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Hilary of Poitiers’s doctrine of divine infinity lies at the foundation of his theological project, and its full significance for his overall thought has not been realized. This chapter argues that it cannot be without an exploration of the exegetical foundation of the doctrine in De Trinitate, namely, John 1:1–4. The argument begins by showing first how infinity transforms Hilary’s argument of Father-Son relations. Second, this transformation aids Hilary toward a working definition of divine infinity. Third, this chapter shows that Hilary provides a new interpretation of the critical text of Proverbs 8:22 due to his John 1:1–4 interpretive foundation. This has immense implications for his trinitarian anthropology. Fourth, these implications are elucidated through his understanding of a progressus in infinitum of the mind toward the infinite God. Hilary’s discussion of divine infinity has significant epistemological conclusions, which reorient how humanity is seen to know and relate to God.

This chapter analyzes the nexus of secrecy, the gift, and the apophatic in the thought of Derrida. Many scholars have weighed in on these themes, but I will reexamine them from the particular vantagepoint of the relation to Jewish mysticism that one may cull from the Derridean corpus. While my focal point is Derrida's understanding of kabbalah as an expression of polysemy and atheism, the implications of the ensuing analysis should put into sharp relief the theological appropriation of deconstruction attested in any number of theo-philosophies of transcendence that have proliferated in the course of the last few decades, many of them centered especially on the metaphor of the gift. For Derrida, Judaism is not primarily a demarcation of ethno-religious identity, but rather a literary trope that signifies what cannot be signified, the secret that characterizes the way of being human in the world. The secret is not a mystery that is inherently unknowable, but rather the unknowability that issues from there being nothing ontologically or metaphysically that is to be known, the secret that there is no secret. Judaism thus provided Derrida with an existential template by which he could articulate the pretense of the secret, the sense of being in place by having no place. The nexus of secrecy and the gift ensues from the fact that the bestowing of the gift occurs precisely as the impossibility of the gift presenting itself as a gift, an event that is totally heterogeneous to either theoretical or phenomenological identification. For the gift to be a gift, it must be free of economic calculability, but to be so free, neither the one who gives nor the one who receives can be conscious of the giving. The phenomenon of the gift may appear only within the horizon of its absence.

To appreciate the risks and benefits of anthropomorphism, it is important (1) to appreciate the genius and limitations of human cognition, (2) to compare ultimacy models to see what difference anthropomorphic modeling techniques make, and (3) to entertain the possibility of an apophatic approach to ultimate reality that relativizes and relates ultimacy models. An apophatic approach to ultimate reality relativizes ultimacy models but also implies a disintegrating metric that serves to relate ultimacy models to one another. Degree of anthropomorphism is an important component of this disintegrating metric. Comparative analysis helps manifest internal complexity in the idea of anthropomorphism by distinguishing three relatively independent dimensions: Intentionality Attribution, Rational Practicality, and Narrative Comprehensibility. Educational efforts stabilized in cultural traditions can confer on people the desire and ability to resist one or more dimensions of the anthropomorphic default modes of cognition to some degree.

This study described the three classes of ultimacy models under discussion, noting internal variations within each class, eliminating inferior members, and retaining the most compelling representatives. It identified strengths and weaknesses, focusing on the most salient respects of comparison. No knock-down arguments for or against any of the three classes of models were detected, which is expected for Great Models of ultimate reality. But a couple of dozen comparative criteria were identified, which collectively constitute the basis upon which the relative plausibility of the competing ultimacy models is determined. When results are tallied, ground-of-being ultimacy models have a slight advantage over agential-being and subordinate-deity models. This process of comparative analysis directs subsequent debate to the relative importance of comparative criteria, which is always the most salient consideration in any well-formed comparison.

Darkness is a biblical theme. Gregory continues the Alexandrian tradition of commenting on Exodus 20:21 and Psalm 18:12, heightening Philo’s apophaticism. He uses darkness as a symbol of divine incomprehensibility, to counter Eunomius’ claims. But his use of darkness symbolism is nuanced and paradoxical. Within the darkness is a presence, symbolized by the tabernacle not made with hands. Gregory’s apophaticism, however, is not undercut, for within the heavenly tabernacle are the mysteries shielded by the wings of the cherubim. Heavenly ascent texts tend to use different biblical imagery: that of glory. Darkness and glory both shield the incomprehensible. The Hekhalot texts are ambivalent about whether human beings can see God, and they use lurid imagery of consuming fire to warn of the dangers of trying to do so. The rabbis quote Psalm 18:12 to protect God’s privacy.