Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-4 of 4 items

  • Keywords: Adam Elga x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

Indifference principles and quantum mechanics

Michael G. Titelbaum

in Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199658305
eISBN:
9780191748134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Adam Elga argues that in certain cases when an agent cannot tell which of many subjectively indistinguishable experiences she is currently having, she should assign equal credence to being in each. ... More


Applying (PEP)

Michael G. Titelbaum

in Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199658305
eISBN:
9780191748134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explains how to apply the Certainty-Loss Framework (CLF) to stories involving self-locating belief and context-sensitivity. This formal modeling framework and its distinctive updating ... More


Locating Ourselves in the World

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Our Knowledge of the Internal World

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199545995
eISBN:
9780191719929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating ... More


Epistemic Modesty Defended 1

David Christensen

in The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199698370
eISBN:
9780191748899
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It has often been noticed that conciliatory views of disagreement are “self-undermining” in a certain way: advocates of such views cannot consistently maintain them when other philosophers disagree. ... More


View: