Emma Leonard Boyle
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781526105813
- eISBN:
- 9781526135988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781526105813.003.0018
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Ugandan security concerns throughout the Museveni era have centered round terrorism, both domestic and international. Internationally, there is evidence to suggest, Ugandan intelligence services ...
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Ugandan security concerns throughout the Museveni era have centered round terrorism, both domestic and international. Internationally, there is evidence to suggest, Ugandan intelligence services foiled attempts by Al Qaeda to bomb the US Embassy in Kampala, at the time of the Dar Es-Salaam and Nairobi Embassy bombings. In 2010, Kampala suffered from Al Qaeda-inspired bombings carried out by the Somali group Al Shabaab, in retaliation for sending peacekeepers to Somalia. Domestically, Uganda has also experienced attacks deemed to be terrorism from the Allied Democratic Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army. This chapter demonstrates how the term ‘terrorism’ has been used by the Ugandan government in many different ways and how the expansive use of this term has been critiqued. I argue that the key to understanding the Ugandan government’s response to these disparate threats is through understanding how Museveni has used these crises to become a key US ally in the War on Terror and to position himself as a regional leader in East Africa.Less
Ugandan security concerns throughout the Museveni era have centered round terrorism, both domestic and international. Internationally, there is evidence to suggest, Ugandan intelligence services foiled attempts by Al Qaeda to bomb the US Embassy in Kampala, at the time of the Dar Es-Salaam and Nairobi Embassy bombings. In 2010, Kampala suffered from Al Qaeda-inspired bombings carried out by the Somali group Al Shabaab, in retaliation for sending peacekeepers to Somalia. Domestically, Uganda has also experienced attacks deemed to be terrorism from the Allied Democratic Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army. This chapter demonstrates how the term ‘terrorism’ has been used by the Ugandan government in many different ways and how the expansive use of this term has been critiqued. I argue that the key to understanding the Ugandan government’s response to these disparate threats is through understanding how Museveni has used these crises to become a key US ally in the War on Terror and to position himself as a regional leader in East Africa.
Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190499389
- eISBN:
- 9780190638559
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190499389.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Some 250,000 people died in the southern Somalia famine of 2011–12, which also displaced and destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands more. Yet this crisis had been predicted in 2010. The ...
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Some 250,000 people died in the southern Somalia famine of 2011–12, which also displaced and destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands more. Yet this crisis had been predicted in 2010. The harshest drought in Somalia’s recent history coincided with a global spike in food prices, hitting this arid, import-dependent country hard. The policies of Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group that controlled southern Somalia, exacerbated an already difficult situation, barring most humanitarian assistance, while the donors’ counter-terrorism policies criminalized any aid falling into their hands. A major disaster resulted from production and market failures precipitated by the drought and food price crisis, while the famine itself resulted from failure to respond quickly to these events—and was thus largely human-made. This book analyzes the famine: the trade-offs between competing policy priorities that led to it, the collective failure in response, and how those affected by it attempted to protect themselves and their livelihoods. It also examines the humanitarian response, including from actors that had not previously been particularly visible in Somalia—from Turkey, the Middle East, and Islamic charities worldwide.Less
Some 250,000 people died in the southern Somalia famine of 2011–12, which also displaced and destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands more. Yet this crisis had been predicted in 2010. The harshest drought in Somalia’s recent history coincided with a global spike in food prices, hitting this arid, import-dependent country hard. The policies of Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group that controlled southern Somalia, exacerbated an already difficult situation, barring most humanitarian assistance, while the donors’ counter-terrorism policies criminalized any aid falling into their hands. A major disaster resulted from production and market failures precipitated by the drought and food price crisis, while the famine itself resulted from failure to respond quickly to these events—and was thus largely human-made. This book analyzes the famine: the trade-offs between competing policy priorities that led to it, the collective failure in response, and how those affected by it attempted to protect themselves and their livelihoods. It also examines the humanitarian response, including from actors that had not previously been particularly visible in Somalia—from Turkey, the Middle East, and Islamic charities worldwide.
Michael Keating and Matt Waldman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
For the last thirty years Somalia has experienced violence and upheaval. Today, the international effort to help Somalis build a federal state and achieve stability is challenged by deep-rooted ...
