Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297574
- eISBN:
- 9780191598982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297572.003.0016
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter argues that the policy equilibrium established by the Treaty is unlikely to be sustainable due to several challenges. These are the relaunching of multilateral trade negotiations under ...
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This chapter argues that the policy equilibrium established by the Treaty is unlikely to be sustainable due to several challenges. These are the relaunching of multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organisation, the Eastward enlargement of the EU, and the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral agreements between the EU and its trading partners. Existing policy mechanisms that should be replaced are discussed.Less
This chapter argues that the policy equilibrium established by the Treaty is unlikely to be sustainable due to several challenges. These are the relaunching of multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organisation, the Eastward enlargement of the EU, and the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral agreements between the EU and its trading partners. Existing policy mechanisms that should be replaced are discussed.
Loukas Tsoukalis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199279487
- eISBN:
- 9780191602979
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279489.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter examines the relationships of the European Union with the United States and the rest of the world, focusing on trade policies, preferential trade agreements with various countries, and ...
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This chapter examines the relationships of the European Union with the United States and the rest of the world, focusing on trade policies, preferential trade agreements with various countries, and common foreign and security policy (CFSP). It argues that the EU remains a political dwarf despite being an economic giant. European political cooperation in the form of the CFSP was aimed at paving the transition to an international political role. However, many Europeans were not ready to accept the consequences for national sovereignty, and failed to agree on how the CFSP would operate in the context of the Atlantic alliance. Deepening integration and rapid changes in the external environment could accelerate the pace.Less
This chapter examines the relationships of the European Union with the United States and the rest of the world, focusing on trade policies, preferential trade agreements with various countries, and common foreign and security policy (CFSP). It argues that the EU remains a political dwarf despite being an economic giant. European political cooperation in the form of the CFSP was aimed at paving the transition to an international political role. However, many Europeans were not ready to accept the consequences for national sovereignty, and failed to agree on how the CFSP would operate in the context of the Atlantic alliance. Deepening integration and rapid changes in the external environment could accelerate the pace.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The ability of supranational agents such as the European Commission and Court of Justice to influence policy outcomes in the European Union varies as a function of the control mechanisms established ...
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The ability of supranational agents such as the European Commission and Court of Justice to influence policy outcomes in the European Union varies as a function of the control mechanisms established by member governments to limit supranational discretion. Examines three cases of market liberalization representing a range of control mechanisms, in the areas of external trade (negotiation of the Uruguay Round), competition policy (the De Havilland merger decision) and the free movement of goods within the Union (ECJ jurisprudence from Cassis de Dijon through Keck). Taken together, these three case studies suggest that the Commission and the Court have indeed been activist in their mission to establish a single European market, but also that their successes have been limited as a function of the control mechanisms established by member governments to control their discretion.Less
The ability of supranational agents such as the European Commission and Court of Justice to influence policy outcomes in the European Union varies as a function of the control mechanisms established by member governments to limit supranational discretion. Examines three cases of market liberalization representing a range of control mechanisms, in the areas of external trade (negotiation of the Uruguay Round), competition policy (the De Havilland merger decision) and the free movement of goods within the Union (ECJ jurisprudence from Cassis de Dijon through Keck). Taken together, these three case studies suggest that the Commission and the Court have indeed been activist in their mission to establish a single European market, but also that their successes have been limited as a function of the control mechanisms established by member governments to control their discretion.
Andreas Dür
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199604104
- eISBN:
- 9780191741531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604104.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The last two decades have seen a major expansion in the scope of the European Union’s foreign economic policies. Repeatedly, EU member states both formally and informally have delegated significant ...
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The last two decades have seen a major expansion in the scope of the European Union’s foreign economic policies. Repeatedly, EU member states both formally and informally have delegated significant powers to carry out these policies to the European Commission and other agents at the European level. What consequences does this delegation of competencies to European institutions have for the control that member states can exert over EU foreign economic policies? A sizeable literature suggests that delegation has led to a loss of control by member states. This chapter, however, argues that member states have maintained control over EU foreign economic policies even in the presence of far-reaching delegation. This is so because delegation has been accompanied by control mechanisms that make sure that the agents’ scope for autonomous action is tightly circumscribed. The chapter illustrates the plausibility of this argument in an analysis of the main changes in the EU’s institutional set-up for foreign economic policy-making from the Treaties of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon.Less
The last two decades have seen a major expansion in the scope of the European Union’s foreign economic policies. Repeatedly, EU member states both formally and informally have delegated significant powers to carry out these policies to the European Commission and other agents at the European level. What consequences does this delegation of competencies to European institutions have for the control that member states can exert over EU foreign economic policies? A sizeable literature suggests that delegation has led to a loss of control by member states. This chapter, however, argues that member states have maintained control over EU foreign economic policies even in the presence of far-reaching delegation. This is so because delegation has been accompanied by control mechanisms that make sure that the agents’ scope for autonomous action is tightly circumscribed. The chapter illustrates the plausibility of this argument in an analysis of the main changes in the EU’s institutional set-up for foreign economic policy-making from the Treaties of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon.
