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The Air Force

Melissa T. Brown

in Enlisting Masculinity: The Construction of Gender in US Military Recruiting Advertising during the All-Volunteer Force

Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training ... More

Chapter 6 provides background material on the Air Force’s culture and recruiting history, before presenting an analysis of the recruiting materials. Air Force advertising has emphasized job training and specifically offered respect and advancement to blue-collar, mechanically inclined young men, reinforcing a working-class masculinity. Air Force recruiting has also made advanced technology a central draw; through association with this technology, the Air Force offers the masculine rewards of mastery, dominance, and control. In recent years, the Air Force has offered recruits not direct physical excitement, but the vicarious thrills of video games, which provide extreme experiences through the mediation of technology. The chapter also gives a brief history of women in the Air Force and examines their portrayal in recruiting advertisements. The Air Force has the largest percentage of women, but its advertising has mainly targeted technically inclined young men; women have been only a token presence.Less

Air Control

Priya Satia

in Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East

This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime ... More

This chapter describes the surveillance technology the British devised, initially in Iraq, as a result of their conspiracy obsessions. The panoptical ambitions of “air control” followed from wartime experiences and the culture of British surveillance in the Middle East—the preoccupation with the region's inscrutability, lack of frontiers, multiplication of rumors and lies—all of which air control would theoretically turn to advantage. In theory, “terror” would enable it to minimize casualties. The chapter describes the regime's actual brutality, showing how cultural conceptions circulated by the agents—the chivalry of Bedouin, the tolerance of a biblical people—helped mute criticism of its inhumanity and inaccuracy, as did its cooperation with allegedly empathetic ground agents. Thus did aerial bombardment become a central part of British military practice. The RAF's dependence on the Middle East for its survival made it impossible for the British to leave Iraq even after Iraqi “independence.”Less

The Empire of the Air

Patrick Deer

in Culture in Camouflage: War, Empire, and Modern British Literature

Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a ... More

Chapter 2 traces the literary response to the seductive futurist appeal and colonialist genealogy of air power in two World Wars. After the Great War, the “empire of the air” was celebrated as a last resort of martial heroism and the colonies provided laboratories for experiment. The interwar period saw the consolidating imperial gaze of air power and mechanized war turned on the civilian home front as both apocalyptic nightmare and escapist fantasy. This chapter explores T.E. Lawrence's haunting fantasies of air power as he dedicated mind and body to the RAF's role in policing the empire in the 1920s and 30s. It argues that for those who waged the war of space and movement, the mythology of armored masculinity and panoramic vision all too often resulted in blackout and bodily disintegration. It explores these conflicts of “airmindedness” in the work of Virginia Woolf, Rex Warner, George Orwell, Richard Hillary, and Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.Less

JUDGE: A Laboratory Evaluation

Jie W Weiss and David J Weiss

in A Science of Decision Making: The Legacy of Ward Edwards

JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be ... More

JUDGE is a decision-making technique designed to aid a commander responsible for dispatching Close Air Support missions in situations wherein resource limitations do not allow all demands to be fulfilled. As each request for close air support is received, the JUDGE system makes a dispatching decision that maximizes the difference between a return gained for sending aircraft against the target and a cost imputed to expending sorties. This chapter reports an experiment to evaluate JUDGE. For comparison, JUDGE was pitted against a second technique called DASC (Direct Air Support Center)—a hypothetical version of the system the Air Force currently uses. The results showed the superiority of JUDGE over DASC when measured by an expected utility criterion. JUDGE performed at the 90% level when compared with the perfect possible performance. DASC reached a level of only 40%.Less

Finding a Place

Edward Kaplan

in To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. ... More

This chapter examines the air-atomic strategy and the organizational struggles it fueled. The structure for national security policy changed dramatically with the National Security Act in July 1947. “Unification,” as the creation of a single Defense Department was known, created an independent Air Force and placed all three services under the direction of the secretary of defense. This development was bound to annoy a service that coveted its autonomy as much did the Navy. Ominously, not only was the Air Force placed into the security structure as a coequal to the Army and Navy, but it threatened to seize the latter's position as America's first line of defense. The basis of the Air Force's power was the air-atomic idea. It became the central issue around which revolved interservice fights in war planning and budgeting, culminating in the B-36 hearings. The struggle between the two services was one between different and largely incompatible conceptions of national security. The chapter concludes by assessing an event that bridged the early and late air-atomic periods, the Korean War.Less

