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An examination is made of US policy towards and participation in several key regional multilateral organizations in the Asia–Pacific area, with the aim of establishing how central these organizations are to the overall development of US policy and the extent to which, and how, they influence or constrain US behaviour. The first section of the chapter reviews US strategic goals and briefly discusses some of the domestic and external factors that have led to the development and implementation of these goals in East Asia. The next section discusses multilateral security cooperation in the region, and gives an overview of regional multilateral security organizations, focusing primarily on the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), given its all‐encompassing nature and relatively advanced (by Asian standards) stage of development; other US‐instigated multilateral institutions and initiatives (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) are touched upon briefly to assess how these more narrowly focused approaches also serve American interests. The third section looks at Asia–Pacific multilateral economic cooperation, and here the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) provides the centrepiece of the discussion; its role both in creating an Asia–Pacific economic community and, more recently, as a vehicle for political cooperation through the institutionalization of the US‐instigated Leaders’ Meetings, which bring many of the region's heads of state and government together annually, ostensibly for economic discussions. The conclusion to the chapter briefly evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of these organizations from a US perspective in order to understand better how security and economic multilateralism fits with the largely bilaterally oriented US national security strategy.

The second case looks at the region of East Asia, again frequently described as having been hegemonic, mostly reflecting the widespread US alliances in the area. Much of the contemporary debate is about whether the region is now undergoing a power transition, as China's economy has bounced back quickly from the global recession, and it has been seen as a powerful motor of regional economic integration ever since the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s. Is the USA losing any hegemony in the region, or simply its primacy in the face of greater multipolarity? The chapter considers the debates about current regional order, and whether it is being led by regional small-power initiatives, such as through ASEAN, or by great-power initiatives coming from China or the USA. Its main conclusion is that any US hegemony in the region has always been incomplete, and a singular hegemony seems precarious for the future. A coalitional hegemony would be deeply divisive, as it would exclude China. Hence, the most plausible future model is a form of collective hegemony, one that is multilayered and displays a complex hierarchy.

This chapter introduces ASEAN and the “ASEAN Way” of taking actions based on consensus as well as both the theoretical and practical difficulties that presents for successful collective action by the members of the organization. Emphasizing the theoretical insights of Ruggie and other scholars concerning multilateralism as well as theories of collective action, the chapter provides insight into the factors that inhibit a common ASEAN response to the disputes in the South China Sea. The chapter further highlights the diversity among ASEAN member states, including geographic, cultural, political, and economic differences, as well as their own territorial disputes both in and outside of the South China Sea, that further inhibit collective action. Finally, the chapter provides data on China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region, which, the book argues, provides China with increased influence over some ASEAN members.

A general concern among development economists is whether there will be another group of “baby tigers” in the world economy. This chapter examines the prospects of the next tier of NICs—notably the ASEAN countries—by surveying their records of trade growth using various aspects of the trade performance of Korea and Taiwan as benchmarks. Using the RCA similarity criteria, this chapter asserts that the “most likely to succeed” are Thailand and Malaysia to become the candidates of the next tier of the NICs. Further, an analysis of the relationships between ASEAN patterns of revealed comparative advantage with those of the two city-states, Hong Kong and Singapore, also provided the same conclusions. While Thailand leads, evidence shows that Indonesia is clearly lagging in the race to become tomorrow's NICs. The latter part of this chapter assesses the dynamic trade expansion in ASEAN countries.

Economic interest groups proliferated after the end of the Suharto regime. They, too, became major stakeholders in foreign policy decisions, especially those with implications for the international competitiveness of Indonesian businesses. The chapter investigates how and to what extent business representatives localized EU norms of regional integration. Interestingly, public contributions of business interests to the Charter debate were rare, and the economic implications of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) envisaged in the Charter were discussed only much later. Yet responses to the AEC’s common market and production base differed. While EU-style market-opening reforms were supported by large, export-oriented firms, the majority of small- and medium-scale industries producing for the domestic market rejected them. Business representatives localized reforms imitating the EU model, too, thereby relying on ancient prosperity ideas, the vulnerability discourse, leadership, and soft power.

Despite political backlash from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam cautiously proceeded along a path of normalization with ASEAN and the United States. Vietnam's entry into ASEAN was a major break with past thinking and a critical step toward full integration in the global system. In retrospect this was the period when Vietnam went so far along the path of full integration that it couldn't pull back, even when reverse currents set in. Was the progress toward integration driven by compelling events, the persuasiveness of “new thinking”? Where did it come from and what influence did it have? Emerging new interest groups, weakening of conservatives and erosion of resistance to reform, realpolitik (need to find an alternative to isolation to counterbalance China), generational change, drift and going with the flow? Or a combination of the above. These questions are pursued throughout the remainder of the book.

