Melissa T. Brown
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199842827
- eISBN:
- 9780199933105
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842827.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training ...
More
Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training and specifically offered respect and advancement to blue-collar, mechanically inclined young men, reinforcing a working-class masculinity. Air Force recruiting has also made advanced technology a central draw; through association with this technology, the Air Force offers the masculine rewards of mastery, dominance, and control. In recent years, the Air Force has offered recruits not direct physical excitement, but the vicarious thrills of video games, which provide extreme experiences through the mediation of technology. The chapter also gives a brief history of women in the Air Force and examines their portrayal in recruiting advertisements. The Air Force has the largest percentage of women, but its advertising has mainly targeted technically inclined young men; women have been only a token presence.Less
Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training and specifically offered respect and advancement to blue-collar, mechanically inclined young men, reinforcing a working-class masculinity. Air Force recruiting has also made advanced technology a central draw; through association with this technology, the Air Force offers the masculine rewards of mastery, dominance, and control. In recent years, the Air Force has offered recruits not direct physical excitement, but the vicarious thrills of video games, which provide extreme experiences through the mediation of technology. The chapter also gives a brief history of women in the Air Force and examines their portrayal in recruiting advertisements. The Air Force has the largest percentage of women, but its advertising has mainly targeted technically inclined young men; women have been only a token presence.
Melissa T. Brown
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199842827
- eISBN:
- 9780199933105
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842827.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics, International Relations and Politics
This book explores how the U.S. military branches have deployed gender and, in particular, ideas about masculinity to sell military service to potential recruits. Military service has strong ...
More
This book explores how the U.S. military branches have deployed gender and, in particular, ideas about masculinity to sell military service to potential recruits. Military service has strong historical ties to masculinity, but conscription ended during a period when masculinity was widely perceived to be in crisis and women’s roles were expanding. The central question the book asks is whether, in the era of the all-volunteer force, masculinity is the underlying basis of military recruiting appeals and if so, in what forms It also asks how women fit into the gendering of service. Based on an analysis of more than 300 print advertisements published between the early 1970s and 2007, as well as television commercials and recruiting Websites, the book argues that masculinity is still a foundation of the appeals, but each branch deploys various constructions of masculinity that serve its particular personnel needs and culture, with conventional martial masculinity being only one among them. While the Marines rely almost exclusively on a traditional, warrior form of masculinity, the Army, Navy, and Air Force draw on various strands of masculinity that are in circulation in the wider culture, including economic independence and breadwinner status, dominance and mastery through technology, and hybrid masculinity which combines egalitarianism and compassion with strength and power. The inclusion of a few token military women in recruiting advertisements has become routine, but the representations of service make it clear that men are the primary audience and combat their exclusive domain.Less
This book explores how the U.S. military branches have deployed gender and, in particular, ideas about masculinity to sell military service to potential recruits. Military service has strong historical ties to masculinity, but conscription ended during a period when masculinity was widely perceived to be in crisis and women’s roles were expanding. The central question the book asks is whether, in the era of the all-volunteer force, masculinity is the underlying basis of military recruiting appeals and if so, in what forms It also asks how women fit into the gendering of service. Based on an analysis of more than 300 print advertisements published between the early 1970s and 2007, as well as television commercials and recruiting Websites, the book argues that masculinity is still a foundation of the appeals, but each branch deploys various constructions of masculinity that serve its particular personnel needs and culture, with conventional martial masculinity being only one among them. While the Marines rely almost exclusively on a traditional, warrior form of masculinity, the Army, Navy, and Air Force draw on various strands of masculinity that are in circulation in the wider culture, including economic independence and breadwinner status, dominance and mastery through technology, and hybrid masculinity which combines egalitarianism and compassion with strength and power. The inclusion of a few token military women in recruiting advertisements has become routine, but the representations of service make it clear that men are the primary audience and combat their exclusive domain.
Priya Satia
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331417
- eISBN:
- 9780199868070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331417.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History
This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime ...
