Anthony Petros Spanakos
David B. H. Denoon (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781479899289
- eISBN:
- 9781479811588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
US-Venezuelan relations display both confrontation and cooperation. Chinese relations with Venezuela are a most likely case for rebellion against the global governance system over which the US ...
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US-Venezuelan relations display both confrontation and cooperation. Chinese relations with Venezuela are a most likely case for rebellion against the global governance system over which the US presides. This chapter makes a structuralist argument, arguing that the way that the three countries are positioned within global and regional governance structures conditions the underlying character of their relations with each other. Simply put, the US, China, and Venezuela have very different interests and capabilities and their structural positions in South America explain why the increased Chinese presence in Venezuela is neither a threat to the US nor does it substantially aid Venezuelan intentions toward multi-polarizing the region or world. To make this argument, the chapter assumes that US foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as regional hegemon, Chinese foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as an extra-regional commercial state, and Venezuelan foreign policy toward both is informed by its position as a petrostate.Less
US-Venezuelan relations display both confrontation and cooperation. Chinese relations with Venezuela are a most likely case for rebellion against the global governance system over which the US presides. This chapter makes a structuralist argument, arguing that the way that the three countries are positioned within global and regional governance structures conditions the underlying character of their relations with each other. Simply put, the US, China, and Venezuela have very different interests and capabilities and their structural positions in South America explain why the increased Chinese presence in Venezuela is neither a threat to the US nor does it substantially aid Venezuelan intentions toward multi-polarizing the region or world. To make this argument, the chapter assumes that US foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as regional hegemon, Chinese foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as an extra-regional commercial state, and Venezuelan foreign policy toward both is informed by its position as a petrostate.
