Miles Pattenden
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198797449
- eISBN:
- 9780191838804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198797449.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History, History of Religion
This chapter explains the various ways by which the cardinals and others tried to circumvent the papal election or, at least, to blunt its effects. It traces the development of several characteristic ...
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This chapter explains the various ways by which the cardinals and others tried to circumvent the papal election or, at least, to blunt its effects. It traces the development of several characteristic features of papal government—the sale of venal office, the proliferation of bureaucratic organs, and the rise of a market in papal debt—and shows how they benefited not just the popes themselves but also the much wider slice of the political elite who invested in such instruments. These developments may have led directly to the decline of papal nepotism, from the late seventeenth century onwards, as the papacy evolved from a personal monarchy to a bureaucratic one. However, they also contributed significantly to eighteenth-century Rome’s stagnation as popes and their debts distorted the structures of economic production.Less
This chapter explains the various ways by which the cardinals and others tried to circumvent the papal election or, at least, to blunt its effects. It traces the development of several characteristic features of papal government—the sale of venal office, the proliferation of bureaucratic organs, and the rise of a market in papal debt—and shows how they benefited not just the popes themselves but also the much wider slice of the political elite who invested in such instruments. These developments may have led directly to the decline of papal nepotism, from the late seventeenth century onwards, as the papacy evolved from a personal monarchy to a bureaucratic one. However, they also contributed significantly to eighteenth-century Rome’s stagnation as popes and their debts distorted the structures of economic production.
Rafael Torres Sánchez
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198784111
- eISBN:
- 9780191826702
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784111.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History, Economic History
In Spain in the eighteenth century the state managed to ensure the victualling supply by granting entrepreneurs benefits such as commercial privileges and monopoly rights. This policy has been ...
More
In Spain in the eighteenth century the state managed to ensure the victualling supply by granting entrepreneurs benefits such as commercial privileges and monopoly rights. This policy has been traditionally interpreted to be the result of pressure exerted on the state by an increasingly powerful and selfish clique of entrepreneurs. This chapter shows that, on the contrary, it was the state itself that discovered advantages in this concession of monopoly rights. Crucially, the state enhanced its control over entrepreneurs and cut down the risks of negotiation with more middlemen of unknown solvency and creditworthiness. The policy of working with a few entrepreneurs of known creditworthiness posed its own risks, shrinking the potential pool of entrepreneurs capable of working with the state. It also tied in the future of the privilege-shielded entrepreneurs with the future of the state itself and its debt-payment capacity.Less
In Spain in the eighteenth century the state managed to ensure the victualling supply by granting entrepreneurs benefits such as commercial privileges and monopoly rights. This policy has been traditionally interpreted to be the result of pressure exerted on the state by an increasingly powerful and selfish clique of entrepreneurs. This chapter shows that, on the contrary, it was the state itself that discovered advantages in this concession of monopoly rights. Crucially, the state enhanced its control over entrepreneurs and cut down the risks of negotiation with more middlemen of unknown solvency and creditworthiness. The policy of working with a few entrepreneurs of known creditworthiness posed its own risks, shrinking the potential pool of entrepreneurs capable of working with the state. It also tied in the future of the privilege-shielded entrepreneurs with the future of the state itself and its debt-payment capacity.