More
This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime experiences and the culture of British surveillance in the Middle East—the preoccupation with the region's inscrutability, lack of frontiers, multiplication of rumors and lies—all of which air control would theoretically turn to advantage. In theory, “terror” would enable it to minimize casualties. The chapter describes the regime's actual brutality, showing how cultural conceptions circulated by the agents—the chivalry of Bedouin, the tolerance of a biblical people—helped mute criticism of its inhumanity and inaccuracy, as did its cooperation with allegedly empathetic ground agents. Thus did aerial bombardment become a central part of British military practice. The RAF's dependence on the Middle East for its survival made it impossible for the British to leave Iraq even after Iraqi “independence.”Less
This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime experiences and the culture of British surveillance in the Middle East—the preoccupation with the region's inscrutability, lack of frontiers, multiplication of rumors and lies—all of which air control would theoretically turn to advantage. In theory, “terror” would enable it to minimize casualties. The chapter describes the regime's actual brutality, showing how cultural conceptions circulated by the agents—the chivalry of Bedouin, the tolerance of a biblical people—helped mute criticism of its inhumanity and inaccuracy, as did its cooperation with allegedly empathetic ground agents. Thus did aerial bombardment become a central part of British military practice. The RAF's dependence on the Middle East for its survival made it impossible for the British to leave Iraq even after Iraqi “independence.”
Patrick Deer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239887
- eISBN:
- 9780191716782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239887.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies, 20th-century and Contemporary Literature
Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a ...
More
Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a last resort of martial heroism and the colonies provided laboratories for experiment. The interwar period saw the consolidating imperial gaze of air power and mechanized war turned on the civilian home front as both apocalyptic nightmare and escapist fantasy. This chapter explores T.E. Lawrence's haunting fantasies of air power as he dedicated mind and body to the RAF's role in policing the empire in the 1920s and 30s. It argues that for those who waged the war of space and movement, the mythology of armored masculinity and panoramic vision all too often resulted in blackout and bodily disintegration. It explores these conflicts of “airmindedness” in the work of Virginia Woolf, Rex Warner, George Orwell, Richard Hillary, and Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.Less
Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a last resort of martial heroism and the colonies provided laboratories for experiment. The interwar period saw the consolidating imperial gaze of air power and mechanized war turned on the civilian home front as both apocalyptic nightmare and escapist fantasy. This chapter explores T.E. Lawrence's haunting fantasies of air power as he dedicated mind and body to the RAF's role in policing the empire in the 1920s and 30s. It argues that for those who waged the war of space and movement, the mythology of armored masculinity and panoramic vision all too often resulted in blackout and bodily disintegration. It explores these conflicts of “airmindedness” in the work of Virginia Woolf, Rex Warner, George Orwell, Richard Hillary, and Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.
Jie W Weiss and David J Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be ...
More
JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be fulfilled. As each request for close air support is received, the JUDGE system makes a dispatching decision that maximizes the difference between a return gained for sending aircraft against the target and a cost imputed to expending sorties. This chapter reports an experiment to evaluate JUDGE. For comparison, JUDGE was pitted against a second technique called DASC (Direct Air Support Center)—a hypothetical version of the system the Air Force currently uses. The results showed the superiority of JUDGE over DASC when measured by an expected utility criterion. JUDGE performed at the 90% level when compared with the perfect possible performance. DASC reached a level of only 40%.Less
JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be fulfilled. As each request for close air support is received, the JUDGE system makes a dispatching decision that maximizes the difference between a return gained for sending aircraft against the target and a cost imputed to expending sorties. This chapter reports an experiment to evaluate JUDGE. For comparison, JUDGE was pitted against a second technique called DASC (Direct Air Support Center)—a hypothetical version of the system the Air Force currently uses. The results showed the superiority of JUDGE over DASC when measured by an expected utility criterion. JUDGE performed at the 90% level when compared with the perfect possible performance. DASC reached a level of only 40%.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. ...