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For the last thirty years Somalia has experienced violence and upheaval. Today, the international effort to help Somalis build a federal state and achieve stability is challenged by deep-rooted grievances, local conflicts and a powerful insurgency led by Al-Shabaab. This book constitutes a unique compendium of insights into the insurgency and its impact. It explores the legacies of past violence, especially impunity, illegitimacy, and exclusion, and the need for national reconciliation. Drawing on decades of experience and months of field research, the chapters throw light on diverse forms of local conflict, its interrelated causes, and what can be done about it. Original research is shared on the role of women, men, and youth in the conflict, and new insight into Al-Shabaab is presented — particularly the group's multi-dimensional strategy, the motivations of its fighters, their foreign links, and the prospects for engagement. The book illuminates the war in Somalia and sets out what can and should be done to bring it to an end.Less
For the last thirty years Somalia has experienced violence and upheaval. Today, the international effort to help Somalis build a federal state and achieve stability is challenged by deep-rooted grievances, local conflicts and a powerful insurgency led by Al-Shabaab. This book constitutes a unique compendium of insights into the insurgency and its impact. It explores the legacies of past violence, especially impunity, illegitimacy, and exclusion, and the need for national reconciliation. Drawing on decades of experience and months of field research, the chapters throw light on diverse forms of local conflict, its interrelated causes, and what can be done about it. Original research is shared on the role of women, men, and youth in the conflict, and new insight into Al-Shabaab is presented — particularly the group's multi-dimensional strategy, the motivations of its fighters, their foreign links, and the prospects for engagement. The book illuminates the war in Somalia and sets out what can and should be done to bring it to an end.
Cerwyn Moore
Donald Holbrook (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190856441
- eISBN:
- 9780190942939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190856441.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
First instalment of a multipart series, which Zawahiri begins by mourning the death of the leader of Al-Shabaab, whose fealty he had accepted in 2012, and reaches out to affiliates, allies and ...
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First instalment of a multipart series, which Zawahiri begins by mourning the death of the leader of Al-Shabaab, whose fealty he had accepted in 2012, and reaches out to affiliates, allies and sympathizers in places like Somalia, Palestine, Yemen, North Africa, the Caucasus, as well as Syria. He claims to have wanted to temper his criticism of ISIL, hoping that the infighting between jihadis would come to an end, but ultimately to have seen no other option than presenting the evidence of al-Baghdadi’s transgressions, which he says go against the prescribed method of the prophet Mohammed. He challenges IS’s understanding of takfir, excommunication, and warns against ways in which religious zealotry can turn to tyranny. In presenting the Muslim Brotherhood as being too compromising and weak, and IS as being too extreme, Zawahiri thus charts a clear ‘middle way’ for Al-Qaeda and its understanding of the world, which he claims will ultimately be victorious.Less
First instalment of a multipart series, which Zawahiri begins by mourning the death of the leader of Al-Shabaab, whose fealty he had accepted in 2012, and reaches out to affiliates, allies and sympathizers in places like Somalia, Palestine, Yemen, North Africa, the Caucasus, as well as Syria. He claims to have wanted to temper his criticism of ISIL, hoping that the infighting between jihadis would come to an end, but ultimately to have seen no other option than presenting the evidence of al-Baghdadi’s transgressions, which he says go against the prescribed method of the prophet Mohammed. He challenges IS’s understanding of takfir, excommunication, and warns against ways in which religious zealotry can turn to tyranny. In presenting the Muslim Brotherhood as being too compromising and weak, and IS as being too extreme, Zawahiri thus charts a clear ‘middle way’ for Al-Qaeda and its understanding of the world, which he claims will ultimately be victorious.
Khadija and Stephen Harley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0021
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the results of interviews with six women in Al-Shabaab who are or were married to Al-Shabaab fighters. These women lead a privileged existence both in terms of the quality of ...
