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An examination is made of US policy towards and participation in several key regional multilateral organizations in the Asia–Pacific area, with the aim of establishing how central these organizations are to the overall development of US policy and the extent to which, and how, they influence or constrain US behaviour. The first section of the chapter reviews US strategic goals and briefly discusses some of the domestic and external factors that have led to the development and implementation of these goals in East Asia. The next section discusses multilateral security cooperation in the region, and gives an overview of regional multilateral security organizations, focusing primarily on the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), given its all‐encompassing nature and relatively advanced (by Asian standards) stage of development; other US‐instigated multilateral institutions and initiatives (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) are touched upon briefly to assess how these more narrowly focused approaches also serve American interests. The third section looks at Asia–Pacific multilateral economic cooperation, and here the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) provides the centrepiece of the discussion; its role both in creating an Asia–Pacific economic community and, more recently, as a vehicle for political cooperation through the institutionalization of the US‐instigated Leaders’ Meetings, which bring many of the region's heads of state and government together annually, ostensibly for economic discussions. The conclusion to the chapter briefly evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of these organizations from a US perspective in order to understand better how security and economic multilateralism fits with the largely bilaterally oriented US national security strategy.

The chapter begins with a brief description of the recent evolution of preferential trading arrangements. In contrast to previous chapters, which focus on Asia or East Asia alone, this chapter considers trans-Pacific trade relations, not just those among countries on the Asian side of the Pacific but those on American shores as well. It also considers APEC, the only regional entity encompassing this entire region; its original aims; and its operation. It provides new evidence on its activities since 1993, drawing inferences from the content of leaders' declarations and project submissions. The chapter concludes with some general lessons and by suggesting some avenues for future research.

This chapter gives an introduction to the worldwide data protection regulatory landscape and the different types of regulatory systems. It provides an overview of the basic principles of the data protection directive (and the changes envisaged by the Proposed Regulation), as knowledge of these principles is required for a proper understanding of the Binding Corporate Rules regime. The APEC Privacy Framework is also discussed as a representative of a data protection system based on an organizational approach rather than a territorial approach.

This chapter examines PIFF's ever-increasing scale and scope by considering the tenth anniversary of 2005 as the pivotal year when the festival's development took a decisive turn to reinforce its regional identity. The chapter illustrates PIFF's focus on Asian identity by investigating special events and programs associated with the tenth anniversary on critical and industrial levels. While the Asian Film Industry Network (AFIN) and the Asian Film Market (AFM) show how the festival accentuated its regional/industrial ties, special programs such as Asian Pantheon, Remapping Asian Auteur Cinema 1, and Special Screening for APEC Films reinforce PIFF's role as a critical hub for Asian cinema. Paying particular attention to a new education program (AFA), the chapter argues that PIFF's strategic arrangement of diverse audience-friendly public events reflected the festival's awareness of its changing relationship with local audiences.

A number of international instruments such as the Council of Europe Convention 108, the OECD Privacy Guidelines, and the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46, regulate the flow of personal data across national borders. International regulation exists largely at the regional level, and as yet there is no multinational instrument of truly global scope dealing with the subject. The various international instruments demonstrate a number of similarities, but there are also important differences between them (e.g., as to whether they are legally binding, and whether they treat data protection as a fundamental right). International human rights law protects the free flow of data across national borders, but governments have sometimes restricted such transfers under the guise of informational sovereignty. The most influential model has been the EU Directive, which has significantly influenced regulation in other regions, but other regional models are currently gaining influence.

This chapter demonstrates elements of change and continuity in Asia’s regional architecture between the waning years of the Cold War and the Asian financial crisis. Despite the external shock of the Cold War, I argue that the path to change is best captured by endogenous processes of change where mechanisms of change and continuity intersect. The first part of the chapter chronicles the development of two multilateral institutions: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The second part demonstrates the continuity of bilateral alliances, focusing on the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliance.

This chapter intends to address the overall potential for intra-regional trade, as opposed to trade with outside world. It gives a brief review of the relative strengths of the Chinese economy in terms of its GNP size, output structure, degree of industrialization and trade volume, relative to that of the various Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies. This chapter also examines the changing trends in China's trade within APEC, vis-à-vis trade with countries outside the region since the early 1980s. It then attempts to identify the major obstacles and constraints inherent in the present Chinese economic system, as well as policies for further economic integration within APEC and with the outside world in general. The concluding section discusses the basic implications for China of the APEC tariff agenda established under the Bogor Declaration of November 1994, under which the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-pacific region is to be achieved no later than 2020, or by 2010 for the industrialized economies of APEC.