More
This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. “Unification,” as the creation of a single Defense Department was known, created an independent Air Force and placed all three services under the direction of the secretary of defense. This development was bound to annoy a service that coveted its autonomy as much did the Navy. Ominously, not only was the Air Force placed into the security structure as a coequal to the Army and Navy, but it threatened to seize the latter's position as America's first line of defense. The basis of the Air Force's power was the air-atomic idea. It became the central issue around which revolved interservice fights in war planning and budgeting, culminating in the B-36 hearings. The struggle between the two services was one between different and largely incompatible conceptions of national security. The chapter concludes by assessing an event that bridged the early and late air-atomic periods, the Korean War.Less
This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. “Unification,” as the creation of a single Defense Department was known, created an independent Air Force and placed all three services under the direction of the secretary of defense. This development was bound to annoy a service that coveted its autonomy as much did the Navy. Ominously, not only was the Air Force placed into the security structure as a coequal to the Army and Navy, but it threatened to seize the latter's position as America's first line of defense. The basis of the Air Force's power was the air-atomic idea. It became the central issue around which revolved interservice fights in war planning and budgeting, culminating in the B-36 hearings. The struggle between the two services was one between different and largely incompatible conceptions of national security. The chapter concludes by assessing an event that bridged the early and late air-atomic periods, the Korean War.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756662
- eISBN:
- 9780804770965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756662.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for ...
More
This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.Less
This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.
John Baylis
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198280125
- eISBN:
- 9780191684357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280125.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such ...
More
This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such contradictions are evident in the discordant views between the Army and Navy of Britain, as well as the Royal Air Force, regarding the issue of regaining international control of the Suez Canal through increased reliance on the United States. Because of this, the administration failed its military adventure, which led to Russian protest, national opposition, discharge of support from America, and eventually, Eden's resignation. The techniques employed by the regime were perhaps inadequate to justify re-entitlement of international authority.Less
This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such contradictions are evident in the discordant views between the Army and Navy of Britain, as well as the Royal Air Force, regarding the issue of regaining international control of the Suez Canal through increased reliance on the United States. Because of this, the administration failed its military adventure, which led to Russian protest, national opposition, discharge of support from America, and eventually, Eden's resignation. The techniques employed by the regime were perhaps inadequate to justify re-entitlement of international authority.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air ...
More
This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air Force and its air-atomic ideas were secure from immediate threat, the other services continued their struggle against it. Some attempts to seize slices of the Air Force mission and budget, like the fight over tactical airpower, were rooted outside strategic airpower. However, the senior services also attacked strategic air theory to provide leverage in other skirmishes. In the mid-1950s, the Navy began its transition to advocacy of finite deterrence with the Martin XP6M Sea Master seaplane and culminated in the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The place of finite deterrence, tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the SLBM, sharply opposed air-atomic theory. Similarly, the Army challenged the theoretical basis of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) predominance by claiming that Soviet nuclear power would cause stalemate—reviving the need for Army limited war forces. These theories became possible because of the characteristics of the air-atomic idea and the size and success of SAC. The interservice disputes also reflected the influence of the civilian strategic community, which emerged as an entity during the 1950s.Less
This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air Force and its air-atomic ideas were secure from immediate threat, the other services continued their struggle against it. Some attempts to seize slices of the Air Force mission and budget, like the fight over tactical airpower, were rooted outside strategic airpower. However, the senior services also attacked strategic air theory to provide leverage in other skirmishes. In the mid-1950s, the Navy began its transition to advocacy of finite deterrence with the Martin XP6M Sea Master seaplane and culminated in the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The place of finite deterrence, tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the SLBM, sharply opposed air-atomic theory. Similarly, the Army challenged the theoretical basis of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) predominance by claiming that Soviet nuclear power would cause stalemate—reviving the need for Army limited war forces. These theories became possible because of the characteristics of the air-atomic idea and the size and success of SAC. The interservice disputes also reflected the influence of the civilian strategic community, which emerged as an entity during the 1950s.
Martin Francis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199277483
- eISBN:
- 9780191699948
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277483.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Cultural History
Between 1939 and 1945, the British public was spellbound by the martial endeavours and dashing style of the young men of the RAF, especially those with silvery fabric wings sewn above the breast ...