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This chapter discusses the results of interviews with six women in Al-Shabaab who are or were married to Al-Shabaab fighters. These women lead a privileged existence both in terms of the quality of life that is accorded to them by Al-Shabaab's Executive Council, especially in comparison to the civilian population living under Al-Shabaab's control, and also the freedoms they are allowed. The women were permitted, and apparently encouraged, to run businesses and in support of that activity they were allowed access to smartphones and could travel relatively freely around Lower and Middle Jubba. The women occasionally participated in Al-Shabaab operations, taking advantage of the lax security that is applied to women to support intelligence gathering and fundraising for the organization.Less
This chapter discusses the results of interviews with six women in Al-Shabaab who are or were married to Al-Shabaab fighters. These women lead a privileged existence both in terms of the quality of life that is accorded to them by Al-Shabaab's Executive Council, especially in comparison to the civilian population living under Al-Shabaab's control, and also the freedoms they are allowed. The women were permitted, and apparently encouraged, to run businesses and in support of that activity they were allowed access to smartphones and could travel relatively freely around Lower and Middle Jubba. The women occasionally participated in Al-Shabaab operations, taking advantage of the lax security that is applied to women to support intelligence gathering and fundraising for the organization.
Catherine Besteman and Daniel Van Lehman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0026
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the Al-Shabaab's policies and activities in the Jubba River Valley, based on research with 41 people who were either recently displaced from the Valley or have relatives living ...
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This chapter discusses the Al-Shabaab's policies and activities in the Jubba River Valley, based on research with 41 people who were either recently displaced from the Valley or have relatives living there. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, powerful militias tied to major clans have vied for control of the Valley, often exploiting and predating marginalized groups, especially the farming communities known as Somali Bantus. Al-Shabaab has done likewise, extorting considerably higher levels of harvests, ‘taxes’, and remittances from Somali Bantus than from Somalis from the major clans. Al-Shabaab also imposes stringent penalties for non-compliance with their rules, sometimes resulting in eviction from long-held farmland. This marginalization demonstrates that a just and sustainable peace in Somalia will depend on far more effective efforts to protect the rights of Somalia's oppressed populations.Less
This chapter discusses the Al-Shabaab's policies and activities in the Jubba River Valley, based on research with 41 people who were either recently displaced from the Valley or have relatives living there. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, powerful militias tied to major clans have vied for control of the Valley, often exploiting and predating marginalized groups, especially the farming communities known as Somali Bantus. Al-Shabaab has done likewise, extorting considerably higher levels of harvests, ‘taxes’, and remittances from Somali Bantus than from Somalis from the major clans. Al-Shabaab also imposes stringent penalties for non-compliance with their rules, sometimes resulting in eviction from long-held farmland. This marginalization demonstrates that a just and sustainable peace in Somalia will depend on far more effective efforts to protect the rights of Somalia's oppressed populations.
Roland Marchal
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0027
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter considers the motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has built itself on a clear agenda: ridding Somalia of foreign forces, portrayed as Christians, and implementing the ...
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This chapter considers the motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has built itself on a clear agenda: ridding Somalia of foreign forces, portrayed as Christians, and implementing the Sharia. These goals implied the need for reform and discipline of Somali society using all means: dawa (preaching) as well as violence. While the goals fit well with Somali nationalistic and Salafi agendas, more fluidity or even flexibility is shown by Al-Shabaab in a situation of weakness. However, there is no doubt that Al-Shabaab eventually intends to monopolize the religious arena and curb the political and social influence of any contenders. Somali viewpoints are not always antagonistic towards Al-Shabaab, which throws light on some of the mistakes or weaknesses of its enemies.Less
This chapter considers the motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has built itself on a clear agenda: ridding Somalia of foreign forces, portrayed as Christians, and implementing the Sharia. These goals implied the need for reform and discipline of Somali society using all means: dawa (preaching) as well as violence. While the goals fit well with Somali nationalistic and Salafi agendas, more fluidity or even flexibility is shown by Al-Shabaab in a situation of weakness. However, there is no doubt that Al-Shabaab eventually intends to monopolize the religious arena and curb the political and social influence of any contenders. Somali viewpoints are not always antagonistic towards Al-Shabaab, which throws light on some of the mistakes or weaknesses of its enemies.
Richard Barrett
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0028
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter considers the issue of why fighters join Al-Shabaab and why they quit, based on an analysis of over 100 interviews with individuals currently and previously in the group. It concludes ...
