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This chapter addresses the influence of nationalism in the shipping industry during the interwar period and how its presence in various maritime nations affected British shipping. It groups countries into categories based on how large an effect they had on British shipping, and explores the factors that made it so. Subsidised shipping is given particular consideration, especially American and trans-Pacific voyages. It asserts that subsidised shipping did impact British shipping, though over-tonnaging made a larger economic dent in the industry. It concludes that if British shipowners had been more flexible in their shipping services, they would likely have avoided the damage done by subsidisation by staying a step ahead of it.

This chapter examines the growth of the Furness Group’s shipping services between 1910 and 1919, as world trade, shipping values, and freight rates escalated after a brief slump. It charts the wave of acquisitions during the period, and considers the expansion of the Furness Group within the context of the industry-wide changes taking place. It offers an overview of the Furness Group’s performance, followed by an overview of their expansion strategy. Next, it focuses on the purchase and reconstruction of five financially weak firms between 1910-1912. It continues with development and expansion of South American trade. Further competitive difficulties arose between the Furness Group, International Mercantile Marine, and Canadian Pacific Railroad, including expansion efforts in New York and Rotterdam and related wartime developments. It concludes that in contrast to Furness’ promotion efforts at the beginning of the century, no new shipping subsidiaries were floated during this period, so capital gains were not realised as shipping values rose.

This chapter follows the diversification of the Furness Group into the industrial sector between 1895 and 1901, as it accumulated coal, steel, engineering, and shipbuilding firms. This period saw a tremendous surge in British and American industrial merges, dubbed merger mania, and so the chapter begins by addressing the differences between their respective surges. It then outlines Furness’ plan to diversify the firm’s interests, tackling it section by section. It explores the pattern of acquisitions; the role of company promoters; Furness’ own work as a promoter of industrial and shipping enterprises and the growth of his trade network; and the form of public floats. It concludes that in contrast to the industrialists who took advantage of the financial boom to liquidate investments, Furness used the growing confidence in the investment community to expand his presence in the primary sector of the economy whilst continuing to form new shipping ventures.

This final essay explores the proposal of an integrated ports policy in the North Atlantic. It describes a proposed Canadian national ports policy, and attempts to explain why it never came to pass. It also looks to the developments of the rest of the North Atlantic in regard to ports policy, and asserts that in general, there has never been a true attempt to instate it. Author Lewis R. Fischer presents both sides of the argument for and against national ports policy, and concludes by suggesting that ports have traditionally been one of the most poorly governed sectors of the maritime economy, but that new ideas and new avenues of governance can significantly alter this.

This chapter continues to explore the economics of British shipping enterprises in relation to the necessary factors for economic expansion, by evaluating international competition and the cost of providing a competitive service. It looks at the classification of costs; liners and national costs; crew and labour costs; external economies; and overseas trade. It concludes that national trade is useful, but not a necessity for success as a shipowner, and that when faced with inadequate national trade, shipowners simply sought extra-national trade in order to expand.