More
Between 1939 and 1945, the British public was spellbound by the martial endeavours and dashing style of the young men of the RAF, especially those with silvery fabric wings sewn above the breast pocket of their glamorous slate-blue uniform. The author provides the first scholarly study of the place of ‘the flyer’ in British culture during the Second World War. Examining the lives of RAF personnel, and their popular representation in literary and cinematic texts, he illuminates broader issues of gender, social class, national and racial identities, emotional life, and the creation of a national myth in twentieth-century Britain. In particular, he argues that the flyer's relationship to fear, aggression, loss of his comrades, bodily dismemberment, and psychological breakdown reveals broader ambiguities surrounding the dominant understandings of masculinity in the middle decades of the century. Despite his star appeal, cultural representations of the flyer encompassed both the gentle, chivalrous warrior and the uncompromising agent of destruction. Paying particular attention to the romantic universe of wartime aircrew, Francis reveals the extraordinary contrasts of their daily lives: dicing with death in the sky one moment, before sitting down to lunch with wives and children in the next. Male and female experiences during the war were not polarized and antithetical, but were complementary and interrelated, a conclusion which has implications for the history of gender in modern Britain that reach well beyond either the specialized military culture of the wartime RAF or the chronological parameters of the Second World War.Less
Between 1939 and 1945, the British public was spellbound by the martial endeavours and dashing style of the young men of the RAF, especially those with silvery fabric wings sewn above the breast pocket of their glamorous slate-blue uniform. The author provides the first scholarly study of the place of ‘the flyer’ in British culture during the Second World War. Examining the lives of RAF personnel, and their popular representation in literary and cinematic texts, he illuminates broader issues of gender, social class, national and racial identities, emotional life, and the creation of a national myth in twentieth-century Britain. In particular, he argues that the flyer's relationship to fear, aggression, loss of his comrades, bodily dismemberment, and psychological breakdown reveals broader ambiguities surrounding the dominant understandings of masculinity in the middle decades of the century. Despite his star appeal, cultural representations of the flyer encompassed both the gentle, chivalrous warrior and the uncompromising agent of destruction. Paying particular attention to the romantic universe of wartime aircrew, Francis reveals the extraordinary contrasts of their daily lives: dicing with death in the sky one moment, before sitting down to lunch with wives and children in the next. Male and female experiences during the war were not polarized and antithetical, but were complementary and interrelated, a conclusion which has implications for the history of gender in modern Britain that reach well beyond either the specialized military culture of the wartime RAF or the chronological parameters of the Second World War.
Tim Benbow
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781949668001
- eISBN:
- 9781949668018
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9781949668001.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Military History
During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service ...
More
During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service squabbling but the product of deep and long-standing differences about the nature and conduct of war. The Admiralty, fully appreciating the central role of air power in attacking and defending sea communications, repeatedly asked for reinforcement of the under-resourced Coastal Command. The Air Staff, however, consistently and strenuously resisted these requests due to the overwhelming priority it placed on the strategic air offensive against Germany. This chapter by Tim Benbow examines these disputes between 1940 and 1943, assessing the arguments presented by the Air Staff and by the Admiralty. It maintains that the Air Staff was dogmatically fixated on demonstrating that bombing could win the war on its own, despite ample evidence to the contrary, and failed to allocate aircraft appropriately. As a result, the war at sea did not receive the support that its strategic importance justified. It further asserts that Churchill and his government failed to adjudicate effectively on this vital issue as a result of their sloppy and inconsistent approach to setting priorities.Less
During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service squabbling but the product of deep and long-standing differences about the nature and conduct of war. The Admiralty, fully appreciating the central role of air power in attacking and defending sea communications, repeatedly asked for reinforcement of the under-resourced Coastal Command. The Air Staff, however, consistently and strenuously resisted these requests due to the overwhelming priority it placed on the strategic air offensive against Germany. This chapter by Tim Benbow examines these disputes between 1940 and 1943, assessing the arguments presented by the Air Staff and by the Admiralty. It maintains that the Air Staff was dogmatically fixated on demonstrating that bombing could win the war on its own, despite ample evidence to the contrary, and failed to allocate aircraft appropriately. As a result, the war at sea did not receive the support that its strategic importance justified. It further asserts that Churchill and his government failed to adjudicate effectively on this vital issue as a result of their sloppy and inconsistent approach to setting priorities.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The most important change to the air-atomic strategy in the 1950s was the compression of time. The “time factor” forced the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to act ever more rapidly: defensively so to ...
