Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter argues that the common view that believing a contradiction is the nadir of rationality should be rejected, and that rational considerations may require one to believe contradictions. An ...
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This chapter argues that the common view that believing a contradiction is the nadir of rationality should be rejected, and that rational considerations may require one to believe contradictions. An informal model of rationality as an optimization procedure under constraint is given.Less
This chapter argues that the common view that believing a contradiction is the nadir of rationality should be rejected, and that rational considerations may require one to believe contradictions. An informal model of rationality as an optimization procedure under constraint is given.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding ...
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This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.Less
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780195171259
- eISBN:
- 9780199834976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517125X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Decision principles aim at optimization, or realization of an act better than alternative acts. Given uncertainty, an agent’s subjective utility assignment to options assesses an option’s prospects ...
More
Decision principles aim at optimization, or realization of an act better than alternative acts. Given uncertainty, an agent’s subjective utility assignment to options assesses an option’s prospects in light of the agent’s information. The pertinent decision goal becomes maximization of utility. An option’s utility depends on the probabilities and utilities of its possible outcomes and so is an expected utility. The step from optimization to utility maximization illustrates a decision principle’s adjustment after removing the idealization of full information.Less
Decision principles aim at optimization, or realization of an act better than alternative acts. Given uncertainty, an agent’s subjective utility assignment to options assesses an option’s prospects in light of the agent’s information. The pertinent decision goal becomes maximization of utility. An option’s utility depends on the probabilities and utilities of its possible outcomes and so is an expected utility. The step from optimization to utility maximization illustrates a decision principle’s adjustment after removing the idealization of full information.
