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‘Foreign woman’ would have been a familiar term in the post-exilic Jewish context, evoking ideas of corruption and apostasy central both to a recent controversy (described in Ezra and Nehemiah), and to the longstanding Deuteronomic/ Deuteronomistic theme that probably provoked the controversy. The presentation of this character in Proverbs 1-9 is consistent with an origin in such earlier ideas, and the motif of corruption is also linked with path imagery in other literature. There, we find associations between deviation from a path and apostasy, along with other detailed correspondences to the figure in Proverbs 1-9. It is difficult to ignore such materials when considering the origins of the characterizations and images in our work.

This chapter takes up the growth of pre-millennial thought in the fundamentalist movement of the 20th century. By the late 1800s, modernism had hit full stride. Rapid advances in the natural sciences, the emergence of the social sciences such as psychology and sociology, and the startling discoveries of biblical scholarship combined to create a new intellectual climate that fostered secular humanism. Many conservative Christians, however, were quick to recognize the work of the Prince of Apostasy in these seductive teachings. By 1920, a new coalition of pre-millennial Protestants emerged with a fully articulated and biblically based chronology for the end times. Known as fundamentalists, they were called upon to do “battle royal” for Christ in his urgent quest to eradicate the modernist, secularist, and humanistic forms in which the Antichrist proudly paraded across American intellectual life. What distinguishes fundamentalism from mainline Protestant denominations is its opposition to the 20th century's principal intellectual trends.

This chapter is a case in point, focusing on the problem of Jewish conversion under Islam. In 1834, Sol Hachuel, a fourteen-year-old Jewish girl from Tangier, was beheaded, having been charged by a Shari'ah court in Fez with accepting Islam and then reverting back to Judaism—an accusation which she denied. Backed by source material in French, Judeo-Arabic, and Hebrew, hitherto untapped, this study analyzes Judeo-Muslim relations based on the concept of ridda (apostasy). It defines Hachuel's execution as martyrdom in the collective memory of Moroccan Jewry, while myths about her abounded. Thereafter, Jews in significant numbers regarded the Muslim court judges, Muslim witnesses who incriminated her, and even the Sharifian Sultan Abd al- Rahman as “losers,” “immoral men,” and “dishonest.” Whereas this chapter does not rule out that her sources may well be regarded as “apologetic literature” favoring Hachuel, there can be no doubt that her beheading affected Jewish-Muslim relations adversely in precolonial Morocco with long-range consequences.

This chapter is the fourth section of Kadivar’s ‘Treatise on Refuting the Punishment for Blasphemy and Apostasy’. In this section, these issues are discussed: Examining the Claim of Consensus on the Necessity to Kill Apostates, Examining the Death Penalty for Apostasy as an Essential Component of Religion, Is the Ruling on Executing Apostates Part of the Essentials of Religion? Examining the Claim of Consensus on Killing Blasphemers. The ruling on killing apostates and blasphemers lacks a reliable proof from the Qur’an; and there is no presence of a mutawātir narration, either verbatim, in meaning or ijmālī. In addition, less than one-third of the twenty-one relevant narrations are reliable as regards the chains of transmission. Moreover, an ijmā‘ madrakī is inadmissible as an independent proof to discover the infallible Imam’s statements. Hence, on the basis of conventional ijtihād, the death penalty for apostasy and blasphemy relies upon few thiqa “isolated reports” (khabar al-wāḥid) and is consolidated with an ijmā‘ madrakī, the invoking of which will be analysed in other parts of this book.

This chapter is the first part of the ‘The Background of the Treatise’ and has three sections; Section one: Legal rulings (Fatāwā) condemning Rāfiq Taqī to death for apostasy or blaspheming the Prophet issued by Mortezā Banī Fazl and Mohammad Fāzel Lankarānī (Lankarānī Sr.) on 22 November 2006; Section two: The Killing of Rāfi q Taqī and Legal Ruling of Five Years Ago – Issued by Mohammad Fāzel Lankarānī (Lankarānī Sr) in 2011; Section three: The statement of delight and rejoice by Mohammad Javād Fāzel Lankarānī (Lankarānī Jr.) upon implementing the judgement on apostasy against Rāfiq Taqī issued on 27 November 2011.

At the outset, one must distinguish the Islam of the Qur’an and definitive hadith reports of the Prophet and the Ahl al-Bayt from the Islam of the “shari‘a” (i.e., the opinions of past jurists derived from the Qur’an and Sunna). The former enshrines the freedoms of religion and expression, whereas the latter places many restrictions upon these freedoms. This chapter discusses these issues: Restrictions on Freedom in the Shari‘a, Standard for the Freedom of Expression in Islam, and Insulting (Blaspheming) as a Standard for Hate Speech. The three principles cited below are essential to accommodating the “respect of the believer, not the belief ”, on the one hand, and, on the other, to protect belief in Islam and also the freedom of expression: The freedom to criticise aspects of religious beliefs; A prohibition on insulting and denigrating the belief system(s) of the believers and the apostates under “hate speech”; The nullification of all punishments related to apostasy (e.g., execution).