This chapter introduces the rival territorial claimants, all of whom, besides China and Taiwan, are members of ASEAN, and their claims in the South China Sea. It provides historical background for several of the claims to the Paracel and Spratly island chains, focusing on those of China, which has been most successful in actualizing its claims. It analyses the shifts over time in China’s foreign policy in the region, highlighting efforts at cooperation near the turn of the century and China’s more aggressively asserting its claims in recent years. It lays out the two tales the book tells: the story of China’s efforts to divide ASEAN in pursuit of its territorial claims and the broader story of how China uses its financial power to influence foreign governments in developing states. The chapter also provides a justification for the selection of the three case studies in the book: China’s relations with Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar, emphasizing variation in the key variable of political regime type. Finally, it introduces each subsequent chapter.

This chapter analyzes each ASEAN member state’s territorial claims and disputes both in and outside of the South China Sea as well as its current position regarding ASEAN efforts to negotiate multilaterally with China over rival South China Sea claims. It highlights the broad support for freedom of navigation within ASEAN as well as the stated desire of each government to pursue a peaceful resolution based on the Code of Conduct with China that the ASEAN members agreed to develop in Phnom Penh in 2002. The chapter makes clear that, despite the many overlapping and competing maritime territorial claims among ASEAN member states, these states have managed to cooperate to resolve disputes outside of the South China Sea and, unlike China, since the signing of the DOC have largely refrained from taking provocative actions related to contested claims within the region. The chapter further notes the important differences in the dynamics between, and preferences of, China and the rival ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea when compared to the cases of successful dispute resolution discussed in the chapter; the most obvious difference is the asymmetry in the balance of power between China and the other claimants.

The chapter summarizes the book’s findings on China’s efforts to divide ASEAN and conquer the South China Sea, using variation in member state’s reactions to the decision in favor of the Philippines by the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration to illustrate the impact of China’s influence. The book concludes that because of the inherent differences within ASEAN, especially in political institutions, as well as the intrinsic difficulties of effective multilateralism and collective action, ASEAN will be unlikely to come together to force China to the negotiating table, as long as China wishes to resist taking a seat. The chapter notes that China’s efforts to influence states in the region have not always been successful, as the case studies illustrate; China has advantages in influencing developing state, authoritarian governments but faces more and higher hurdles in its efforts to influence developing state governments operating within relatively democratic institutions. A brief comparative analysis of China’s bilateral relations in Latin America suggests that the book’s findings are generalizable to China’s relations with developing states globally. The book concludes that the potential evolution of political institutions toward democracy is a form of long-term political risk facing Chinese efforts to influence developing state governments.

This chapter begins by introducing the topic of energy security. It then provides an overview of Singapore's energy needs and its sources of energy. It gives an historical overview of Singapore's oil trade and gas markets. It examines Singapore's energy security policies, including the restructuring of the Singapore power industry. It investigates energy security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It highlights that Singapore is highly dependent on energy because energy is used as an intermediate input for its production processes, and that it is also a final commodity for the market. It adds that all the energy Singapore uses is imported, with oil as the dominant import, but with an increasing share in natural gas.

This chapter explores how regional responsibility is expressed in the context of Southeast Asia’s creep towards the pacific settlement of trade and territorial disputes. It examines the nexus between sovereignty and responsibility, which is also partly manifested in the way regional countries have coalesce around the notion of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific, where responsible stakeholders presumably abide by rules-based governance, consensually agreed codes of interstate conduct and resort to peaceful means of dispute settlement. This includes ASEAN’s slow evolution towards a rules-based regional governance and a ‘legal personality’ in the form of the ASEAN charter. It also looks at the increasing reliance by Southeast Asian countries on international dispute settlement regimes and mechanisms as means, such as mediation, reconciliation, arbitration and/or adjudication, for resolving their disputes over trade and territory. Crucially, increasing reliance on peace means of dispute resolution does not automatically lead to a concomitant reduction in conflicts and disputes between regional countries; indeed, it might even engender more disputes because governments are now encouraged to raise issues in the mutual expectation that contending parties are unlikely to resort to war to settle their conflicts.

This chapter presents findings regarding special and differential treatment and the adjudication of development principally in international economic law, bringing to light creative approaches to dealing with treaty participants in widely different developmental circumstances. Many of the themes that WTO members grapple with, such as the cost of implementing obligations, capacity constraints, and the need for technical assistance, are also pervasive in other treaties. However, some treaties or organizations take a much bolder stance on asymmetric commitments between members with different economic, social, and political conditions. The manner in which such differentiated commitments are built into parties' legal obligations can also differ strikingly from the WTO's more limitative perspective.