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This chapter describes the liberal critics' distrust of post-Civil War territorial expansion, and their growing concerns about the corruption and intrigue of American party politics. It describes the Gladstonian campaign for Home Rule, which represents American liberal reformers' most important intervention in the public policies of a foreign country. The chapter also treats the liberal critics' opposition to the Philippine–American war as their last collective engagement in national politics.

This chapter describes the efforts of various Republican presidents and congressional leaders to strike balances between nationalist and internationalist priorities between the 1960s and 2015. Barry Goldwater championed a hawkish Sunbelt conservatism that in the long run helped remake the Republican Party. President Nixon pursued a foreign policy based upon assumptions of great-power politics and realpolitik. President Reagan led an ideologically charged effort at anti-Communist rollback, although he was careful not to overextend the United States in any large-scale wars on the ground. Republicans during the Clinton presidency struggled to reformulate conservative foreign policy assumptions in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. George W. Bush remade conservative foreign policy into a war on terror, aiming at the democratization of the Greater Middle East. Finally, during the presidency of Barack Obama, Republican foreign policy factions once again splintered, paving the way for a conservative nationalist resurgence.

This chapter provides the framework for understanding American nationalism, liberal internationalism, and conservative foreign policy approaches in their various forms. The history, premises, and practices of American nationalism are recounted, from the American founding to the beginning of the twentieth century. Then the key elements of liberal internationalism are discussed, including their incorporation into American foreign policy beginning with Woodrow Wilson. Conservative American reactions to liberal internationalist policies are described and delineated into their own distinct categories as well. The context is thus set for a discussion of conservative American nationalism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

This chapter investigates the state of foreign policy opinion within the Republican Party today. Perhaps surprisingly, the basic distribution of voter opinion on foreign policy within the GOP has not changed that much since the early Obama era. However, Republican voters do support Trump, and not only because he is an incumbent president from the same party. The GOP has moved in a populist, culturally conservative, and white working-class direction over a period now spanning several decades. In this sense, Trump is as much an effect as a cause. He has broken open prior conservative orthodoxies. In certain ways, on a range of specific issues following his presidency, this leaves the future of Republican foreign policy wide open. But observers should understand that the conservative-leaning American nationalism he has championed is not about to disappear when he leaves the scene. In one form or another, it is here to stay.

This chapter describes the efforts of various Republican presidents and congressional leaders to balance nationalist with global foreign policy priorities between 1901 and 1960. Theodore Roosevelt was quite effective in doing so, within the context of his time. GOP conservatives struggled to respond to Woodrow Wilson, splintering into factional disputes, but agreeing that Wilson’s League of Nations could not be supported unrevised. Republican presidents from Warren Harding to Herbert Hoover then tried to cultivate a pacified international system while promoting US national interests, but were unwilling to sustain the necessary costs. Fierce debates over foreign policy characterized internal GOP politics during 1939–1941. Finally, in the mid-1950s, President Eisenhower hit upon a reasonable balance of national and global priorities, internationalizing the Republican Party.

Missionary activity on the frontier precipitated sharp grievances against privilege and inequality, and the missionary version of Christianity, from local religious leaders. After the Panic of 1819, these grievances began to coalesce into protests against capitalism and Northeastern elites. With Andrew Jackson, this anti-elitist discourse on the frontier, favoring small producers, found a champion in American party politics. As much as they opposed aspects of Jackson’s politics, the missionary movement found his messianic nationalism palatable, even appealing. Jackson’s nationalism also gave the quarrels that followers of frontier revivalists had with American expansion a stake in American nationalist politics. Among national political leaders, Jackson, combining core elements of each movement, benefited uniquely from the contest between the missions movement and frontier revivalism. Understanding the political work and influence of these two large and historic movements within Anglo-Protestantism provides new insight into why “Indian removal” happened when, and how, it did.

This chapter summarizes the entire book. It argues that a kind of conservative American nationalism long predates the Trump presidency, and goes back to the American founding. Different aspects of conservative American nationalism have been incorporated into the Republican Party from its creation. Every Republican president since Theodore Roosevelt has tried to balance elements of this tradition with global US foreign policy priorities. Donald Trump was able to win his party’s nomination and rise to the presidency in part by challenging liberal internationalist assumptions. Yet in practice, he too has combined nationalist assumptions with global US foreign policy priorities. The long-term trend within the Republican party—predating Trump—is toward political populism, cultural conservatism, and white working-class voters, and this has international implications. Republican foreign policy nationalism is not about to disappear.