This chapter is the second section of Kadivar’s ‘Treatise on Refuting the Punishment for Blasphemy and Apostasy’. Lankarani claimed: “Killing an apostate does not require a juridical ruling. Therefore, any Muslim can implement it.” Kadivar regarded this as a dangerous “terror fatwa” that is null and void from the perspective of both shar‘ and reason, and have warned him that its only possible aftermath is anarchy and social disorder. The chapter has three sections: Interrogating the Death Penalty for Apostasy, Analysis of the Death Penalty for Blasphemy, and What is the Position of the Jurists on one who Denigrates the Prophet? The death penalty for blasphemy and apostasy is supported by no more than two “isolated hadiths” (khabar al-wāḥid), both of which have strongly contested chains of transmission and indication. Such an important judgement cannot be supported by such extremely weak and shaky proofs. Thus, pronouncing the death penalty for blasphemy and apostasy in the absence of reliable proofs contradicts the shar‘, debilitates Islam and violates the Qur’anic dictates.

This chapter is the third section of Kadivar’s ‘Treatise on Refuting the Punishment for Blasphemy and Apostasy’. In this section, these issues are discussed: Analysis of the Hadiths on Apostasy, Two-thirds of the narrations pertaining to the death penalty for apostasy have a deficient chain of transmission, Non-mutawātir Hadiths Do Not Permit or Mandate the Death Penalty for Apostasy, Examination of the Narrations on the Death Penalty for Blasphemy The narration sentencing a blasphemer to death is an “isolated report” (khabar al-wāḥid) as opposed to a verbatim mutawātir. It being mutawātir in meaning or ijmālī is not actualised. Altogether, the Shi‘i sources relate ten narrations for executing a blasphemer. Of these, four are mursal and four of the remaining six hadiths are ḍa‘īf. Only two hadiths are viewed by some jurists as reliable as regards their chain of transmission. As such, the death penalty for blasphemy rests exclusively on two “isolated reports” (khabar al-wāḥid) that are seriously contested from the perspective of their chain of transmission.

The introduction outlines the paradoxes in LDS conceptions of the past by introducing the narrative construction of a boundary between apostasy and restoration, a binary categorization that has defined Mormonism as set apart from other religious traditions. It introduces the collaborative project that generated this volume and summarizes the contributors’ assumptions about the narrative and ethical dimensions of historical representations and their method of dialectical and charitable conversation with the past.

This chapter identifies B. H. Roberts, James E. Talmage, and Joseph Fielding Smith as the formulators of the LDS Great Apostasy narrative in the early twentieth century. It traces the sources of these church historians and identifies methodological limitations of their sources, particularly in light of shifts in academic historical paradigms about periodization, progressivism, and metanarration at the turn of the twentieth century. Drawing from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century confessional histories, Roberts, Talmage, and Smith absorbed the arguments of Jacob Burkhardt and John Addington Symonds, who created a firm distinction between the “dark” Middle Ages and the “light” Renaissance. This periodization remains one of the central features of Mormon historical consciousness.

This chapter traces the development of and changes in LDS narratives of the Great Apostasy during the twentieth century and argues that while these narratives helped the LDS church maintain its distinctive identity during two significant institutional transitions, they also fostered a tradition of exclusive historical consciousness and interfaith relations. Using three narratives composed in Judeo-Christian communities during historical periods marked by transition—the Hebrew Bible’s Exodus, Prudentius’s Psychomachia, and Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queen—as examples, it suggests that revising the social boundaries, cultural relations, and search for origins enacted in LDS historical narratives may contribute to the next phase of the church’s development in the twenty-first century.

This chapter considers the freedom of Belief and Religion in Islam and absolute rejection of worldly punishments for apostasy. The first section analyses the conventional Islamic reading of the issue of freedom of belief and religion, as well the evidence it is based on. The second section addresses the task of proving that the freedom of religion and belief is desirable and beneficial. In looking at original Islamic texts, extracting the fundamental criteria of the religion, and criticising the arguments of the conventional reading, the third section provides the evidence for the freedom of belief and religion in Islam. People are free to choose their religion and belief, and nobody can pressure or force another into accepting the religion of truth and correct beliefs. Islam recognizes the plurality of religions and beliefs, meaning that some will follow the Divine invitation and others will remain in error. No temporal punishments have been set for having a false religion or belief. One cannot force another into changing his or her religion. Apostasy has no temporal punishment The choice of non-Muslims between acceptance of Islam or execution (or enslavement) is in deep conflict with the explicit verses of the Qur’an and Prophetic Tradition.