Alasdair R. Young and John Peterson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199579907
- eISBN:
- 9780191778728
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579907.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter introduces the volume’s argument and establishes the significance of its subject. In particular, it sets out how important the EU is in international trade and global trade governance ...
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This chapter introduces the volume’s argument and establishes the significance of its subject. In particular, it sets out how important the EU is in international trade and global trade governance and how important trade policy is to the EU as a constitutive policy, source of legitimacy, and instrument of foreign policy. It also sets out some unresolved tensions regarding the EU’s trade policy—Is it liberal or protectionist? Is it a champion of multilateral rules or a scofflaw?—and contends that a policy sub-system approach helps to resolves these apparent tensions.Less
This chapter introduces the volume’s argument and establishes the significance of its subject. In particular, it sets out how important the EU is in international trade and global trade governance and how important trade policy is to the EU as a constitutive policy, source of legitimacy, and instrument of foreign policy. It also sets out some unresolved tensions regarding the EU’s trade policy—Is it liberal or protectionist? Is it a champion of multilateral rules or a scofflaw?—and contends that a policy sub-system approach helps to resolves these apparent tensions.
Alasdair R. Young and John Peterson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199579907
- eISBN:
- 9780191778728
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Europe’s trade policies matter in global politics. Despite the recent focus on Brazil, India, and particularly China, the European Union remains the world’s largest market and trader. Despite its ...
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Europe’s trade policies matter in global politics. Despite the recent focus on Brazil, India, and particularly China, the European Union remains the world’s largest market and trader. Despite its recent economic troubles, Europe remains in a powerful position to shape how globalization is governed. We know surprisingly little about how its trade policy is actually made, because previous works have focused on individual trade policy decisions to the detriment of the “big picture” of the Union as a trade power. The book argues that trade policy is composed of multiple, distinct policies. Each presents a distinctive constellation of mobilized societal preferences, pattern of political institutions, and range of government preferences. The balance of economic power between the EU and its trade partner(s) affects the stakes involved. Together these four factors define trade policy sub-systems, which help explain both the EU’s objectives and whether it realizes them. The book advances this argument by analyzing the EU’s role in the demise of the Doha Round, its use of anti-dumping and pursuit of market access, the trade effects of its single market program and efforts at regulatory diplomacy, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. The book thus focuses centrally on modern, 21st century trade policy. It also sheds light on the EU as a global actor by analyzing its use of trade policy as a tool of foreign policy from promoting development, to encouraging human rights and environmental protection, to punishing security threats.Less
Europe’s trade policies matter in global politics. Despite the recent focus on Brazil, India, and particularly China, the European Union remains the world’s largest market and trader. Despite its recent economic troubles, Europe remains in a powerful position to shape how globalization is governed. We know surprisingly little about how its trade policy is actually made, because previous works have focused on individual trade policy decisions to the detriment of the “big picture” of the Union as a trade power. The book argues that trade policy is composed of multiple, distinct policies. Each presents a distinctive constellation of mobilized societal preferences, pattern of political institutions, and range of government preferences. The balance of economic power between the EU and its trade partner(s) affects the stakes involved. Together these four factors define trade policy sub-systems, which help explain both the EU’s objectives and whether it realizes them. The book advances this argument by analyzing the EU’s role in the demise of the Doha Round, its use of anti-dumping and pursuit of market access, the trade effects of its single market program and efforts at regulatory diplomacy, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. The book thus focuses centrally on modern, 21st century trade policy. It also sheds light on the EU as a global actor by analyzing its use of trade policy as a tool of foreign policy from promoting development, to encouraging human rights and environmental protection, to punishing security threats.
