William Lasser
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300088793
- eISBN:
- 9780300128888
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300088793.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter details Cohen's new position as “counselor to the ambassador,” following the appointment of John G. Winant as the American ambassador to Great Britain. The initiative for Cohen's ...
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This chapter details Cohen's new position as “counselor to the ambassador,” following the appointment of John G. Winant as the American ambassador to Great Britain. The initiative for Cohen's appointment came from Winant himself. Given Winant's lack of direct foreign policy experience, the idea of having an assistant with Cohen's connections and talents was appealing. Their personal relationship was also cordial, and Winant had tremendous respect for Cohen's abilities.Less
This chapter details Cohen's new position as “counselor to the ambassador,” following the appointment of John G. Winant as the American ambassador to Great Britain. The initiative for Cohen's appointment came from Winant himself. Given Winant's lack of direct foreign policy experience, the idea of having an assistant with Cohen's connections and talents was appealing. Their personal relationship was also cordial, and Winant had tremendous respect for Cohen's abilities.
John Mulqueen
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781789620641
- eISBN:
- 9781789629453
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.3828/liverpool/9781789620641.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
A potential espionage threat to Britain from Dublin-based Soviet agents arose as the establishment of Irish-Soviet relations became a probability. This chapter examines perceptions of the ...
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A potential espionage threat to Britain from Dublin-based Soviet agents arose as the establishment of Irish-Soviet relations became a probability. This chapter examines perceptions of the communist-influenced Official republican movement as the Troubles escalated in 1971-2, with officials expressing fears for the stability of the Dublin government – the ‘Irish Cuba’. British and American officials used a Cold War prism here. The Russians could be expected to exploit the northern crisis, the American ambassador warned, using the Official movement as their ‘natural vehicle’. Following Bloody Sunday, when British paratroopers killed thirteen unarmed civilians, the British prime minister, Ted Heath, warned Dublin that the Soviets would cause as much trouble as they could, using the Official IRA as a proxy. The Irish revolutionary left too used a Cold War lens when opposing Ireland’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC): it would lock Ireland into a NATO-dominated bloc.Less
A potential espionage threat to Britain from Dublin-based Soviet agents arose as the establishment of Irish-Soviet relations became a probability. This chapter examines perceptions of the communist-influenced Official republican movement as the Troubles escalated in 1971-2, with officials expressing fears for the stability of the Dublin government – the ‘Irish Cuba’. British and American officials used a Cold War prism here. The Russians could be expected to exploit the northern crisis, the American ambassador warned, using the Official movement as their ‘natural vehicle’. Following Bloody Sunday, when British paratroopers killed thirteen unarmed civilians, the British prime minister, Ted Heath, warned Dublin that the Soviets would cause as much trouble as they could, using the Official IRA as a proxy. The Irish revolutionary left too used a Cold War lens when opposing Ireland’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC): it would lock Ireland into a NATO-dominated bloc.
