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This chapter focuses on a different form of evidence for the creation of the Athenian past, namely its public oratory. Through the public speeches of Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates, as well as of fragmentary texts, it examines the parameters of plausibility within which the orator was free to construct history, both buying into a commonly shared past and moulding that past for his audience. It considers whether orators favoured particular exemplary moments in history and, if so, whether these were the same as those which were dominant in local historiography. The orator, like the historian or the dramatist, played a vital role in helping the polis to formulate a past which was relevant to the present through its inclusion both of exemplary figures and events and of characteristics, which remained constant across time.

This chapter assembles all the testimonia and fragments in which Menander is explicitly named; the Greek text is accompanied by an English translation and commentary. The collection is overwhelmingly dominated by the fragments of Menander’s commentary on Demosthenes. He may also have written commentaries on Aeschines and Aelius Aristides. Commentaries on works of rhetorical theory by Minucianus and Hermogenes are also attested. Two works on epideictic oratory have been transmitted under his name, and it is argued that only the second of the two was actually written by Menander.

In the first trial between Demosthenes and Aeschines, the former depicts his rival as a traitor who by accepting Philip of Macedon's bribes and acting against the interest of the Aeschines has effectively left the community of Athenians. Demosthenes uses references to cults, festivals, or ceremonies to support this political point: Aeschines has poured libations and sung the paean with the enemy, and he has caused disruption to an Athenian festival through his detrimental policies. Hardly ever does Demosthenes accuse Aeschines directly of being flawed in a religious way. The clearest instances of argumentation based on religion are the admonitions to the judges to heed the heliastic oath and therefore not to acquit Aeschines.

A description of Demosthenes' position after Chaeroneia stands at the start of this chapter, showing that he defends himself not only against Aeschines, but also against the many accusations and the allegations with a religious background which Aeschines only exploits. Demosthenes turns arguments about his ‘Fortune’, described as a goddess by Aeschines, into a discussion of personal fortune, thus deflecting the debate to one of social standing. In the discussion of Aeschines' participation in the obscure rite of Sabazius, he does not make a religious point but ridicules Aeschines for his ignoble upbringing. In this way he removes the religious element, alluding to this aspect of the accusation only occasionally and after long preparation.

An analysis of the speeches of Aeschines and Lycurgus as well as Lysias' sixth speech shows all the features of religious argumentation, including those that cannot be read without acceptance of the religious notions. Lysias' speech shows the widest range, featuring divine intervention in human affairs and the opponent's pollution, Lycurgus uses only the former type of argument, Aeschines only the latter. However, these two orators are consistent in the arguments they resort to throughout their careers; the choice of religious motifs is not made for one speech alone. An excursus considers the speech Against Aristogiton, which contains religious argumentation of a type Demosthenes does not employ in the undoubtedly genuine speeches; other motifs occur in higher density and intensity. There cannot be a definite conclusion about authenticity, though the interpretation as a genuine logographic speech seems most likely.

This chapter is devoted to the crown trial of 330, when Aeschines indicted Ctesiphon for proposing a crown for Demosthenes in 336 for his services to the state, and Demosthenes ended up delivering the defense speech. It justified his politics and Ctesiphon was acquitted.

This chapter features more of Demosthenes' political speeches, his growing success in the Assembly, and Philip's invasion of the Chalcidice. It also deals with the clash between Demosthenes and Meidias, the rise to political power of Aeschines, and the death throes of the Third Sacred War.

This chapter discusses the events and negotiations between Philip and Athens that led to the Peace of Philocrates and the end of the war between the two, as well as the trial of Meidias and Demosthenes' speech against him, the end of the Third Sacred War, and the punishment of Phocis.

This chapter examines the uneasy aftermath of the Peace of Philocrates, Philip's plans to amend the peace, and Demosthenes' adverse reaction to them in his next political speeches as well as his indictment in the so-called false embassy trial of Aeschines for corruption during the diplomatic negotiations with Philip in 346.