Alasdair R. Young and John Peterson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199579907
- eISBN:
- 9780191778728
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579907.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Chapter 9 concludes by highlighting how variation in politics across trade policy instruments—trade policy sub-systems—produces distinctive policies. It reflects on the implications of this analysis ...
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Chapter 9 concludes by highlighting how variation in politics across trade policy instruments—trade policy sub-systems—produces distinctive policies. It reflects on the implications of this analysis for the EU’s capacity to act strategically and to be an effective global actor. In addition, it considers the implications of treating trade policy as being composed of multiple policies for the broader IPE literature on trade policy. Our central argument is re-stated: explaining the European Union’s behavior as an economic superpower requires understanding policy sub-systems, some of which conspire to encourage Europe to behave very parochially even as it seeks influence globally.Less
Chapter 9 concludes by highlighting how variation in politics across trade policy instruments—trade policy sub-systems—produces distinctive policies. It reflects on the implications of this analysis for the EU’s capacity to act strategically and to be an effective global actor. In addition, it considers the implications of treating trade policy as being composed of multiple policies for the broader IPE literature on trade policy. Our central argument is re-stated: explaining the European Union’s behavior as an economic superpower requires understanding policy sub-systems, some of which conspire to encourage Europe to behave very parochially even as it seeks influence globally.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The second case study zooms in on the case of the Canadian system of multilevel government. In contrast to the US case, Canada has demonstrated remarkable adaptability in its patterns of vertical ...
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The second case study zooms in on the case of the Canadian system of multilevel government. In contrast to the US case, Canada has demonstrated remarkable adaptability in its patterns of vertical power-sharing. The chapter finds that despite the provinces’ initial lack of voice in its self-rule setting, the Canadian federation has been able effectively to construct a regime of ongoing, constructive, and trusting vertical dialogue in the field of international trade policy. Against the backdrop of increasing domestic market integration and a generally low degree of politicization, their increased voice has eventually incited subcentral executives to forego their sovereign right to exit. Ultimately, the Canadian case demonstrates that, under certain conditions, self-rule systems can adapt to their increasing embeddedness in multilevel trade governance. Despite being built on a delineation of central and subcentral spheres of competence in ‘watertight compartments’, the Canadian system integrated means of shared rule to deal with pressures from the international realm while preserving a substantive measure of subcentral autonomy. The concomitant increase in subcentral voice leads to two observations of immediate relevance to the theorizing of multilevel trade governance. First, despite the systematic inclusion of subcentral executives in trade policy-making, the destructive side-effects of the joint-decision trap can be avoided. Second, multilevel systems are dialectically capable of integrating certain fields while decentralizing authority.Less
The second case study zooms in on the case of the Canadian system of multilevel government. In contrast to the US case, Canada has demonstrated remarkable adaptability in its patterns of vertical power-sharing. The chapter finds that despite the provinces’ initial lack of voice in its self-rule setting, the Canadian federation has been able effectively to construct a regime of ongoing, constructive, and trusting vertical dialogue in the field of international trade policy. Against the backdrop of increasing domestic market integration and a generally low degree of politicization, their increased voice has eventually incited subcentral executives to forego their sovereign right to exit. Ultimately, the Canadian case demonstrates that, under certain conditions, self-rule systems can adapt to their increasing embeddedness in multilevel trade governance. Despite being built on a delineation of central and subcentral spheres of competence in ‘watertight compartments’, the Canadian system integrated means of shared rule to deal with pressures from the international realm while preserving a substantive measure of subcentral autonomy. The concomitant increase in subcentral voice leads to two observations of immediate relevance to the theorizing of multilevel trade governance. First, despite the systematic inclusion of subcentral executives in trade policy-making, the destructive side-effects of the joint-decision trap can be avoided. Second, multilevel systems are dialectically capable of integrating certain fields while decentralizing authority.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The concluding chapter of Trade Policy in Multilevel Government not only elaborates on the theoretical model’s explanatory power and its limits in the light of the three analysed polities, but also ...