More
The most important change to the air-atomic strategy in the 1950s was the compression of time. The “time factor” forced the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to act ever more rapidly: defensively so to escape destruction, offensively in order to achieve a meaningful victory. The timescale for decision shrank from months to days to hours, which had uncontrolled, uncontrollable, and unintended consequences. This chapter examines the time factor itself; its impact on thinking within the Air Force; its consequences on planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union; and the perceived shape of future conflict. The causes for the change in the time factor fall in two broad categories: Soviet strategic power and technological change. The rise of a Soviet air-atomic force able to target the United States put the timer in motion, while technological progress dialed in ever shorter time limits. Both categories are necessary but neither is sufficient on its own to explain the dramatic changes to air-atomic thinking during the 1950s. Only the combination of a hostile Soviet atomic threat and missile technology can account for the dramatic effects of the time factor.Less
The most important change to the air-atomic strategy in the 1950s was the compression of time. The “time factor” forced the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to act ever more rapidly: defensively so to escape destruction, offensively in order to achieve a meaningful victory. The timescale for decision shrank from months to days to hours, which had uncontrolled, uncontrollable, and unintended consequences. This chapter examines the time factor itself; its impact on thinking within the Air Force; its consequences on planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union; and the perceived shape of future conflict. The causes for the change in the time factor fall in two broad categories: Soviet strategic power and technological change. The rise of a Soviet air-atomic force able to target the United States put the timer in motion, while technological progress dialed in ever shorter time limits. Both categories are necessary but neither is sufficient on its own to explain the dramatic changes to air-atomic thinking during the 1950s. Only the combination of a hostile Soviet atomic threat and missile technology can account for the dramatic effects of the time factor.
John Baylis
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198280125
- eISBN:
- 9780191684357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280125.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Several proposals were made regarding the modifications on defence planning and the utilization of nuclear weapons. These undertakings led to divided feedback from the military personnel (which ...
More
Several proposals were made regarding the modifications on defence planning and the utilization of nuclear weapons. These undertakings led to divided feedback from the military personnel (which refers to the Navy and Air Force) and conflicts on bureaucratic interest in terms of the employment of the materials, the dilemma of the defence process of Britain during the two world wars (that was centralized on the continental commitment and maritime/air strategy), and the usage of either supervised weapons or nuclear weapons. Although there are steps to eliminate rivalry in the policy-making bodies, the differences in the concentration and perspectives that each one pursues give rise to an unsuccessful execution of their nuclear blueprints and more importantly, national security. Indeed, nuclear abstractions, no matter how brilliant they can be, will only be useless until they are applied.Less
Several proposals were made regarding the modifications on defence planning and the utilization of nuclear weapons. These undertakings led to divided feedback from the military personnel (which refers to the Navy and Air Force) and conflicts on bureaucratic interest in terms of the employment of the materials, the dilemma of the defence process of Britain during the two world wars (that was centralized on the continental commitment and maritime/air strategy), and the usage of either supervised weapons or nuclear weapons. Although there are steps to eliminate rivalry in the policy-making bodies, the differences in the concentration and perspectives that each one pursues give rise to an unsuccessful execution of their nuclear blueprints and more importantly, national security. Indeed, nuclear abstractions, no matter how brilliant they can be, will only be useless until they are applied.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the ...
More
This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the Kennedy administration, the Air Force and administration not only clashed in the realm of strategic concepts, they also interacted with the real world. The collision played out in contemporary crises and future plans. For the first time since 1945, ideas at the national level directly opposed those at the service level. The new administration's ideas about discriminate nuclear weapon use, no-cities, and Assured Destruction radically changed crisis management and procurement. The distance between concepts produced chasms between air-atomic advocates and their opponents. The most direct collision between these ideas and reality occurred during the intense crises of the early 1960s. The limits of abstract strategy became plain when real issues were at stake. These crises also reflected other changes in the national security structure, most importantly, a shift from seeking the counsel of uniformed advisors and toward detached civilian analysis; and they also show how hard it was to apply the ideas generated by academics to the real world.Less
This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the Kennedy administration, the Air Force and administration not only clashed in the realm of strategic concepts, they also interacted with the real world. The collision played out in contemporary crises and future plans. For the first time since 1945, ideas at the national level directly opposed those at the service level. The new administration's ideas about discriminate nuclear weapon use, no-cities, and Assured Destruction radically changed crisis management and procurement. The distance between concepts produced chasms between air-atomic advocates and their opponents. The most direct collision between these ideas and reality occurred during the intense crises of the early 1960s. The limits of abstract strategy became plain when real issues were at stake. These crises also reflected other changes in the national security structure, most importantly, a shift from seeking the counsel of uniformed advisors and toward detached civilian analysis; and they also show how hard it was to apply the ideas generated by academics to the real world.
