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Epistemic Expressivism: Traditional Views

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Expressivist views in morality accept a similar ontology to that of error theories: they deny that moral facts exist. However, they also maintain that moral discourse does not even purport to state ... More


A Critique of Expressivism

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780198250173
eISBN:
9780191604072
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250177.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan ... More


The Negation Problem

Mark Schroeder

in Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199534654
eISBN:
9780191715938
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter explores the difficult features of the negation problem for expressivism. The problem is outlined together with the set of tools available to expressivists in order to solve it. A-type ... More


Expressivism

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Nature of Normativity

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199251315
eISBN:
9780191719127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Many philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive ... More


Comments on Allan Gibbard's Tanner Lectures

John Broome

in Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780195370423
eISBN:
9780199851980
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses that one can accept that ought sentences are true or false because of what he does with them. It explains that ought sentences help man to plan his life in general, and to plan ... More


Introduction

Mark Schroeder

in Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199534654
eISBN:
9780191715938
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter introduces metaethical expressivism, explains its main sources of interest over earlier noncognitivist theories, and illustrates how it has been applied to many topics across all ... More


Substitutes for God’s Assistance

JOHN E. HARE

in The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198269571
eISBN:
9780191683701
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269571.003.0008
Subject:
Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology

This chapter examines attempts in naturalistic ethics to bridge the moral gap. These include the works of Donald Campbell, David Gauthier, and Allan Gibbard. These authors suggested bridging the ... More


What Do Reasons Do?

Jonathan Dancy

in Metaethics after Moore

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199269914
eISBN:
9780191710032
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter focuses on the issue of how we are to understand ‘contributory reasons’, particularly as they are related to oughts. It begins by rehearsing six proposals for understanding contributory ... More


Philosophical Sentimentalism

Shaun Nichols

in Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195169348
eISBN:
9780199835041
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195169344.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

According to the influential sentimentalist tradition in moral philosophy, moral judgment is grounded in affective response. On Allan Gibbard’s prominent contemporary version of this view, he ... More


The Limits of Expressivism

Anandi Hattiangadi

in Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198722199
eISBN:
9780191789045
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Aesthetics

In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that meta-ethical expressivism can be profitably extended to semantic and intentional language: meta-linguistic discourse ... More


Expression for Expressivists

Mark Schroeder

in Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198714149
eISBN:
9780191782541
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714149.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Allan Gibbard claims that “everyone agrees” that words express attitudes, so what is controversial about expressivism is only what attitudes are expressed. This chapter argues that this is mistaken; ... More


Biology and Ethics

Philip Kitcher

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195147797
eISBN:
9780199785841
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195147790.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa ... More


Disagreement

Michael Ridge

in Impassioned Belief

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199682669
eISBN:
9780191774454
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter develops and defends an expressivism-friendly theory of normative disagreement. It argues that existing expressivist treatments of normative disagreement are inadequate, and that ... More


Normativity and Truth

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter looks at the philosophical dimensions of normativity and truth. It first considers Allan Gibbard's Expressivist account of rationality. According to Gibbard, his aim is to explain ‘what ... More


The Thin

Simon Kirchin

in Thick Evaluation

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198803430
eISBN:
9780191841613
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198803430.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter has two main topics. First, the notion of a thin concept is investigated as is the dividing line between thin and thick concepts, with the conclusion drawn that some thin concepts may be ... More


The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement

Stephen Finlay

in Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780199347582
eISBN:
9780199347605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Relational theories of normative language allegedly face special problems in accounting for the extent of disagreement, but this is everybody’s problem, because normative sentences are relativized to ... More


Metaphysics

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter relates metaphysics and ontology with Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism. If some things matter, then there are some irreducibly normative truths. This notion is denied by Allan Gibbard and ... More


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