What is the situation of religious freedom in contemporary Islam? What are the positions of conservative and reformist Muslims on blasphemy, apostasy and heresy? Are there any substantive differences between Sunnis and Shi‘is on the main points of this subject? What is this book’s original contribution to scholarship? Although the focus of this book is the critical analysis of religious freedom and the penalty sanctioned for the commission of blasphemy and apostasy from a Shi‘i perspective, this inquiry would be incomplete without a review of the general outline of Sunni Muslim positions on the same subjects. Thus, Section one of this Introduction explores the literature review on religious freedom, blasphemy and apostasy in contemporary Sunni Islam. Section two, which is more detailed, engages in a similar literature review, but from the perspective of contemporary Shi‘i Islam. These two sections allow a comparative study of Islam’s two major denominations, their exchanges, influences and effects. Section three describes the story of how this book unfolded, analyses the genealogy of the author’s ideas in detail, introduces novel ideas applied by other Sunni and Shi‘i thinkers, and highlights the original contribution made by this book.

This chapter is the second part of the ‘The Background of the Treatise’ and it is the open letter of Mohsen Kadivar to his former classmate Mohammad Javād Fāzel Lankarānī (Lankarānī Jr.) on 28 November 2011. It has two sections: Objections to the Assassination Fatwa and the Lawfulness of Shedding Blood with Impunity (mahdūr al-dam) and Strategies to Confront the Insults and Mockery of Religious Beliefs. Kadivar argued that calling for the execution of an apostate or a blasphemer and shedding their blood lack any reliable Qur’anic justification. Rather, the Qur’an’s very tenor goes against such a legal ruling. The justification for both legal rulings (i.e., the lawfulness of executing an apostate or a blasphemer) is based on “isolated reports” (khabar al-wāḥid al-thiqa). As such, its probative force and reliability rests upon rational beings. On a matter so crucial and vital, in contrast to other issues, rational beings would not find such hadith reports sufficient. Kadivar concluded “In contrast to you, not only am I not jubilant at the execution of this impudent Azeri citizen, but I am also ashamed at this savage and cowardly deed done in the name of Islam, Shiʿism, marja‘iyya and fatwa.”

This chapter is the third part of the ‘The Background of the Treatise’ and it is the respond of Mohammad Javād Fāzel Lankarānī (Lankarānī Jr.) to objections especially Kadivar’s open letter on 13 December 2011. He justified strongly the execution of apostate and blasphemer in this way: “All Muslims ought to know that condemning an apostate is a definitive and indisputable divine ruling that was acted upon during the Prophet’s time as well as that of the infallible Imams and thereafter.” He claimed six important issues: 1 and 2: A fiṭrī apostate and blasphemer’s blood can be shed with impunity (mahdūr al-dam) 3 and 4: An apostate (fiṭrī unconditionally and millī after refusing to repent) and blasphemer are subject to the death penalty. 5: Every jurist who is qualified to issue legal rulings is recognised as ḥākim shar‘. 6: There is consensus on the obligation to kill an apostate; it is an essential part of religion; and the narrations adduced to prove such a ruling are mostly ṣaḥīḥ and beyond reproach, as they are related through multiple independent chains of transmission that are either verbatim (mutawātir lafẓī) or fully capture its meaning (mutawātir ma‘nawī).

This chapter is the first section of Kadivar’s ‘Treatise on Refuting the Punishment for Blasphemy and Apostasy’. In this section, the author’s aim is to respond to two questions: (1) can one issue judgements on blasphemy and apostasy outside the orbit of a competent court? and (2) can one delegate the responsibility for carrying out the punishment that is, in principle, the mandate of judicial functionaries, to “anyone who has access to the convicted”? One who replies “Yes, it is” to both of these questions is actually issuing a fatwa in favour of anarchy and disorder, which is certainly not the Lawgiver’s intent. After the introduction of the treatise, this section is divided into four subsections: Under which Jurist’s Jurisdiction is a Judicial Ruling Issued? Issuing a Judicial Order is the Exclusive Mandate of a Competent Court, Disorder Resulting from Allowing the General Public to Carry Out the Death Sentence, and Human Rights are not in Conflict with Islam.

This chapter is the fifth section of Kadivar’s ‘Treatise on Refuting the Punishment for Blasphemy and Apostasy’. It discusses the subject in four periods: No one during the time of the Prophet was killed solely on the charge of apostasy. Rather, it was for some other transgression. The Ahl al-Bayt did not endorse those killed during the reigns of the first three caliphs (632–656) under the title of ahl al-ridda (the people of “apostasy”). No reliable evidence indicates that Imam Ali executed anyone for apostasy during his caliphate. The other Imams never ordered anyone to be executed for abandoning Islam. No one disputes that the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid caliphs sentenced people to death for apostasy. However, no reliable proof substantiates that these executions were carried out in accord with the Imams’ instructions or implicit consent. The author concludes: No reliable evidence proves that the Prophet, Imam Ali or the other Imams ordered people to be executed solely for apostasy. The death penalty meted out to the apostates under the first three caliphs, as well as under the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasids, cannot be advanced as proofs in the school of Ahl al-Bayt.