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Ugandan security concerns throughout the Museveni era have centered round terrorism, both domestic and international. Internationally, there is evidence to suggest, Ugandan intelligence services foiled attempts by Al Qaeda to bomb the US Embassy in Kampala, at the time of the Dar Es-Salaam and Nairobi Embassy bombings. In 2010, Kampala suffered from Al Qaeda-inspired bombings carried out by the Somali group Al Shabaab, in retaliation for sending peacekeepers to Somalia. Domestically, Uganda has also experienced attacks deemed to be terrorism from the Allied Democratic Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army. This chapter demonstrates how the term ‘terrorism’ has been used by the Ugandan government in many different ways and how the expansive use of this term has been critiqued. I argue that the key to understanding the Ugandan government’s response to these disparate threats is through understanding how Museveni has used these crises to become a key US ally in the War on Terror and to position himself as a regional leader in East Africa.

This chapter provides an introduction to and overview of the famine: exploring the declaration of July 20, 2011, and the immediate response to it. It puts the Somalia famine in context and lays out the three big questions the book addresses: What can be learned from the failure to prevent the food price crisis and from the response to it? What can be learned from the emergence of major Islamic humanitarian actors, and how can western and Islamic humanitarian actors collaborate more closely? And how did people cope in areas that the humanitarian response could not reach because of Al Shabaab restrictions and donor constraints? The chapter also provides a “roadmap” to the rest of the book.

This chapter puts the famine of 2011 in the context of Somalia’s recent history, the political economy of humanitarian aid in the Greater Horn of Africa, and Somalia’s protracted crisis of development since the 1970s. This includes the Ethio-Somali war in 1978, the civil war in Somalia, the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, the 1992 famine, the “warlord” era, the rise of the Islamic Courts Union, the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and the rise of Al Shabaab. The chapter traces the history of the “normalization of crisis in Somalia,” and sets the scene for the crisis of 2011. Lastly, it traces the impact of Al Shabaab and the counter-terrorism legislation intended to curb its activities.

This chapter discusses the results of interviews with six women in Al-Shabaab who are or were married to Al-Shabaab fighters. These women lead a privileged existence both in terms of the quality of life that is accorded to them by Al-Shabaab's Executive Council, especially in comparison to the civilian population living under Al-Shabaab's control, and also the freedoms they are allowed. The women were permitted, and apparently encouraged, to run businesses and in support of that activity they were allowed access to smartphones and could travel relatively freely around Lower and Middle Jubba. The women occasionally participated in Al-Shabaab operations, taking advantage of the lax security that is applied to women to support intelligence gathering and fundraising for the organization.

This chapter discusses the Al-Shabaab's policies and activities in the Jubba River Valley, based on research with 41 people who were either recently displaced from the Valley or have relatives living there. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, powerful militias tied to major clans have vied for control of the Valley, often exploiting and predating marginalized groups, especially the farming communities known as Somali Bantus. Al-Shabaab has done likewise, extorting considerably higher levels of harvests, ‘taxes’, and remittances from Somali Bantus than from Somalis from the major clans. Al-Shabaab also imposes stringent penalties for non-compliance with their rules, sometimes resulting in eviction from long-held farmland. This marginalization demonstrates that a just and sustainable peace in Somalia will depend on far more effective efforts to protect the rights of Somalia's oppressed populations.

This chapter considers the motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has built itself on a clear agenda: ridding Somalia of foreign forces, portrayed as Christians, and implementing the Sharia. These goals implied the need for reform and discipline of Somali society using all means: dawa (preaching) as well as violence. While the goals fit well with Somali nationalistic and Salafi agendas, more fluidity or even flexibility is shown by Al-Shabaab in a situation of weakness. However, there is no doubt that Al-Shabaab eventually intends to monopolize the religious arena and curb the political and social influence of any contenders. Somali viewpoints are not always antagonistic towards Al-Shabaab, which throws light on some of the mistakes or weaknesses of its enemies.