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The concluding chapter of Trade Policy in Multilevel Government not only elaborates on the theoretical model’s explanatory power and its limits in the light of the three analysed polities, but also turns to raising questions as to the democratic legitimacy of the multilevel pattern of trade policy described in the book. Questions of democratic legitimacy in multilevel systems are complicated by the fact that a popular and a territorial logic of representation coexist and, at times, compete. Both citizens and constituent units are entitled to input into the system. The ensuing tension between popular and territorial logics of representation also permeates multilevel trade governance. In the EU and the Canadian cases, territorial legitimacy clearly takes precedence over popular representation. Seen from this perspective, the US case appears in a somewhat different light. In the face of adaptational pressures arising from economic and political globalization, popular representation could also be regarded as an additional layer of autonomy in self-rule systems of multilevel government.Less
The concluding chapter of Trade Policy in Multilevel Government not only elaborates on the theoretical model’s explanatory power and its limits in the light of the three analysed polities, but also turns to raising questions as to the democratic legitimacy of the multilevel pattern of trade policy described in the book. Questions of democratic legitimacy in multilevel systems are complicated by the fact that a popular and a territorial logic of representation coexist and, at times, compete. Both citizens and constituent units are entitled to input into the system. The ensuing tension between popular and territorial logics of representation also permeates multilevel trade governance. In the EU and the Canadian cases, territorial legitimacy clearly takes precedence over popular representation. Seen from this perspective, the US case appears in a somewhat different light. In the face of adaptational pressures arising from economic and political globalization, popular representation could also be regarded as an additional layer of autonomy in self-rule systems of multilevel government.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The third case study investigates the case of the European Union. It finds that the EU’s constituent units enjoy an unusually influential role in its council model of subcentral representation. ...
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The third case study investigates the case of the European Union. It finds that the EU’s constituent units enjoy an unusually influential role in its council model of subcentral representation. Member states shape EU trade policy at both stages of formal decision-making. In-between these formal veto points, collaborative relations between supranational and national executives are supported by a dense and formalized network of committees as well as a clear-cut division of procedural authorities. Turning to the two theorized intervening factors, the chapter finds that the nexus between European integration and international liberalization has been particularly close in procurement, reinforcing member states’ openness. Politicization of procurement liberalization, in turn, has remained low despite recent years’ contestation against CETA and TTIP. Ultimately, the EU case corroborates the initial expectation that shared rule systems are institutionally and procedurally well-equipped to adapt flexibly to the demands of multilevel trade governance and organize openness more effectively than self-rule models. EU member states have developed strategies to avoid the joint-decision trap’s propensity to decision-making blockades and lowest common denominator outcomes. Among these means rank a clear-cut division of procedural competences with the Commission, a densely institutionalized system of IGR largely secluded from domestic public and party political pressures, and the adoption of legislative proposals by qualified majority. This general institutional and procedural set-up has allowed the Union to act as a ‘market-making polity’ both internally, forging an integrated procurement market, as well as externally, pursuing an offensive agenda in the WTO and in preferential trade agreements.Less
The third case study investigates the case of the European Union. It finds that the EU’s constituent units enjoy an unusually influential role in its council model of subcentral representation. Member states shape EU trade policy at both stages of formal decision-making. In-between these formal veto points, collaborative relations between supranational and national executives are supported by a dense and formalized network of committees as well as a clear-cut division of procedural authorities. Turning to the two theorized intervening factors, the chapter finds that the nexus between European integration and international liberalization has been particularly close in procurement, reinforcing member states’ openness. Politicization of procurement liberalization, in turn, has remained low despite recent years’ contestation against CETA and TTIP. Ultimately, the EU case corroborates the initial expectation that shared rule systems are institutionally and procedurally well-equipped to adapt flexibly to the demands of multilevel trade governance and organize openness more effectively than self-rule models. EU member states have developed strategies to avoid the joint-decision trap’s propensity to decision-making blockades and lowest common denominator outcomes. Among these means rank a clear-cut division of procedural competences with the Commission, a densely institutionalized system of IGR largely secluded from domestic public and party political pressures, and the adoption of legislative proposals by qualified majority. This general institutional and procedural set-up has allowed the Union to act as a ‘market-making polity’ both internally, forging an integrated procurement market, as well as externally, pursuing an offensive agenda in the WTO and in preferential trade agreements.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
Trade Policy in Multilevel Government investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. In recent years, the multilevel politics of trade ...
