John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
It is initially plausible that people are morally entitled to take faith-beliefs to be true only when held on the basis of adequate evidential support. This moral evidentialism is parsed into (1) the ...
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It is initially plausible that people are morally entitled to take faith-beliefs to be true only when held on the basis of adequate evidential support. This moral evidentialism is parsed into (1) the claim that moral entitlement to a faith-belief requires epistemic entitlement, and (2) epistemic evidentialism, which holds that epistemic entitlement requires the belief to be held on the basis of adequate evidential support. Epistemic evidentialism is defended, while conceding to epistemological externalism that beliefs may have epistemic worth without being supported by evidence accessible to the believer. Despite the force of the arguments of natural theology and atheological arguments such as the Argument from Evil, it is argued that it is plausible enough that theistic beliefs are evidentially ambiguous. Any defence of theistic faith-commitment would then need to repudiate moral evidentialism and embrace some form of fideism.Less
It is initially plausible that people are morally entitled to take faith-beliefs to be true only when held on the basis of adequate evidential support. This moral evidentialism is parsed into (1) the claim that moral entitlement to a faith-belief requires epistemic entitlement, and (2) epistemic evidentialism, which holds that epistemic entitlement requires the belief to be held on the basis of adequate evidential support. Epistemic evidentialism is defended, while conceding to epistemological externalism that beliefs may have epistemic worth without being supported by evidence accessible to the believer. Despite the force of the arguments of natural theology and atheological arguments such as the Argument from Evil, it is argued that it is plausible enough that theistic beliefs are evidentially ambiguous. Any defence of theistic faith-commitment would then need to repudiate moral evidentialism and embrace some form of fideism.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- July 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198821625
- eISBN:
- 9780191860904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198821625.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human ...
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The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.Less
The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.