This chapter focuses on the notions of conspiracy against legislative initiatives and decrees in ancient Athens. It suggests that litigants who depicted legislative proposals and decrees as scheme-shares with other practitioners and consumers of the rhetoric of conspiracy received a fundamental refusal to take manifest goals at face value unless they were selfish enough to put their trust in others. The chapter also describes, and provides commentaries on, the relevant works of Demosthenes and Aeschines.

The sixth chapter pursues the analysis of the contrast between public speech and letter writing in political and forensic contexts through a discussion of the mention of letters in the speeches of the Attic orators. Particular attention is given to the use made of letters in the political speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines. Finally, after a survey of the letters and documents embedded in Isocrates’ speeches, the chapter discusses the ‘epistolary speeches’ of Isocrates, and more generally the first treatises in epistolary form, with an attempt at teasing out the reasons for the choice of this extraordinarily successful form, and its implications.

This chapter provides a new analysis of the state documents (laws, decrees, registers) found in Demosthenes’ On the Crown. It discusses the relevant sources in detail, reconstructing the contents of the actual documents used by Demosthenes, and assessing the inserted documents in the light of this information, of comparable epigraphical material, and of the most recent advancements in the understanding of the institutional and legal workings of the Athenian democracy. As a result, this chapter confirms and strengthens previous judgements that these documents are not authentic, and in the process offers new insights on key moments of the history of the late fourth-century and of the struggle between Athens and Philip.

Inscriptions were an essential part of the ancient landscape of Delphi, exerting a strong influence over the narratives devoted to the sanctuary by historians and other writers. Inscriptions offered a guide to the reconstruction of the past and an exciting way to narrate it. A great deal of information and many reflections on Delphic history and myths, on amphictionic institutions, and on the most remarkable monuments of the site were therefore suggested to the ancient authors by their own skill in reading and interpreting written documents available on the site itself, and by their confidence in the genuineness of such texts. On latter point, there is particular interest in both the polemic between Aeschines and Demosthenes on the possibility of knowing and ‘teaching’ the most ancient history of the sanctuary, and the research carried out by Aristotle and Callisthenes in Delphic archives. Delphi was therefore, in the classical period, simultaneously a place to visit and to go to on a pilgrimage, the focus of many historians' interest, and their ‘library’ and ‘epigraphic museum’. The chapters devoted to Delphi in the works by Herodotus, Strabo, or Plutarch (not to mention Pausanias) were directly inspired by the observation of monuments, buildings, and votive offerings and by the reading of written documents on permanent media. This chapter discusses some of the most interesting examples of this research work taking place in (and concerning) Delphi and demonstrates the extent of intellectual activity excited by the availability of one of the widest ‘epigraphic collections’ of the ancient world.

The chapter opens by examining, through an extrapolation of Aristotle’s comments in the Rhetoric, how an Aristotelian orator might use phthonos in argument in practice, and concludes that the only use consistent with Aristotle’s thought is demonstrating that it motivates an opponent’s actions. A survey of phthonos words in the Attic oratorical corpus shows that accusations against the opponent (or disclamations in response to, or anticipation of, an opponent’s argument) do indeed account for nearly all instances. The only explicit attempts to arouse an audience’s phthonos for the opponent are when the word means specifically moral censure, not envy. A detailed examination of two speeches (by Demosthenes) that make extensive use of phthonos arguments (and words) exemplifies this. However, it is possible to arouse envy against one’s opponent covertly—without using the word—and the chapter ends by considering a number of speeches where this happens, in response to avoidance of liturgies, embezzlement, or bribe-taking.

This chapter inquires into the judgement of Demosthenes about the affairs during the period of his full maturity, from the defeat of Chaeronea down to his triumph over Aeschines in 330. The speeches of that year provide insight on what sort of judge of politics Demosthenes was. It also considers Demosthenes' silence on his part in the Theban revolt of 335 as well as the silence of Aeschines on this subject.