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This chapter considers the issue of why fighters join Al-Shabaab and why they quit, based on an analysis of over 100 interviews with individuals currently and previously in the group. It concludes that a majority seek a sense of belonging and purpose, influenced by Al-Shabaab's claim to be acting in defence of Islam. Younger members are attracted by the opportunity for adventure, prospects of economic security, and because of the encouragement of friends who have already joined. Fighters often leave because life in the group, and the treatment of its members, are harsher than expected, or they find that the group does not abide by its religious principles, especially in its brutality and use of arbitrary detentions. Interestingly, six Al-Shabaab leaders interviewed suggested that the group was fighting a political rather than ideological battle, and that its members had little interest in Al-Qaida's global agenda.Less
This chapter considers the issue of why fighters join Al-Shabaab and why they quit, based on an analysis of over 100 interviews with individuals currently and previously in the group. It concludes that a majority seek a sense of belonging and purpose, influenced by Al-Shabaab's claim to be acting in defence of Islam. Younger members are attracted by the opportunity for adventure, prospects of economic security, and because of the encouragement of friends who have already joined. Fighters often leave because life in the group, and the treatment of its members, are harsher than expected, or they find that the group does not abide by its religious principles, especially in its brutality and use of arbitrary detentions. Interestingly, six Al-Shabaab leaders interviewed suggested that the group was fighting a political rather than ideological battle, and that its members had little interest in Al-Qaida's global agenda.
Hussein Yusuf Ali
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0029
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Radicalization is undermining Somalia's peace, stability, and development prospects. Religious extremism has also become a major security concern for the region and for the world. This chapter ...
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Radicalization is undermining Somalia's peace, stability, and development prospects. Religious extremism has also become a major security concern for the region and for the world. This chapter evaluates causes, drivers, and contributing factors of radicalization in Somalia. It also assesses the strategies adopted to deal with Al-Shabaab as well as other feasible options to address the issue of radicalization. There are currently over 20,000 UN-mandated forces with the African Union Mission in Somalia forces in the country battling with Al-Shabaab, and US military forces are also engaged in aerial attacks and at times special forces raids. Despite such combined efforts, Al-Shabaab endures as a strong force, unleashes devastating terror acts, and is poised to remain potent unless effective strategies are adopted.Less
Radicalization is undermining Somalia's peace, stability, and development prospects. Religious extremism has also become a major security concern for the region and for the world. This chapter evaluates causes, drivers, and contributing factors of radicalization in Somalia. It also assesses the strategies adopted to deal with Al-Shabaab as well as other feasible options to address the issue of radicalization. There are currently over 20,000 UN-mandated forces with the African Union Mission in Somalia forces in the country battling with Al-Shabaab, and US military forces are also engaged in aerial attacks and at times special forces raids. Despite such combined efforts, Al-Shabaab endures as a strong force, unleashes devastating terror acts, and is poised to remain potent unless effective strategies are adopted.
Mohamed Haji Abdullahi “Ingiriis”
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0030
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter examines the extent to which the push and pull factors of youth recruitment in Al-Shabaab have reinforced radicalization in Somalia. Whereas the push factors are facilitated by negative ...
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This chapter examines the extent to which the push and pull factors of youth recruitment in Al-Shabaab have reinforced radicalization in Somalia. Whereas the push factors are facilitated by negative dynamics, such as the hostile environment and indoctrination, the pull factors are reinforced by issues of identity, ideology, and economic exclusion. Methodologically, the chapter is based on intensive one-on-one and group interviews with former Al-Shabaab defectors. Understanding Al-Shabaab from various angles through an empirically grounded analysis is crucial for two reasons. First, it will help the Somali government to find ways of tackling the threats posed by ongoing insurgency activities. Second, it will contribute to the efforts of creating peace and stability in southern Somalia.Less
This chapter examines the extent to which the push and pull factors of youth recruitment in Al-Shabaab have reinforced radicalization in Somalia. Whereas the push factors are facilitated by negative dynamics, such as the hostile environment and indoctrination, the pull factors are reinforced by issues of identity, ideology, and economic exclusion. Methodologically, the chapter is based on intensive one-on-one and group interviews with former Al-Shabaab defectors. Understanding Al-Shabaab from various angles through an empirically grounded analysis is crucial for two reasons. First, it will help the Somali government to find ways of tackling the threats posed by ongoing insurgency activities. Second, it will contribute to the efforts of creating peace and stability in southern Somalia.
