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A brief synoptic conclusion. When our aim is a distinctive account of ultimate reality the proper postmodal tool is that of fundamentality. With that tool we can articulate a "fundamentalist vision": an account of the fundamental nature of the facts and laws in the domain in question. This conception of the metaphysics of science fits a certain realist outlook, and undermines some forms of structuralism: nomic essentialism and structural realism (though not comparativism). But the vision faces serious challenges having to do with arbitrariness: arbitrariness in the constituents of the fundamental facts, and arbitrariness in the laws of nature.

One of the major discoveries of modern linguistics is that languages do not vary arbitrarily: for example, all syntactic rules must be based on hierarchical structure generated by recursive procedure rather than linear order. Neuroimaging techniques have shown that these formal restrictions constituting the boundaries of Babel are in fact represented in the brain for people who learn non-recursive artificially designed rules do not involve those neural circuits that underpin language computation. The boundaries of Babels cannot be cultural and arbitrary.

Quantitative properties are those that come in degrees, which we represent with numbers. A metaphysical account of quantity - in my view an account of the fundamental quantitative features - must explain the possibility of numerical representation; and such an account will have implications for the laws of nature in which quantitative properties figure. One such account is comparativism, the view that the fundamental quantitative features are comparative relations. Comparativism passes a minimum test (which certain other accounts fail): enabling strong laws of nature. But questions arise about the kinds of laws it enables. Hartry Field's insistence on "intrinsic" laws is examined, as well as David John Baker's argument that comparativism undermines determinism. In the end a pessimistic conclusion emerges: any account of the fundamental quantitative features, whether comparativist or no, seems to require unattractively arbitrary choices.

This chapter presents a non‐arbitrariness argument against future bias: (1) At any given time, a prudentially rational agent’s preferences are insensitive to arbitrary differences. (2) Being past rather than future is an arbitrary difference between events. (3) If you are future‐biased, your preferences are sensitive to when an event is scheduled relative to the present. (C) So, at any given time, future‐biased preferences are not rational. The chapter defends (2) by considering a variety of ways in which being past rather than future might be normatively significant. These include asymmetries in temporal properties, emotional reactions, attachment, control, andmetaphysical possibility. Thechapter argues that none of these asymmetries are normatively significant.

The previous chapter analysed the role played by rights in the EU legal order and their impact on judicial review. This chapter is concerned with equality and the way in which it has been shaped by Union legislation and the Courts’ jurisprudence. The principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination are found within a number of Treaty articles, but the ECJ held that these were merely specific enunciations of the general principle of equality as one of the fundamental principles of EU law, which must be observed by any court.