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Motivation and Agency

Alfred R. Mele

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ... More


Deliberative Libertarian Accounts

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes ... More


Luck and Libertarianism

Neil Levy

in Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199601387
eISBN:
9780191729256
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter turns to an assessment of event-causal and agent-causal accounts of libertarian free will, in the light of the account of luck developed in Chapter 2. It shows that the standard luck ... More


Defending Anselmian Internalism

Katherin A. Rogers

in Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198743972
eISBN:
9780191803963
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

The Anselmian holds that freedom and responsibility require that the agent confront open options and choose a se. But the torn condition preceding the choice may be determined by something beyond the ... More


WEAKNESS OF WILL

Ingmar Persson

in The Retreat of Reason: A dilemma in the philosophy of life

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199276905
eISBN:
9780191603198
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199276900.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e., the phenomenon of agents acting against their best judgement or reasons, presents a problem for internalism. This chapter reviews and rejects a ... More


The Luck Problem: Part I. Probabilities and Possible Worlds

Katherin A. Rogers

in Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198743972
eISBN:
9780191803963
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 7 deals with three preliminary issues in addressing the “luck” problem, a perennial difficulty confronting libertarians: If nothing preceding a choice explains why the agent made it, isn’t ... More


Kane, Luck, and Control: Trying to Get by without Too Much Effort

Alfred R. Mele

in Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199860081
eISBN:
9780190200008
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860081.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy

The first part of his essay introduces the luck objection to libertarian views and critically examines Kane’s response to it. Kane’s response rests, most centrally, on the claim that agents make ... More


Why not Compatibilism?: The Divine Controller Argument and a Wager

Katherin A. Rogers

in Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198743972
eISBN:
9780191803963
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Anselm assumes, without argument, that you cannot be free if God causes your choices. Chapter 1 defends this intuition, and incompatibilism in general, using a manipulator or controller argument, ... More


Deviant Causal Chains

Scott Sehon

in Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780198758495
eISBN:
9780191818394
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

It should be relatively uncontentious that we often give reasons explanations of human behavior that are teleological in form, and when a behavior is done on purpose, we can say that the agent ... More


Anselmian Alternatives and Frankfurt-style Counterexamples

Katherin A. Rogers

in Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198743972
eISBN:
9780191803963
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. ... More


Agency

Lenn E. Goodman and D. Gregory Caramenico

in Coming to Mind: The Soul and Its Body

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780226061061
eISBN:
9780226061238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226061238.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Our case for the soul stands or falls with human agency: Do we act, or are we only acted upon? William James, deeply troubled by epiphenomenalism, which made thought no more consequential to action ... More


Other Objections to the Teleological Account

Scott Sehon

in Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780198758495
eISBN:
9780191818394
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter responds to several objections that have been raised against the teleological account of action explanation. The first is from Al Mele, originally put forward as an objection to George ... More


Skepticism about Natural Agency and the Causal Theory of Action

John Bishop

in Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014564
eISBN:
9780262289139
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0043
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter argues that it is helpful for action theorists to be more explicit about what their larger motivations are, and to keep their theorizing consciously in contact with broader philosophical ... More


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