Roland Marchal
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0031
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses what Al-Shabaab delivers in the areas it controls. It focuses on three main sectors: preaching and education, organizing civil society, and justice. Al-Shabaab uses religion to ...
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This chapter discusses what Al-Shabaab delivers in the areas it controls. It focuses on three main sectors: preaching and education, organizing civil society, and justice. Al-Shabaab uses religion to enhance its legitimacy and as a means of social control. The group promotes religious education in Quranic schools, and exalts dogmatism and righteousness, which undermines tolerance and open-mindedness. On taking control of a community, Al-Shabaab will declare that Sharia, rather than xeer, will be applied. It therefore tends to disempower elders, while sometimes promoting and manipulating the role of other groups such as women, teenagers, and traders. The group enforces harsh rules of behaviour, but they are predictable. It also establishes courts that are generally considered to be non-corrupt and whose judgements are enforced.Less
This chapter discusses what Al-Shabaab delivers in the areas it controls. It focuses on three main sectors: preaching and education, organizing civil society, and justice. Al-Shabaab uses religion to enhance its legitimacy and as a means of social control. The group promotes religious education in Quranic schools, and exalts dogmatism and righteousness, which undermines tolerance and open-mindedness. On taking control of a community, Al-Shabaab will declare that Sharia, rather than xeer, will be applied. It therefore tends to disempower elders, while sometimes promoting and manipulating the role of other groups such as women, teenagers, and traders. The group enforces harsh rules of behaviour, but they are predictable. It also establishes courts that are generally considered to be non-corrupt and whose judgements are enforced.
Richard Barrett
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0032
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter considers the origins of Al-Shabaab and the gap between its rhetoric and practice. Despite its globalist agenda, reinforced by its allegiance to Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab is at its core an ...
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This chapter considers the origins of Al-Shabaab and the gap between its rhetoric and practice. Despite its globalist agenda, reinforced by its allegiance to Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab is at its core an ethnic movement with its focus on Somalia. As such, it can only survive, let alone expand, by offering better security, better prospects, and better governance than the structures established by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Currently, however, the FGS is dominant and Al-Shabaab does not look like a viable alternative. To stem its decline, Al-Shabaab has appealed to Somalis as Muslims to support its role in the global campaign against ‘Western aggression’, while mounting attacks inside the country to undermine any appearance of growing stability, and attacking outside the country to dissuade Somalia's regional allies from continuing their support.Less
This chapter considers the origins of Al-Shabaab and the gap between its rhetoric and practice. Despite its globalist agenda, reinforced by its allegiance to Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab is at its core an ethnic movement with its focus on Somalia. As such, it can only survive, let alone expand, by offering better security, better prospects, and better governance than the structures established by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Currently, however, the FGS is dominant and Al-Shabaab does not look like a viable alternative. To stem its decline, Al-Shabaab has appealed to Somalis as Muslims to support its role in the global campaign against ‘Western aggression’, while mounting attacks inside the country to undermine any appearance of growing stability, and attacking outside the country to dissuade Somalia's regional allies from continuing their support.
Harrper Mary
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0033
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Since Al-Shabaab's inception more than a decade ago, communications have played a central role in its strategy. The group has stated that the ‘media battle’ is one of the most important elements of ...
