Tim Button
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672172
- eISBN:
- 9780191758393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores three versions of bracketed empiricism. The first involves the idea of a constructed world (as in Carnap’s Aufbau). The second involves the idea that there is a dichotomy ...
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This chapter explores three versions of bracketed empiricism. The first involves the idea of a constructed world (as in Carnap’s Aufbau). The second involves the idea that there is a dichotomy between sensation-words (used to describe sensations) and posit-words (used for posits in a theory that adequately captures ones sensations). The third involves the loose idea of a notional world. All three positions hold that empirical content is given solely in terms of bracketed experience. Consequently, all three positions effectively erect a veil of sensations between the subject and the world. All three must therefore accept that, by their own lights, any statement with empirical content is just more theory and so fails to constrain reference.Less
This chapter explores three versions of bracketed empiricism. The first involves the idea of a constructed world (as in Carnap’s Aufbau). The second involves the idea that there is a dichotomy between sensation-words (used to describe sensations) and posit-words (used for posits in a theory that adequately captures ones sensations). The third involves the loose idea of a notional world. All three positions hold that empirical content is given solely in terms of bracketed experience. Consequently, all three positions effectively erect a veil of sensations between the subject and the world. All three must therefore accept that, by their own lights, any statement with empirical content is just more theory and so fails to constrain reference.
Tim Button
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672172
- eISBN:
- 9780191758393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 5 raised problems for external realists who accepted a bracketed empiricist theory of empirical content. Many external realists do, indeed, accept such a theory of empirical content. But in ...
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Chapter 5 raised problems for external realists who accepted a bracketed empiricist theory of empirical content. Many external realists do, indeed, accept such a theory of empirical content. But in fact, no matter how the external realist explains her Cartesianism Principle, similar problems arise. In addition to the veil of sensations, it is possible to consider: a veil of Fregean senses that prevents access to ordinary objects; a veil of phenomena that prevents access to the noumena; a veil of observables that prevents access to unobservables; and a veil of flux that prevents access to the Forms. All external realists must accept that, by their own lights, any statement with empirical content is just more theory and so fails to constrain reference.Less
Chapter 5 raised problems for external realists who accepted a bracketed empiricist theory of empirical content. Many external realists do, indeed, accept such a theory of empirical content. But in fact, no matter how the external realist explains her Cartesianism Principle, similar problems arise. In addition to the veil of sensations, it is possible to consider: a veil of Fregean senses that prevents access to ordinary objects; a veil of phenomena that prevents access to the noumena; a veil of observables that prevents access to unobservables; and a veil of flux that prevents access to the Forms. All external realists must accept that, by their own lights, any statement with empirical content is just more theory and so fails to constrain reference.
Edmond Wright (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262232661
- eISBN:
- 9780262286497
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical ...
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Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical position that has qualia as a central tenet) include Michael Tye, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and even Frank Jackson, a former supporter. Qualiaphiles apparently face the difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when their access to it is seen by qualiaphobes to be secondhand and, worse, hidden behind a “veil of sensation”—a position that would slide easily into relativism and solipsism, presenting an ethical dilemma. In this book, chapters defending qualia look at the Indirect Realist position and mount detailed counterarguments against opposing views. The book first presents philosophical defenses, with arguments propounding, variously, a new argument from illusion, a sense-datum theory, dualism, “qualia realism,” qualia as the “cement” of the experiential world, and “subjective physicalism.” Three scientific defenses follow, discussing color, heat, and the link between the external object and the internal representation. Finally, specific criticisms of opposing views include discussions of the Churchlands’ “neurophilosophy,” answers to Frank Jackson’s abandonment of qualia (one of which is titled, in a reference to Jackson’s famous thought experiment, “Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary”), and refutations of Transparency Theory.Less
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical position that has qualia as a central tenet) include Michael Tye, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and even Frank Jackson, a former supporter. Qualiaphiles apparently face the difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when their access to it is seen by qualiaphobes to be secondhand and, worse, hidden behind a “veil of sensation”—a position that would slide easily into relativism and solipsism, presenting an ethical dilemma. In this book, chapters defending qualia look at the Indirect Realist position and mount detailed counterarguments against opposing views. The book first presents philosophical defenses, with arguments propounding, variously, a new argument from illusion, a sense-datum theory, dualism, “qualia realism,” qualia as the “cement” of the experiential world, and “subjective physicalism.” Three scientific defenses follow, discussing color, heat, and the link between the external object and the internal representation. Finally, specific criticisms of opposing views include discussions of the Churchlands’ “neurophilosophy,” answers to Frank Jackson’s abandonment of qualia (one of which is titled, in a reference to Jackson’s famous thought experiment, “Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary”), and refutations of Transparency Theory.