Adjusting to the National Military Establishment

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for ... More

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.Less

Stalemate, Finite Deterrence, Polaris, and SIOP-62

Edward Kaplan

in To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air ... More

This chapter recounts the continued clashes between the Air Force and its sister services whose new ideas, including finite deterrence and stalemate, threatened its predominance. Although the Air Force and its air-atomic ideas were secure from immediate threat, the other services continued their struggle against it. Some attempts to seize slices of the Air Force mission and budget, like the fight over tactical airpower, were rooted outside strategic airpower. However, the senior services also attacked strategic air theory to provide leverage in other skirmishes. In the mid-1950s, the Navy began its transition to advocacy of finite deterrence with the Martin XP6M Sea Master seaplane and culminated in the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The place of finite deterrence, tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the SLBM, sharply opposed air-atomic theory. Similarly, the Army challenged the theoretical basis of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) predominance by claiming that Soviet nuclear power would cause stalemate—reviving the need for Army limited war forces. These theories became possible because of the characteristics of the air-atomic idea and the size and success of SAC. The interservice disputes also reflected the influence of the civilian strategic community, which emerged as an entity during the 1950s.Less

Brothers in Arms: The Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the Battle of the Atlantic

Tim Benbow

in Decision in the Atlantic: The Allies and the Longest Campaign of the Second World War

During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service ... More

During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service squabbling but the product of deep and long-standing differences about the nature and conduct of war. The Admiralty, fully appreciating the central role of air power in attacking and defending sea communications, repeatedly asked for reinforcement of the under-resourced Coastal Command. The Air Staff, however, consistently and strenuously resisted these requests due to the overwhelming priority it placed on the strategic air offensive against Germany. This chapter by Tim Benbow examines these disputes between 1940 and 1943, assessing the arguments presented by the Air Staff and by the Admiralty. It maintains that the Air Staff was dogmatically fixated on demonstrating that bombing could win the war on its own, despite ample evidence to the contrary, and failed to allocate aircraft appropriately. As a result, the war at sea did not receive the support that its strategic importance justified. It further asserts that Churchill and his government failed to adjudicate effectively on this vital issue as a result of their sloppy and inconsistent approach to setting priorities.Less

The Fantastic Compression of Time

Edward Kaplan

in To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

The most important change to the air-atomic strategy in the 1950s was the compression of time. The “time factor” forced the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to act ever more rapidly: defensively so to ... More

The most important change to the air-atomic strategy in the 1950s was the compression of time. The “time factor” forced the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to act ever more rapidly: defensively so to escape destruction, offensively in order to achieve a meaningful victory. The timescale for decision shrank from months to days to hours, which had uncontrolled, uncontrollable, and unintended consequences. This chapter examines the time factor itself; its impact on thinking within the Air Force; its consequences on planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union; and the perceived shape of future conflict. The causes for the change in the time factor fall in two broad categories: Soviet strategic power and technological change. The rise of a Soviet air-atomic force able to target the United States put the timer in motion, while technological progress dialed in ever shorter time limits. Both categories are necessary but neither is sufficient on its own to explain the dramatic changes to air-atomic thinking during the 1950s. Only the combination of a hostile Soviet atomic threat and missile technology can account for the dramatic effects of the time factor.Less

End of an Era

Edward Kaplan

in To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the ... More

This chapter addresses the impact of new ideas on the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, plans for nuclear warfare, weapons for future war, and the US Air Force. During the one thousand days of the Kennedy administration, the Air Force and administration not only clashed in the realm of strategic concepts, they also interacted with the real world. The collision played out in contemporary crises and future plans. For the first time since 1945, ideas at the national level directly opposed those at the service level. The new administration's ideas about discriminate nuclear weapon use, no-cities, and Assured Destruction radically changed crisis management and procurement. The distance between concepts produced chasms between air-atomic advocates and their opponents. The most direct collision between these ideas and reality occurred during the intense crises of the early 1960s. The limits of abstract strategy became plain when real issues were at stake. These crises also reflected other changes in the national security structure, most importantly, a shift from seeking the counsel of uniformed advisors and toward detached civilian analysis; and they also show how hard it was to apply the ideas generated by academics to the real world.Less