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Since Al-Shabaab's inception more than a decade ago, communications have played a central role in its strategy. The group has stated that the ‘media battle’ is one of the most important elements of its campaign. This chapter examines the communications strategies and techniques of Al-Shabaab and other parties, and analyses how this information is received and what kind of impact it makes. Interviews with a broad range of individuals showed that many consider Al-Shabaab's messaging more compelling than Federal Government of Somalia and international counter-messaging. The group produces high-quality media products; targets local, national, and international journalists; and is rigorous and persistent. However, Al-Shabaab threatens journalists who do not do its bidding, produces highly distorted stories, and projects power and success for a vast number of Somali websites, many of which are unreliable.Less
Since Al-Shabaab's inception more than a decade ago, communications have played a central role in its strategy. The group has stated that the ‘media battle’ is one of the most important elements of its campaign. This chapter examines the communications strategies and techniques of Al-Shabaab and other parties, and analyses how this information is received and what kind of impact it makes. Interviews with a broad range of individuals showed that many consider Al-Shabaab's messaging more compelling than Federal Government of Somalia and international counter-messaging. The group produces high-quality media products; targets local, national, and international journalists; and is rigorous and persistent. However, Al-Shabaab threatens journalists who do not do its bidding, produces highly distorted stories, and projects power and success for a vast number of Somali websites, many of which are unreliable.
Stig Jarle Hansen and Linnéa Gelot
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0034
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter considers how Al-Shabaab messaging can be best countered, drawing on field research in Mogadishu and Baidoa, focusing on the area of Bay/Bakool. It shows that lack of security, ...
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This chapter considers how Al-Shabaab messaging can be best countered, drawing on field research in Mogadishu and Baidoa, focusing on the area of Bay/Bakool. It shows that lack of security, opportunity, and justice, combined with clan conflicts create conditions that Al-Shabaab can exploit. In Bay/Bakool, the group is seen as having semi-territorial control; in other words, a fairly regular presence despite intermittent deployments or patrols by forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia. Thus, the involvement of sheikhs and clan elders is all the more important as they wield considerable influence in communities and can strengthen efforts of countering violent extremism (CVE). A wide, inclusive approach is recommended, drawing upon a combination of different types of religious leaders, in which Sufi, Shafi'i, and Quietist/non-political Wahhabism are represented.Less
This chapter considers how Al-Shabaab messaging can be best countered, drawing on field research in Mogadishu and Baidoa, focusing on the area of Bay/Bakool. It shows that lack of security, opportunity, and justice, combined with clan conflicts create conditions that Al-Shabaab can exploit. In Bay/Bakool, the group is seen as having semi-territorial control; in other words, a fairly regular presence despite intermittent deployments or patrols by forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia. Thus, the involvement of sheikhs and clan elders is all the more important as they wield considerable influence in communities and can strengthen efforts of countering violent extremism (CVE). A wide, inclusive approach is recommended, drawing upon a combination of different types of religious leaders, in which Sufi, Shafi'i, and Quietist/non-political Wahhabism are represented.
Tricia Bacon and Daisy Muibu
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0035
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter focuses on the alliance between Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab. Although cooperation between the groups is limited and irregular, the relationship has proven durable despite the loss of leaders ...
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This chapter focuses on the alliance between Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab. Although cooperation between the groups is limited and irregular, the relationship has proven durable despite the loss of leaders on both sides and the emergence of Islamic State in northeast Somalia. The resilience of the relationship is attributed to several factors: Al-Shabaab's links to Al-Qaida's affiliate in Yemen, which may have enhanced Al-Shabaab's military expertise; Al-Qaida's ability to help Al-Shabaab with raising funds; Al-Shabaab's oath of allegiance or bayah to Al-Qaida; and the trust and predictability of the alliance, reinforced by ideological and personal ties between some leaders. The relationship is used by Al-Shabaab leaders to justify measures to enforce unity, control its rank and file, and avoid defections to Islamic State. The relationship is also flexible, giving Al-Shabaab leaders access to assistance and jihadi prestige, while retaining a high degree of autonomy.Less
This chapter focuses on the alliance between Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab. Although cooperation between the groups is limited and irregular, the relationship has proven durable despite the loss of leaders on both sides and the emergence of Islamic State in northeast Somalia. The resilience of the relationship is attributed to several factors: Al-Shabaab's links to Al-Qaida's affiliate in Yemen, which may have enhanced Al-Shabaab's military expertise; Al-Qaida's ability to help Al-Shabaab with raising funds; Al-Shabaab's oath of allegiance or bayah to Al-Qaida; and the trust and predictability of the alliance, reinforced by ideological and personal ties between some leaders. The relationship is used by Al-Shabaab leaders to justify measures to enforce unity, control its rank and file, and avoid defections to Islamic State. The relationship is also flexible, giving Al-Shabaab leaders access to assistance and jihadi prestige, while retaining a high degree of autonomy.
