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An examination is made of US policy towards and participation in several key regional multilateral organizations in the Asia–Pacific area, with the aim of establishing how central these organizations are to the overall development of US policy and the extent to which, and how, they influence or constrain US behaviour. The first section of the chapter reviews US strategic goals and briefly discusses some of the domestic and external factors that have led to the development and implementation of these goals in East Asia. The next section discusses multilateral security cooperation in the region, and gives an overview of regional multilateral security organizations, focusing primarily on the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), given its all‐encompassing nature and relatively advanced (by Asian standards) stage of development; other US‐instigated multilateral institutions and initiatives (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) are touched upon briefly to assess how these more narrowly focused approaches also serve American interests. The third section looks at Asia–Pacific multilateral economic cooperation, and here the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) provides the centrepiece of the discussion; its role both in creating an Asia–Pacific economic community and, more recently, as a vehicle for political cooperation through the institutionalization of the US‐instigated Leaders’ Meetings, which bring many of the region's heads of state and government together annually, ostensibly for economic discussions. The conclusion to the chapter briefly evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of these organizations from a US perspective in order to understand better how security and economic multilateralism fits with the largely bilaterally oriented US national security strategy.

India’s attempt to join the process of regional integration was marked by ambivalence. India did bypass its own region to seek integration in the adjacent one, ignoring SAARC to seek membership in some of the ASEAN led institutions. Operating by consensus through non-binding agreements, ASEAN-centered regionalism suited India’s needs for recognition and protected it against the negative repercussions of regional tensions while preventing the rise of potential regional hegemonys. Through its participation in a regional security architecture led by ASEAN rules, India established a normative buffer while being able to influence decisions. However, ASEAN’s centrality (i.e.; consensus based and a unanimous position reflecting common strategic vision) is gradually being eroded by US-China proxy struggle for influence, eroding the foundation of India’s relations with ASEAN, as it may draw New Delhi into the zero-sum game situation it has so far tried to avoid.