Not Only Above, But Among: American Airpower and Leadership into the Twenty-First Century

William Waddell

in Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force After 9/11

Since 9/11 the Air Force has been compelled, sometimes reluctantly, to adopt a subsidiary role to US landpower in the various wars against terror. This process has left the notion of Airpower and Air ... More

Since 9/11 the Air Force has been compelled, sometimes reluctantly, to adopt a subsidiary role to US landpower in the various wars against terror. This process has left the notion of Airpower and Air Leadership struggling to find a voice. While the reemergence of great power competition might bring rain to the Air Force's leadership desert, it is the contention of this chapter that the Air Force needs to be able to adapt and lead even if that is not the case.Less

The Indian Air Force of Tomorrow: Challenges

Pramod K. Mehra

in India's Military Modernization: Challenges and Prospects

This chapter seeks to assess India’s present air power capability and its future potential in the face of changing security challenges to its major power status. It argues that to face such ... More

This chapter seeks to assess India’s present air power capability and its future potential in the face of changing security challenges to its major power status. It argues that to face such challenges, India would require a greater role to be played by its Air Force, which, however, limited in its capability, is still in the process of transformation into an up-to-date force. The historical evolution of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and its operational experiences in the pre-Independence and post-Independence period are discussed. The chapter also sheds light on the key security challenges to India’s emergence as a major regional power and the role of the IAF. It examines the force projection capability of the IAF and various challenges at the force and policy levels.Less

Declaration, Action, and the Air-Atomic Strategy

Edward Kaplan

in To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

This chapter addresses two types of policies—declaratory policy and action policy—and their intersection with air-atomic ideas. Declaratory policy, the public face of nuclear strategy, consists of ... More

This chapter addresses two types of policies—declaratory policy and action policy—and their intersection with air-atomic ideas. Declaratory policy, the public face of nuclear strategy, consists of the nation's announced nuclear stance. Action policy is how a nation actually prepares to carry out nuclear strategy. These policies are distinct, often uncoordinated, and relevant for that fact. The air-atomic theory was tightly integrated into early postwar plans against the Soviet Union. The chapter outlines the plans written by the Joint Chiefs which were patterned on the recently completed war, and on the central role of the air-atomic offensive within them. Next it examines the function of strategic air attack in the Air Force's war plans, which conformed closely to the Joint Chiefs' expectations. It then looks at how the Air Force and other government bodies assessed its ability to carry out the strategic air offensive plans. Finally, the chapter considers how plans for atomic war fit within national strategy.Less

Slugging It Out on Capitol Hill

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter describes the events leading up to the Navy's presentation to the House Armed Services Committee in the fall of 1949 on national military strategy and the importance of strengthening ... More

This chapter describes the events leading up to the Navy's presentation to the House Armed Services Committee in the fall of 1949 on national military strategy and the importance of strengthening naval aviation. Some of the naval officers who had been involved were convinced that the Navy's presentations had demonstrated to the committee that there were real differences in service thinking regarding how best to assure the country's security. Other naval officers, however, thought that the whole effort had been a costly failure.Less

Unfortunate Sons

Glenn Robins

in The Longest Rescue: The Life and Legacy of Vietnam POW William A. Robinson

This chapter covers Robinson's early years in the cotton-mill town of Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, his troubled relationship with his father, and his enlistment in the Air Force. It explains the ... More

This chapter covers Robinson's early years in the cotton-mill town of Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, his troubled relationship with his father, and his enlistment in the Air Force. It explains the development of the Air Force Air Rescue Service, emphasizing equipment and doctrine, and discusses air rescue operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. It closes with a detailed narrative of Robinson's shootdown and capture.Less