William Waddell
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780813177571
- eISBN:
- 9780813177588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813177571.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Since 9/11 the Air Force has been compelled, sometimes reluctantly, to adopt a subsidiary role to US landpower in the various wars against terror. This process has left the notion of Airpower and Air ...
More
Since 9/11 the Air Force has been compelled, sometimes reluctantly, to adopt a subsidiary role to US landpower in the various wars against terror. This process has left the notion of Airpower and Air Leadership struggling to find a voice. While the reemergence of great power competition might bring rain to the Air Force's leadership desert, it is the contention of this chapter that the Air Force needs to be able to adapt and lead even if that is not the case.Less
Since 9/11 the Air Force has been compelled, sometimes reluctantly, to adopt a subsidiary role to US landpower in the various wars against terror. This process has left the notion of Airpower and Air Leadership struggling to find a voice. While the reemergence of great power competition might bring rain to the Air Force's leadership desert, it is the contention of this chapter that the Air Force needs to be able to adapt and lead even if that is not the case.
Brian D. Laslie
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813169989
- eISBN:
- 9780813174068
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169989.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Only the most ardent of air power historians know the name of General Laurence S. Kuter, despite the fact he welded a B-17 group into a cohesive fighting force, was the deputy commander of allied ...
More
Only the most ardent of air power historians know the name of General Laurence S. Kuter, despite the fact he welded a B-17 group into a cohesive fighting force, was the deputy commander of allied tactical air forces in North Africa, and later served as commander of the Military Air Transport Service, Air University, Far East Air Forces—later Pacific Air Forces—and finally as a Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). The biography of Larry Kuter is the biography of the United States Air Corps, Army Air Forces and U.S. Air ForceLess
Only the most ardent of air power historians know the name of General Laurence S. Kuter, despite the fact he welded a B-17 group into a cohesive fighting force, was the deputy commander of allied tactical air forces in North Africa, and later served as commander of the Military Air Transport Service, Air University, Far East Air Forces—later Pacific Air Forces—and finally as a Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). The biography of Larry Kuter is the biography of the United States Air Corps, Army Air Forces and U.S. Air Force
Craig Jones
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198842927
- eISBN:
- 9780191878824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198842927.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This is the first of two chapters analysing the role of military lawyers in the contemporary US kill chain. This chapter focuses on deliberate (planned) targeting operations and the routine nature of ...
More
This is the first of two chapters analysing the role of military lawyers in the contemporary US kill chain. This chapter focuses on deliberate (planned) targeting operations and the routine nature of legal advice at a key location in the US targeting apparatus—the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar. Military lawyers participate throughout the ‘targeting cycle’ giving legal, operational, and public relations advice. In contrast to inflated claims about the ‘total’ visibility of the battlespace, planned operations are beset with gaps in intelligence and emergent events. Legal oversight is far from complete, given the scale of lawyer deployment. Moreover, the legal frameworks that military lawyers bring to bear on the kill chain are malleable and open to a wide range of interpretations. In practice, this means that the constraining function of targeting law often loses out to its enabling function with consequences for who and what is targeted.Less
This is the first of two chapters analysing the role of military lawyers in the contemporary US kill chain. This chapter focuses on deliberate (planned) targeting operations and the routine nature of legal advice at a key location in the US targeting apparatus—the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar. Military lawyers participate throughout the ‘targeting cycle’ giving legal, operational, and public relations advice. In contrast to inflated claims about the ‘total’ visibility of the battlespace, planned operations are beset with gaps in intelligence and emergent events. Legal oversight is far from complete, given the scale of lawyer deployment. Moreover, the legal frameworks that military lawyers bring to bear on the kill chain are malleable and open to a wide range of interpretations. In practice, this means that the constraining function of targeting law often loses out to its enabling function with consequences for who and what is targeted.
Phillip S. Meilinger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780813178899
- eISBN:
- 9780813178905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813178899.003.0014
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This essay deals with the massive report chartered by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 to measure the effects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan—the US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). ...
More
This essay deals with the massive report chartered by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 to measure the effects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan—the US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). Ascertaining the effects of air strikes was critical, and airmen took steps to ensure that data would be amassed and analyzed to determine if the strategic bombing campaign was successful and worth the effort. USSBS was a massive effort employing over 1,500 personnel that conducted a detailed examination of the evidence both in Europe and the Pacific. Its unimpeachable findings and answers were fairly clear-cut, as detailed in the statistical findings published in over 300 reports. This essay closely examines the bulk of the surveys and reveals what they actually said.Less
This essay deals with the massive report chartered by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 to measure the effects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan—the US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). Ascertaining the effects of air strikes was critical, and airmen took steps to ensure that data would be amassed and analyzed to determine if the strategic bombing campaign was successful and worth the effort. USSBS was a massive effort employing over 1,500 personnel that conducted a detailed examination of the evidence both in Europe and the Pacific. Its unimpeachable findings and answers were fairly clear-cut, as detailed in the statistical findings published in over 300 reports. This essay closely examines the bulk of the surveys and reveals what they actually said.
Pramod K. Mehra
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198092384
- eISBN:
- 9780199082674
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198092384.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter seeks to assess India’s present air power capability and its future potential in the face of changing security challenges to its major power status. It argues that to face such ...
More
This chapter seeks to assess India’s present air power capability and its future potential in the face of changing security challenges to its major power status. It argues that to face such challenges, India would require a greater role to be played by its Air Force, which, however, limited in its capability, is still in the process of transformation into an up-to-date force. The historical evolution of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and its operational experiences in the pre-Independence and post-Independence period are discussed. The chapter also sheds light on the key security challenges to India’s emergence as a major regional power and the role of the IAF. It examines the force projection capability of the IAF and various challenges at the force and policy levels.Less
This chapter seeks to assess India’s present air power capability and its future potential in the face of changing security challenges to its major power status. It argues that to face such challenges, India would require a greater role to be played by its Air Force, which, however, limited in its capability, is still in the process of transformation into an up-to-date force. The historical evolution of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and its operational experiences in the pre-Independence and post-Independence period are discussed. The chapter also sheds light on the key security challenges to India’s emergence as a major regional power and the role of the IAF. It examines the force projection capability of the IAF and various challenges at the force and policy levels.
Edward Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452482
- eISBN:
- 9780801455506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter addresses two types of policies—declaratory policy and action policy—and their intersection with air-atomic ideas. Declaratory policy, the public face of nuclear strategy, consists of ...
More
This chapter addresses two types of policies—declaratory policy and action policy—and their intersection with air-atomic ideas. Declaratory policy, the public face of nuclear strategy, consists of the nation's announced nuclear stance. Action policy is how a nation actually prepares to carry out nuclear strategy. These policies are distinct, often uncoordinated, and relevant for that fact. The air-atomic theory was tightly integrated into early postwar plans against the Soviet Union. The chapter outlines the plans written by the Joint Chiefs which were patterned on the recently completed war, and on the central role of the air-atomic offensive within them. Next it examines the function of strategic air attack in the Air Force's war plans, which conformed closely to the Joint Chiefs' expectations. It then looks at how the Air Force and other government bodies assessed its ability to carry out the strategic air offensive plans. Finally, the chapter considers how plans for atomic war fit within national strategy.Less
This chapter addresses two types of policies—declaratory policy and action policy—and their intersection with air-atomic ideas. Declaratory policy, the public face of nuclear strategy, consists of the nation's announced nuclear stance. Action policy is how a nation actually prepares to carry out nuclear strategy. These policies are distinct, often uncoordinated, and relevant for that fact. The air-atomic theory was tightly integrated into early postwar plans against the Soviet Union. The chapter outlines the plans written by the Joint Chiefs which were patterned on the recently completed war, and on the central role of the air-atomic offensive within them. Next it examines the function of strategic air attack in the Air Force's war plans, which conformed closely to the Joint Chiefs' expectations. It then looks at how the Air Force and other government bodies assessed its ability to carry out the strategic air offensive plans. Finally, the chapter considers how plans for atomic war fit within national strategy.