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Trade Policy in Multilevel Government investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. In recent years, the multilevel politics of trade caught the broader public’s attention, not least due to the Wallonian regional parliament’s initial rejection of the EU-Canada trade deal in 2016. In all multilevel polities, competencies held by states and regions have increasingly become the subject of international rule-setting. This is particularly so in the field of trade, which has progressively targeted so-called “behind the border” regulatory barriers. In their reaction to this “deep trade” agenda, constituent units in different multilevel polities have shown widely varying degrees of openness to liberalizing their markets. Why is that? Trade Policy in Multilevel Government argues that domestic institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations are the decisive factor. Countering a widely held belief among practitioners and analysts of trade policy that involving subcentral actors complicates trade negotiations, it demonstrates that the more voice a multilevel polity affords its constituent units in trade policy-making, the less the latter have an incentive eventually to exit from emerging trade deals. While in shared rule systems constituent unit governments are directly represented along the entirety of the policy cycle, in self-rule systems territorial representation is achieved merely indirectly. Shared rule systems are hence more effective than self-rule systems in organizing openness to trade. The book tests the explanatory power of this theory on the understudied case of international procurement liberalization in extensive studies of three systems of multilevel government: Canada, the European Union, and the United States.Less
Trade Policy in Multilevel Government investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. In recent years, the multilevel politics of trade caught the broader public’s attention, not least due to the Wallonian regional parliament’s initial rejection of the EU-Canada trade deal in 2016. In all multilevel polities, competencies held by states and regions have increasingly become the subject of international rule-setting. This is particularly so in the field of trade, which has progressively targeted so-called “behind the border” regulatory barriers. In their reaction to this “deep trade” agenda, constituent units in different multilevel polities have shown widely varying degrees of openness to liberalizing their markets. Why is that? Trade Policy in Multilevel Government argues that domestic institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations are the decisive factor. Countering a widely held belief among practitioners and analysts of trade policy that involving subcentral actors complicates trade negotiations, it demonstrates that the more voice a multilevel polity affords its constituent units in trade policy-making, the less the latter have an incentive eventually to exit from emerging trade deals. While in shared rule systems constituent unit governments are directly represented along the entirety of the policy cycle, in self-rule systems territorial representation is achieved merely indirectly. Shared rule systems are hence more effective than self-rule systems in organizing openness to trade. The book tests the explanatory power of this theory on the understudied case of international procurement liberalization in extensive studies of three systems of multilevel government: Canada, the European Union, and the United States.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The second chapter constructs a theoretical framework to account for the introduced research puzzle. Building on a central line of work on ‘federal dynamics’, it argues that the institutions and ...
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The second chapter constructs a theoretical framework to account for the introduced research puzzle. Building on a central line of work on ‘federal dynamics’, it argues that the institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations bear a decisive impact on a multilevel system’s ability to organize openness to international trade. While self-rule systems build on power-hoarding and the delineation of spheres of competence, shared rule systems rely on collaborative power-sharing between central and subcentral executives. In reference to Hirschman’s seminal concepts of exit and voice, the chapter then posits that any multilevel polity endows subcentral executives with a specific amount of voice in the making of trade and procurement policy. This voice it expects to be inversely related to exit: the more voice subcentral executives are equipped with, the less they dispose of an incentive to exit from a system-wide policy or international commitment. As shared-rule systems endow constituent units with more voice in polity-wide trade policy-making, they should organize openness more effectively than self-rule systems. At the same time, the inverse relationship between voice and exit does not unfold in an experimental vacuum. Depending on the specific policy sector, intervening factors can come to affect constituent units’ propensity to seek exit without affecting the amount of their voice. In the specific field of trade and procurement policy, the book expects two such policy-specific factors potentially to affect constituent units’ degree of exit. These are the amount of domestic procurement market integration and the politicization of international procurement liberalization.Less
The second chapter constructs a theoretical framework to account for the introduced research puzzle. Building on a central line of work on ‘federal dynamics’, it argues that the institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations bear a decisive impact on a multilevel system’s ability to organize openness to international trade. While self-rule systems build on power-hoarding and the delineation of spheres of competence, shared rule systems rely on collaborative power-sharing between central and subcentral executives. In reference to Hirschman’s seminal concepts of exit and voice, the chapter then posits that any multilevel polity endows subcentral executives with a specific amount of voice in the making of trade and procurement policy. This voice it expects to be inversely related to exit: the more voice subcentral executives are equipped with, the less they dispose of an incentive to exit from a system-wide policy or international commitment. As shared-rule systems endow constituent units with more voice in polity-wide trade policy-making, they should organize openness more effectively than self-rule systems. At the same time, the inverse relationship between voice and exit does not unfold in an experimental vacuum. Depending on the specific policy sector, intervening factors can come to affect constituent units’ propensity to seek exit without affecting the amount of their voice. In the specific field of trade and procurement policy, the book expects two such policy-specific factors potentially to affect constituent units’ degree of exit. These are the amount of domestic procurement market integration and the politicization of international procurement liberalization.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The first of the three case studies looks at the United States. It finds that while the states’ opportunities for individual exit have remained unconstrained in the non-coercive field of procurement ...