This concluding chapter examines the primary drivers of change in Asia's regional institutional architecture. With trade cooperation being the area of greatest activity, commentators on Asian regionalism typically focus primarily on regional economic interdependence and the associated pressure from pro-liberalization business interests, which are perceived to generate self-reinforcing or domino-style cascading effects. More consequential than any of these variables for Asian regionalism in the first decade of the 21st Century, however, has been the effect of diplomatic and deeper strategic competition. With Korea's signature of preferential trade agreements with the EU and the US, economic factors may become a more significant driver of Asian regionalism. But strategic constraints will remain central, seen for instance in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has been closely associated with the Obama Administration's “pivot to Asia”.

This chapter studies the institutional logic of Western order after the Cold War. American foreign policy after the Cold War is largely consistent with the institutional model of order building. As a rising post-Cold War power, the United States had incentives to use institutions to lock in favorable policy orientations in other states. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) all contain elements of this thinking. American officials calculated that bringing newly reforming countries into these organizations would help reinforce domestic institutions and political coalitions in these countries that were committed to political and market liberalization. In return, the United States accepted some additional obligations to these countries in the form of security commitments or institutionalized access to American markets.

Both America and Russia, for different reasons, decided to undertake a policy pivot towards Asia. For President Obama, such a pivot may have represented a needed change from preoccupation with tough issues in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan. President Putin may have looked East in an effort to get away from constant preoccupation with issues related to Crimea and the eastern edge of Europe. The Asian-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) offered a common forum of communication for both wth other Asian states. However, both powers had different historical reasons for pursuing the overture to Asian states. For the United States, a major defense agreement with South Korea was a result of the Korean War of the 1950s, while its long engagement in the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 70s provided it with additional historical experiences in the region. Russia concerned itself with intensified trade relations and also defined the region to include Central Asian states that had formerly been republics in the Soviet Union. U.S. troops had been a presence in the region for decades, and the multi-state controversy over Chinese actions in the South China Sea also bore in part a defensive component.

This chapter discusses the developments concerning global or regional data privacy agreements and instruments likely to affect Asian countries in future. The overall picture is one of continuing competition for global influence over the shape of data privacy developments, and their trade and human rights implications. The issues are usually more complex than a simple ‘USA v Europe’ divide. The main international developments considered are: APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)’s Cross-Border Privacy Rules system (CBPRs); the 2013 revision of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) privacy Guidelines, and its ‘globalization’; the Council of Europe Convention 108 ‘modernization’ and ‘globalization’; the proposed EU data protection Regulation; United Nations developments including the surveillance resolution and proposed new International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) protocol; and the possibility of law reform in the USA. Discussion of the strengthening of global privacy standards, and five prospects for global or regional agreements, conclude the chapter.

This chapter discusses the principal international legal instruments on data privacy. It focuses on international instruments that have been central in shaping national and other international data privacy regimes. These instruments have been drafted within the respective institutional frameworks of the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, the European Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Economic Community of West African States. The special role of human rights treaties is also described.

Chapter 4 explores the negotiating landscape that faces those who would reform the international governance regime. It shows the post World War II dispersion of economic power and the turbulence in the global IT sector that requires new forms of market leadership. It also considers who must be present at the negotiating table and why. We explore whether, as governance preferences among key countries widens, a “credible club,” a core group of reasonably like-minded countries with sufficient influence to alter the world market, still exists to initiate meaningful governance reform? The answer is yes. Chapter 4 also explains why technocratic efficiency and political reality require that “civil society” play a larger role in any governance strategy.

The afterlife of The Hijaz) statehood and the right of self-determination) this chapter calls for finding the lost space in Islamic governance and advocates for an inclusive form of statehood. The policy proposal is that The Hijaz become the fountainhead of Islamic governance and organization, in this way reinventing relations between Islam with Saudi Arabia. The book does not in any way advocates a caliphate. The conclusion suggests the development of a soft form regionalism which considers Islamic norms and does not merely seek to replicate western structures. The book concludes with an emphasis of the potential for The Hijaz to have an integrative value at multiple levels; for (i) its own benefit and that of Saudi Arabia; (ii) the benefit of the Arab world; (iii) the benefit of the Islamic world (including Iran); (iv) the development of a global relationship and world relations between Islamic states, Muslim constituencies and the rest of the world and finally; (iv) the heritage of all mankind, being the focal point for almost a quarter of the world’s population and the logical starting place in which the West, Islam and the Middle East can remedy and rebuild their encounters.