This chapter considers the issue of why fighters join Al-Shabaab and why they quit, based on an analysis of over 100 interviews with individuals currently and previously in the group. It concludes that a majority seek a sense of belonging and purpose, influenced by Al-Shabaab's claim to be acting in defence of Islam. Younger members are attracted by the opportunity for adventure, prospects of economic security, and because of the encouragement of friends who have already joined. Fighters often leave because life in the group, and the treatment of its members, are harsher than expected, or they find that the group does not abide by its religious principles, especially in its brutality and use of arbitrary detentions. Interestingly, six Al-Shabaab leaders interviewed suggested that the group was fighting a political rather than ideological battle, and that its members had little interest in Al-Qaida's global agenda.

Radicalization is undermining Somalia's peace, stability, and development prospects. Religious extremism has also become a major security concern for the region and for the world. This chapter evaluates causes, drivers, and contributing factors of radicalization in Somalia. It also assesses the strategies adopted to deal with Al-Shabaab as well as other feasible options to address the issue of radicalization. There are currently over 20,000 UN-mandated forces with the African Union Mission in Somalia forces in the country battling with Al-Shabaab, and US military forces are also engaged in aerial attacks and at times special forces raids. Despite such combined efforts, Al-Shabaab endures as a strong force, unleashes devastating terror acts, and is poised to remain potent unless effective strategies are adopted.

This chapter examines the extent to which the push and pull factors of youth recruitment in Al-Shabaab have reinforced radicalization in Somalia. Whereas the push factors are facilitated by negative dynamics, such as the hostile environment and indoctrination, the pull factors are reinforced by issues of identity, ideology, and economic exclusion. Methodologically, the chapter is based on intensive one-on-one and group interviews with former Al-Shabaab defectors. Understanding Al-Shabaab from various angles through an empirically grounded analysis is crucial for two reasons. First, it will help the Somali government to find ways of tackling the threats posed by ongoing insurgency activities. Second, it will contribute to the efforts of creating peace and stability in southern Somalia.

This chapter discusses what Al-Shabaab delivers in the areas it controls. It focuses on three main sectors: preaching and education, organizing civil society, and justice. Al-Shabaab uses religion to enhance its legitimacy and as a means of social control. The group promotes religious education in Quranic schools, and exalts dogmatism and righteousness, which undermines tolerance and open-mindedness. On taking control of a community, Al-Shabaab will declare that Sharia, rather than xeer, will be applied. It therefore tends to disempower elders, while sometimes promoting and manipulating the role of other groups such as women, teenagers, and traders. The group enforces harsh rules of behaviour, but they are predictable. It also establishes courts that are generally considered to be non-corrupt and whose judgements are enforced.

This chapter considers the origins of Al-Shabaab and the gap between its rhetoric and practice. Despite its globalist agenda, reinforced by its allegiance to Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab is at its core an ethnic movement with its focus on Somalia. As such, it can only survive, let alone expand, by offering better security, better prospects, and better governance than the structures established by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Currently, however, the FGS is dominant and Al-Shabaab does not look like a viable alternative. To stem its decline, Al-Shabaab has appealed to Somalis as Muslims to support its role in the global campaign against ‘Western aggression’, while mounting attacks inside the country to undermine any appearance of growing stability, and attacking outside the country to dissuade Somalia's regional allies from continuing their support.

Since Al-Shabaab's inception more than a decade ago, communications have played a central role in its strategy. The group has stated that the ‘media battle’ is one of the most important elements of its campaign. This chapter examines the communications strategies and techniques of Al-Shabaab and other parties, and analyses how this information is received and what kind of impact it makes. Interviews with a broad range of individuals showed that many consider Al-Shabaab's messaging more compelling than Federal Government of Somalia and international counter-messaging. The group produces high-quality media products; targets local, national, and international journalists; and is rigorous and persistent. However, Al-Shabaab threatens journalists who do not do its bidding, produces highly distorted stories, and projects power and success for a vast number of Somali websites, many of which are unreliable.

This chapter considers how Al-Shabaab messaging can be best countered, drawing on field research in Mogadishu and Baidoa, focusing on the area of Bay/Bakool. It shows that lack of security, opportunity, and justice, combined with clan conflicts create conditions that Al-Shabaab can exploit. In Bay/Bakool, the group is seen as having semi-territorial control; in other words, a fairly regular presence despite intermittent deployments or patrols by forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia. Thus, the involvement of sheikhs and clan elders is all the more important as they wield considerable influence in communities and can strengthen efforts of countering violent extremism (CVE). A wide, inclusive approach is recommended, drawing upon a combination of different types of religious leaders, in which Sufi, Shafi'i, and Quietist/non-political Wahhabism are represented.

This chapter focuses on the alliance between Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab. Although cooperation between the groups is limited and irregular, the relationship has proven durable despite the loss of leaders on both sides and the emergence of Islamic State in northeast Somalia. The resilience of the relationship is attributed to several factors: Al-Shabaab's links to Al-Qaida's affiliate in Yemen, which may have enhanced Al-Shabaab's military expertise; Al-Qaida's ability to help Al-Shabaab with raising funds; Al-Shabaab's oath of allegiance or bayah to Al-Qaida; and the trust and predictability of the alliance, reinforced by ideological and personal ties between some leaders. The relationship is used by Al-Shabaab leaders to justify measures to enforce unity, control its rank and file, and avoid defections to Islamic State. The relationship is also flexible, giving Al-Shabaab leaders access to assistance and jihadi prestige, while retaining a high degree of autonomy.

This chapter considers the threat posed by Al-Shabaab both in Somalia and to the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is a composite insurgency, which has exploited local grievances by aligning itself with disaffected clans or minority groups. In 2016, it stepped up efforts to co-opt clan leaders through coercion and incentives, even establishing a new Council of Clan Leaders. Since 2010, Al-Shabaab has sought to establish itself in the Horn of Africa, initiating insurgent activities in six countries of the region and conducting attacks in five of them. In 2013, Al-Shabaab established two transnational military wings: one focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; the other on Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab's regional unit, Jaysh Ayman, has carried out a campaign of attacks in northern Kenya, while its affiliate Al-Hijra is said to have established a range of networks and operational cells, including in Kenya's prisons.

This chapter examines foreign fighter influence in Al-Shabaab. The role and influence of foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab have varied over time. In the early years, there were numerous reports highlighting the importance of foreign fighters; however, in recent years, their influence has been limited. Regional recruits mostly come from Kenya, followed by Tanzania and Uganda. These fighters generally occupy rank and file military roles, and increase the group's ability to operate and recruit in the region. The number of foreign fighters joining Al-Shabaab from outside the region has diminished since the group purged such fighters between 2011 and 2013, and the emergence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. Looking ahead, foreign fighter influence within the group is likely to remain limited given that many of its activities are acutely local and its strength often depends on managing and exploiting clan conflict.

This chapter considers Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Members of the Somali diaspora in the West were the major source of Al-Shabaab's Western foreign fighters. Previously, a considerable number of members of the diaspora joined or attempted to join Al-Shabaab (referred to as ‘travellers’), and while the group's attractiveness for potential travellers has waned, the risk remains that it could revive. The chapter suggests that alienation plays a role in radicalization, such that travellers' acceptance of Al-Shabaab's violently anti-Western rhetoric demonstrates they were not deeply assimilated into the mainstream values of their host countries. However, it was Al-Shabaab's ideology that primarily attracted travellers. Thus, governments must try to delegitimize Al-Shabaab's worldview while promoting the attractions of their own ways of life in order to ensure travellers will not again seek out Al-Shabaab in large numbers.

This chapter examines the potential for talks with Al-Shabaab, identifies potential facilitators and spoilers, and highlights lessons to be learned from past dialogues with Al-Shabaab. Three main conclusions are reached. First, many Somali and international parties agree that there exists some degree of common ground between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Al-Shabaab. Second, while Somali elders, business leaders, and Muslim-majority countries have been identified as potential facilitators or initiators of a dialogue with Al-Shabaab, such talks require at least non-opposition from key factions in the FGS and Al-Shabaab and more broadly from powerful regional powers who have rejected past agreements. Third, FGS and international actors need to decide whether they want to maintain their focus on facilitating and promoting defections from Al-Shabaab or explore the possibility of comprehensive talks with Al-Shabaab aimed at bringing in the entire armed group.