Sahan Africa
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0036
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter considers the threat posed by Al-Shabaab both in Somalia and to the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is a composite insurgency, which has exploited local grievances by aligning itself with ...
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This chapter considers the threat posed by Al-Shabaab both in Somalia and to the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is a composite insurgency, which has exploited local grievances by aligning itself with disaffected clans or minority groups. In 2016, it stepped up efforts to co-opt clan leaders through coercion and incentives, even establishing a new Council of Clan Leaders. Since 2010, Al-Shabaab has sought to establish itself in the Horn of Africa, initiating insurgent activities in six countries of the region and conducting attacks in five of them. In 2013, Al-Shabaab established two transnational military wings: one focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; the other on Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab's regional unit, Jaysh Ayman, has carried out a campaign of attacks in northern Kenya, while its affiliate Al-Hijra is said to have established a range of networks and operational cells, including in Kenya's prisons.Less
This chapter considers the threat posed by Al-Shabaab both in Somalia and to the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is a composite insurgency, which has exploited local grievances by aligning itself with disaffected clans or minority groups. In 2016, it stepped up efforts to co-opt clan leaders through coercion and incentives, even establishing a new Council of Clan Leaders. Since 2010, Al-Shabaab has sought to establish itself in the Horn of Africa, initiating insurgent activities in six countries of the region and conducting attacks in five of them. In 2013, Al-Shabaab established two transnational military wings: one focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; the other on Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab's regional unit, Jaysh Ayman, has carried out a campaign of attacks in northern Kenya, while its affiliate Al-Hijra is said to have established a range of networks and operational cells, including in Kenya's prisons.
Tricia Bacon and Daisy Muibu
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0037
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter examines foreign fighter influence in Al-Shabaab. The role and influence of foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab have varied over time. In the early years, there were numerous reports ...
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This chapter examines foreign fighter influence in Al-Shabaab. The role and influence of foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab have varied over time. In the early years, there were numerous reports highlighting the importance of foreign fighters; however, in recent years, their influence has been limited. Regional recruits mostly come from Kenya, followed by Tanzania and Uganda. These fighters generally occupy rank and file military roles, and increase the group's ability to operate and recruit in the region. The number of foreign fighters joining Al-Shabaab from outside the region has diminished since the group purged such fighters between 2011 and 2013, and the emergence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. Looking ahead, foreign fighter influence within the group is likely to remain limited given that many of its activities are acutely local and its strength often depends on managing and exploiting clan conflict.Less
This chapter examines foreign fighter influence in Al-Shabaab. The role and influence of foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab have varied over time. In the early years, there were numerous reports highlighting the importance of foreign fighters; however, in recent years, their influence has been limited. Regional recruits mostly come from Kenya, followed by Tanzania and Uganda. These fighters generally occupy rank and file military roles, and increase the group's ability to operate and recruit in the region. The number of foreign fighters joining Al-Shabaab from outside the region has diminished since the group purged such fighters between 2011 and 2013, and the emergence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. Looking ahead, foreign fighter influence within the group is likely to remain limited given that many of its activities are acutely local and its strength often depends on managing and exploiting clan conflict.
Johusa Meservey
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0038
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter considers Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Members of the Somali diaspora in the West were the major source of Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Previously, a considerable ...
