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Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will

Alfred R. Mele

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199896134
eISBN:
9780199949533
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ... More


Introduction

Alfred R. Mele

in Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199896134
eISBN:
9780199949533
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter identifies the book’s goal—to show that weak-willed action is possible and to explain why it happens. The chapter provides conceptual and historical background, including background on ... More


Weakness of Will and Akrasia

Alfred R. Mele

in Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199896134
eISBN:
9780199949533
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he ... More


Are Addicts Akratic?: Interpreting the Neuroscience of Reward

Gideon Yaffe

in Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199862580
eISBN:
9780199369638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Moral Philosophy

Working with the view that akratic action is action that conflicts with what the agent values at the time of action, the paper asks whether addicts act akratically. The paper offers an interpretation ... More


Team Reasoning, Framing, and Self-Control: An Aristotelian Account

Natalie Gold

in Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199862580
eISBN:
9780199369638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Moral Philosophy

Decision theory explains weakness of will as the result of a conflict of incentives between different transient agents. In this framework, self-control can only be achieved by the I-now altering the ... More


Inner Struggle

Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder

in In Praise of Desire

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199348169
eISBN:
9780199348183
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199348169.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Inner struggle is not merely acting contrary to one's judgment of what is best (i.e., akrasia). Rather, it is a phenomenon in which one's thoughts, emotions, and felt dispositions to act suggest ... More


Desire and Vividness

Neil Sinhababu

in Humean Nature: How desire explains action, thought, and feeling

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198783893
eISBN:
9780191826542
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

All of desire’s other properties are amplified when its object is vividly sensed or imagined. Chapter 7 uses this property of desire, Amplification by Vividness, to explain procrastination and ... More


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