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The tiny Southeast Asian city-state of Singapore has a reputation for adroit and nimble diplomacy, built upon an ingrained desire to overcome its vulnerability by maintaining its strategic relevance and economic prosperity in an international system that is seen as essentially anarchic. As its neighborhood experiences major shifts in the strategic and economic domains, Singapore finds itself once again having to strike a balance between getting out of harm’s way and capitalizing on opportunities.

India’s attempt to join the process of regional integration was marked by ambivalence. India did bypass its own region to seek integration in the adjacent one, ignoring SAARC to seek membership in some of the ASEAN led institutions. Operating by consensus through non-binding agreements, ASEAN-centered regionalism suited India’s needs for recognition and protected it against the negative repercussions of regional tensions while preventing the rise of potential regional hegemonys. Through its participation in a regional security architecture led by ASEAN rules, India established a normative buffer while being able to influence decisions. However, ASEAN’s centrality (i.e.; consensus based and a unanimous position reflecting common strategic vision) is gradually being eroded by US-China proxy struggle for influence, eroding the foundation of India’s relations with ASEAN, as it may draw New Delhi into the zero-sum game situation it has so far tried to avoid.

India’s defence interactions with Southeast Asia were formed by the uncertain strategic configuration emerging in Asia at the end of the Cold War. India’s defence interactions with Southeast Asia were the outcome of the uncertain strategic configuration which emerged in Asia at the end of the Cold War. Additionally, asAs India’s economic interaction with the region grew, so did the need to protect its line of communication through Southeast Asia. Two sets of strategic strategy drive India’s defence interactions in Southeast Asia: the perceived imperative to be the predominant power in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, which borders Southeast Asia and the willingness to assume a greater strategic role in Southeast Asia and the West-Pacific Ocean. Practically, however, India’s defence engagements have been defined by availability of strategical partners and the level of political trust between New Delhi and concerned countries, In practical terms however India’s defence engagements in the region have been defined by the availability of strategically meaningful partners and the level of political trust between New Delhi and each of the concerned countries, generating a hierarchy of partnership dominated by Singapore. This uneven development of India’s defence collaboration with Southeast Asia is partly mitigated by India’s participation in ASEAN’s consensus based multilateral fora, ARF and ADMM+., which consensus based approach and non-binding character make India’s favourite instrument in the region.

India’s relationship with the United States remains crucial to its own objectives, but is also ambiguous. The asymmetry of power between the two countries is such that the relationship, if potentially useful, is not necessary for the United States while potentially risky for India. Moreover, the shift of the political centre of gravity of Asia — resulting from the growing rivalry between China and the US — is eroding the foundations of India’s policy in Asia, while prospects for greater economic interaction is limited by India’s slow pace of reforms. The future of India-US relations lies in their capacity to evolve a new quid pro quo in which the US will formulate its expectations in more realistic terms while India would assume a larger share of the burden of Asia’ security.