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This chapter considers Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Members of the Somali diaspora in the West were the major source of Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Previously, a considerable number of members of the diaspora joined or attempted to join Al-Shabaab (referred to as ‘travellers’), and while the group's attractiveness for potential travellers has waned, the risk remains that it could revive. The chapter suggests that alienation plays a role in radicalization, such that travellers' acceptance of Al-Shabaab's violently anti-Western rhetoric demonstrates they were not deeply assimilated into the mainstream values of their host countries. However, it was Al-Shabaab's ideology that primarily attracted travellers. Thus, governments must try to delegitimize Al-Shabaab's worldview while promoting the attractions of their own ways of life in order to ensure travellers will not again seek out Al-Shabaab in large numbers.Less
This chapter considers Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Members of the Somali diaspora in the West were the major source of Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Previously, a considerable number of members of the diaspora joined or attempted to join Al-Shabaab (referred to as ‘travellers’), and while the group's attractiveness for potential travellers has waned, the risk remains that it could revive. The chapter suggests that alienation plays a role in radicalization, such that travellers' acceptance of Al-Shabaab's violently anti-Western rhetoric demonstrates they were not deeply assimilated into the mainstream values of their host countries. However, it was Al-Shabaab's ideology that primarily attracted travellers. Thus, governments must try to delegitimize Al-Shabaab's worldview while promoting the attractions of their own ways of life in order to ensure travellers will not again seek out Al-Shabaab in large numbers.
Harmonie Toros and Stephen Harley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0039
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter examines the potential for talks with Al-Shabaab, identifies potential facilitators and spoilers, and highlights lessons to be learned from past dialogues with Al-Shabaab. Three main ...
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This chapter examines the potential for talks with Al-Shabaab, identifies potential facilitators and spoilers, and highlights lessons to be learned from past dialogues with Al-Shabaab. Three main conclusions are reached. First, many Somali and international parties agree that there exists some degree of common ground between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Al-Shabaab. Second, while Somali elders, business leaders, and Muslim-majority countries have been identified as potential facilitators or initiators of a dialogue with Al-Shabaab, such talks require at least non-opposition from key factions in the FGS and Al-Shabaab and more broadly from powerful regional powers who have rejected past agreements. Third, FGS and international actors need to decide whether they want to maintain their focus on facilitating and promoting defections from Al-Shabaab or explore the possibility of comprehensive talks with Al-Shabaab aimed at bringing in the entire armed group.Less
This chapter examines the potential for talks with Al-Shabaab, identifies potential facilitators and spoilers, and highlights lessons to be learned from past dialogues with Al-Shabaab. Three main conclusions are reached. First, many Somali and international parties agree that there exists some degree of common ground between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Al-Shabaab. Second, while Somali elders, business leaders, and Muslim-majority countries have been identified as potential facilitators or initiators of a dialogue with Al-Shabaab, such talks require at least non-opposition from key factions in the FGS and Al-Shabaab and more broadly from powerful regional powers who have rejected past agreements. Third, FGS and international actors need to decide whether they want to maintain their focus on facilitating and promoting defections from Al-Shabaab or explore the possibility of comprehensive talks with Al-Shabaab aimed at bringing in the entire armed group.
Joanne Crouch and Abdi Ali
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190947910
- eISBN:
- 9780190055929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0040
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the results of key interviews with Somalis regarding their perceptions about Al-Shabaab. Respondents expressed concerns about Al-Shabaab's indiscriminate and excessive use of ...
More
This chapter discusses the results of key interviews with Somalis regarding their perceptions about Al-Shabaab. Respondents expressed concerns about Al-Shabaab's indiscriminate and excessive use of violence, which are considered inconsistent with Islam, and its restrictions on freedom of speech and movement. However, they spoke positively about Al-Shabaab's strict enforcement of rules and their impartial resolution of disputes. They also compared Al-Shabaab favourably to the government in terms of reducing clan influence over politics or the allocation of resources, and in terms of minimizing corruption in ‘tax’ collection, but noted the group's failure to provide social services. Three-quarters of respondents expressed support for a negotiated solution to the conflict, but doubted Al-Shabaab would be willing to engage.Less
This chapter discusses the results of key interviews with Somalis regarding their perceptions about Al-Shabaab. Respondents expressed concerns about Al-Shabaab's indiscriminate and excessive use of violence, which are considered inconsistent with Islam, and its restrictions on freedom of speech and movement. However, they spoke positively about Al-Shabaab's strict enforcement of rules and their impartial resolution of disputes. They also compared Al-Shabaab favourably to the government in terms of reducing clan influence over politics or the allocation of resources, and in terms of minimizing corruption in ‘tax’ collection, but noted the group's failure to provide social services. Three-quarters of respondents expressed support for a negotiated solution to the conflict, but doubted Al-Shabaab would be willing to engage.
