the scope, and the limit of the book. The aims of the book are to propose a methodological framework for an ethical ...
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The Introduction outlines the aims, the object of the research, the methodology, the scope, and the limit of the book. The aims of the book are to propose a methodological framework for an ethical reading of Old Testament narrative and to demonstrate the benefits and the validity of such a framework by providing exemplary readings. When ethics is understood within the Aristotelian tradition, narrative can play a crucial role in Old Testament ethics. The critical methodology employed is synchronic literary criticism anchored in discourse analysis. With this methodology, the objectivity of literary criticism can be enhanced because it can be built upon linguistic observations. This book is about neither ethics of reading (a pragmatic reflection regarding the ethical responsibility of the reader) nor discourse ethics (as proposed by Habermas).Less
The Introduction outlines the aims, the object of the research, the methodology, the scope, and the limit of the book. The aims of the book are to propose a methodological framework for an ethical reading of Old Testament narrative and to demonstrate the benefits and the validity of such a framework by providing exemplary readings. When ethics is understood within the Aristotelian tradition, narrative can play a crucial role in Old Testament ethics. The critical methodology employed is synchronic literary criticism anchored in discourse analysis. With this methodology, the objectivity of literary criticism can be enhanced because it can be built upon linguistic observations. This book is about neither ethics of reading (a pragmatic reflection regarding the ethical responsibility of the reader) nor discourse ethics (as proposed by Habermas).
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198790938
- eISBN:
- 9780191836282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790938.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. While the references to happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics are brief and at times ...
More
This chapter discusses happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. While the references to happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics are brief and at times cryptic, happiness is treated and presented differently in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics.Less
This chapter discusses happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Aristotelian Ethics. While the references to happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics are brief and at times cryptic, happiness is treated and presented differently in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics.
Cheryl Mattingly
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780520281196
- eISBN:
- 9780520959538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520281196.003.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
This chapter sets out the parameters of the book as a whole, proposing a first-person virtue ethics as a way to understand the moral projects of African American parents caring for children with ...
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This chapter sets out the parameters of the book as a whole, proposing a first-person virtue ethics as a way to understand the moral projects of African American parents caring for children with severe and chronic illnesses and disabilities. It opens with an “experimental” soccer game in which a boy in a wheelchair has been included in a children’s neighborhood soccer league. Drawing upon this example, the chapter outlines the key claims of a virtue ethics framework in which parents struggle over how to provide their children a “best good life” and the dilemmas and tragedies that entail their efforts to care for these “intimate others.” The first-person framework that is offered draws both upon philosophical virtue ethics and hermeneutic phenomenology.Less
This chapter sets out the parameters of the book as a whole, proposing a first-person virtue ethics as a way to understand the moral projects of African American parents caring for children with severe and chronic illnesses and disabilities. It opens with an “experimental” soccer game in which a boy in a wheelchair has been included in a children’s neighborhood soccer league. Drawing upon this example, the chapter outlines the key claims of a virtue ethics framework in which parents struggle over how to provide their children a “best good life” and the dilemmas and tragedies that entail their efforts to care for these “intimate others.” The first-person framework that is offered draws both upon philosophical virtue ethics and hermeneutic phenomenology.
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198248439
- eISBN:
- 9780191597558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198248431.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Concerns various forms of perfectionist accounts of well‐being: Aristotelian, pluralist, Nietzschean, and so on. It discusses the ends of life (defending a modified Aristotelian view) and the ...
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Concerns various forms of perfectionist accounts of well‐being: Aristotelian, pluralist, Nietzschean, and so on. It discusses the ends of life (defending a modified Aristotelian view) and the relation of prudence and morality. These discussions reinforce the conclusion of the previous chapter.Less
Concerns various forms of perfectionist accounts of well‐being: Aristotelian, pluralist, Nietzschean, and so on. It discusses the ends of life (defending a modified Aristotelian view) and the relation of prudence and morality. These discussions reinforce the conclusion of the previous chapter.
Jay L. Garfield
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190499778
- eISBN:
- 9780190499792
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190499778.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This essay explores the role of the two aspects of mindfulness (smṛti and samprajanya) in ethical discipline. It argues that mindfulness understood as the union of these two attitudes is essential to ...
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This essay explores the role of the two aspects of mindfulness (smṛti and samprajanya) in ethical discipline. It argues that mindfulness understood as the union of these two attitudes is essential to the kind of perception and attention necessary for spontaneous moral engagement with the world. The essay first discusses why mindfulness is so important in Buddhist ethics. It then turns to the importance of spontaneity, first in the Aristotelian and then in the Zen tradition. It closes by showing why spontaneity can be understood as desirable only if infused by the kind of mindfulness philosophers such as Śāntideva recommend, and why mindfulness can be morally efficacious only if it suffuses our perception and action so as to render them spontaneous.Less
This essay explores the role of the two aspects of mindfulness (smṛti and samprajanya) in ethical discipline. It argues that mindfulness understood as the union of these two attitudes is essential to the kind of perception and attention necessary for spontaneous moral engagement with the world. The essay first discusses why mindfulness is so important in Buddhist ethics. It then turns to the importance of spontaneity, first in the Aristotelian and then in the Zen tradition. It closes by showing why spontaneity can be understood as desirable only if infused by the kind of mindfulness philosophers such as Śāntideva recommend, and why mindfulness can be morally efficacious only if it suffuses our perception and action so as to render them spontaneous.
