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Reductio

Arianna Betti

in Against Facts

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780262029216
eISBN:
9780262329644
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that there is no reference to facts by means of that-clauses because that-clauses are non-referential parts of speech. Four necessary conditions for an expression to be a singular ... More


Conclusion: Farewell to Facts

Arianna Betti

in Against Facts

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780262029216
eISBN:
9780262329644
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of ... More


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