Hendrik Lorenz
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290635
- eISBN:
- 9780191604027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290636.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter raises and explains two central questions about Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul. First, what is involved in Plato’s claim that the embodied human soul is a thing of parts? ...
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This chapter raises and explains two central questions about Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul. First, what is involved in Plato’s claim that the embodied human soul is a thing of parts? Secondly, does Plato have a reasonable basis for holding that the soul is composed of precisely three parts, reason, spirit, and appetite?Less
This chapter raises and explains two central questions about Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul. First, what is involved in Plato’s claim that the embodied human soul is a thing of parts? Secondly, does Plato have a reasonable basis for holding that the soul is composed of precisely three parts, reason, spirit, and appetite?
Hendrik Lorenz
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290635
- eISBN:
- 9780191604027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290636.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter argues that Republic-style partition of the soul amounts to a position that can fairly be characterized in terms of two main claims. First, the proper subjects of desires and aversions ...
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This chapter argues that Republic-style partition of the soul amounts to a position that can fairly be characterized in terms of two main claims. First, the proper subjects of desires and aversions are not whole souls, but in each case some part or other of the soul in question. Secondly, the parts of the soul that are the proper subjects of desires and aversions are unified in the strong sense that it is impossible for a given soul-part to desire something and at the same time to be averse to it.Less
This chapter argues that Republic-style partition of the soul amounts to a position that can fairly be characterized in terms of two main claims. First, the proper subjects of desires and aversions are not whole souls, but in each case some part or other of the soul in question. Secondly, the parts of the soul that are the proper subjects of desires and aversions are unified in the strong sense that it is impossible for a given soul-part to desire something and at the same time to be averse to it.
Hendrik Lorenz
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290635
- eISBN:
- 9780191604027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290636.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter addresses the concern that for a Platonic soul to make sense, is not right to say that it has genuine parts. It also assesses the philosophical cost of soul-partition by considering its ...
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This chapter addresses the concern that for a Platonic soul to make sense, is not right to say that it has genuine parts. It also assesses the philosophical cost of soul-partition by considering its impact on the question of the soul’s immortality and by worrying, with Aristotle, about the soul’s unity.Less
This chapter addresses the concern that for a Platonic soul to make sense, is not right to say that it has genuine parts. It also assesses the philosophical cost of soul-partition by considering its impact on the question of the soul’s immortality and by worrying, with Aristotle, about the soul’s unity.
Christopher Bobonich
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251438
- eISBN:
- 9780191597084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251436.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues ...
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Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues that the Laws abandons the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. I examine the Laws’ new theory of akrasia (weakness of will) and some of the implications of the Laws’ new psychology for broader issues in Plato's ethics.Less
Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues that the Laws abandons the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. I examine the Laws’ new theory of akrasia (weakness of will) and some of the implications of the Laws’ new psychology for broader issues in Plato's ethics.
Matthew Duncombe
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- April 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198846185
- eISBN:
- 9780191881343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198846185.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In Republic IV, Socrates argues that the soul has three parts. Before arguing that the soul has three parts, Socrates argues that it has at least two parts. I call this the Partition Argument. This ...
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In Republic IV, Socrates argues that the soul has three parts. Before arguing that the soul has three parts, Socrates argues that it has at least two parts. I call this the Partition Argument. This argument crucially involves relatives, but commentators have thought the partition argument falls to one of two objections. In this chapter, I argue that, once we understand that constitutive relativity is in play, neither objection is fatal. But this approach reveals a tension within constitutive relativity: some of the formal features may turn out to form an inconsistent set. The chapter ends with some reflections on how Plato articulates this tension in the Statesman and how one might respond.Less
In Republic IV, Socrates argues that the soul has three parts. Before arguing that the soul has three parts, Socrates argues that it has at least two parts. I call this the Partition Argument. This argument crucially involves relatives, but commentators have thought the partition argument falls to one of two objections. In this chapter, I argue that, once we understand that constitutive relativity is in play, neither objection is fatal. But this approach reveals a tension within constitutive relativity: some of the formal features may turn out to form an inconsistent set. The chapter ends with some reflections on how Plato articulates this tension in the Statesman and how one might respond.