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The first of the three case studies looks at the United States. It finds that while the states’ opportunities for individual exit have remained unconstrained in the non-coercive field of procurement in which federal pre-emption is not an option, no serious attempts have been made to systematically increase their voice. This is due, firstly, to the mechanics of the US senate-type system of multilevel representation and, secondly, to the lack of an institutionalized procedure of vertical collaboration in a policy environment characterized by ‘coercive federalism’. Persisting barriers in the internal market and a widespread politicization of international procurement liberalization as a threat to state sovereignty have further contributed to constituent units’ high propensity to seek exit from international constraints. Ultimately, the US case highlights the limits of self-rule systems in organizing trade openness across multiple levels of government. Endowing the states with little voice in polity-wide policy-making, the US model shows a marked tendency to breed resistance to internationally driven adaptational pressures among constituent units. As self-rule systems are built on a delineation of central and subcentral spheres of competence, they generally tend to lack the institutional means and ideational underpinnings to effectively organize collaborative power-sharing by establishing patterns of shared rule.Less
The first of the three case studies looks at the United States. It finds that while the states’ opportunities for individual exit have remained unconstrained in the non-coercive field of procurement in which federal pre-emption is not an option, no serious attempts have been made to systematically increase their voice. This is due, firstly, to the mechanics of the US senate-type system of multilevel representation and, secondly, to the lack of an institutionalized procedure of vertical collaboration in a policy environment characterized by ‘coercive federalism’. Persisting barriers in the internal market and a widespread politicization of international procurement liberalization as a threat to state sovereignty have further contributed to constituent units’ high propensity to seek exit from international constraints. Ultimately, the US case highlights the limits of self-rule systems in organizing trade openness across multiple levels of government. Endowing the states with little voice in polity-wide policy-making, the US model shows a marked tendency to breed resistance to internationally driven adaptational pressures among constituent units. As self-rule systems are built on a delineation of central and subcentral spheres of competence, they generally tend to lack the institutional means and ideational underpinnings to effectively organize collaborative power-sharing by establishing patterns of shared rule.
Christian Freudlsperger
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198856122
- eISBN:
- 9780191889615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198856122.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The introductory chapter to Trade Policy in Multilevel Government commences by elaborating the empirical puzzle of subcentral executives’ varying openness to trade liberalization. In multilevel ...
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The introductory chapter to Trade Policy in Multilevel Government commences by elaborating the empirical puzzle of subcentral executives’ varying openness to trade liberalization. In multilevel government, it is unusual for lower-level executives to sit at international negotiating tables. At the same time, the latter increasingly hold competences of relevance to contemporary trade policy. The ‘deep trade’ agenda of recent decades has progressively subjected subcentral governments’ prerogatives to international rule-setting, thereby constraining their policy space. Interestingly, subcentral governments in different multilevel polities have reacted with widely varying degrees of openness to this development. How can this variance in subcentral openness be explained? The remainder of the introductory chapter sketches out the book’s theoretical and methodological approach. After elaborating on its contribution to existing scholarship on trade policy and the dynamics of multilevel government, and emphasizing the empirical significance of public procurement liberalization for the political economies of multilevel polities, the chapter presents a brief summary of the book’s empirical findings. It concludes with an overview of the book’s general structure.Less
The introductory chapter to Trade Policy in Multilevel Government commences by elaborating the empirical puzzle of subcentral executives’ varying openness to trade liberalization. In multilevel government, it is unusual for lower-level executives to sit at international negotiating tables. At the same time, the latter increasingly hold competences of relevance to contemporary trade policy. The ‘deep trade’ agenda of recent decades has progressively subjected subcentral governments’ prerogatives to international rule-setting, thereby constraining their policy space. Interestingly, subcentral governments in different multilevel polities have reacted with widely varying degrees of openness to this development. How can this variance in subcentral openness be explained? The remainder of the introductory chapter sketches out the book’s theoretical and methodological approach. After elaborating on its contribution to existing scholarship on trade policy and the dynamics of multilevel government, and emphasizing the empirical significance of public procurement liberalization for the political economies of multilevel polities, the chapter presents a brief summary of the book’s empirical findings. It concludes with an overview of the book’s general structure.