Devin Henry
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199679430
- eISBN:
- 9780191758492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199679430.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines the role of optimality reasoning in Aristotle’s natural science. By the phrase ‘optimality reasoning’ Aristotle means reasoning that appeals to some conception of ‘what is ...
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This chapter examines the role of optimality reasoning in Aristotle’s natural science. By the phrase ‘optimality reasoning’ Aristotle means reasoning that appeals to some conception of ‘what is best’. This is used to explain why things are the way they are. This pattern of reasoning is first introduced in the famous passage at Phaedo 97b8-98a2, where (Plato’s) Socrates invokes ‘what is best’ as a cause (aitia) of things in nature. The chapter explores three questions that arise in connection with Aristotle’s use of the optimality principle: How do we understand the concept of ‘the best’ at work in the principle? How does Aristotle conceive of ‘the range of possibilities’? What role does optimality reasoning play in Aristotle’s natural science? Is it a special form of demonstration in which the optimality principle functions as one of its premises, or is it a heuristic device that helps uncover those causally relevant features of a natural substances that ultimately serve as middle terms in demonstrations? The final section returns to the comparison between Plato and Aristotle. It concludes that despite their general agreement, it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle simply took over Plato’s use of optimality reasoning without significant modifications.Less
This chapter examines the role of optimality reasoning in Aristotle’s natural science. By the phrase ‘optimality reasoning’ Aristotle means reasoning that appeals to some conception of ‘what is best’. This is used to explain why things are the way they are. This pattern of reasoning is first introduced in the famous passage at Phaedo 97b8-98a2, where (Plato’s) Socrates invokes ‘what is best’ as a cause (aitia) of things in nature. The chapter explores three questions that arise in connection with Aristotle’s use of the optimality principle: How do we understand the concept of ‘the best’ at work in the principle? How does Aristotle conceive of ‘the range of possibilities’? What role does optimality reasoning play in Aristotle’s natural science? Is it a special form of demonstration in which the optimality principle functions as one of its premises, or is it a heuristic device that helps uncover those causally relevant features of a natural substances that ultimately serve as middle terms in demonstrations? The final section returns to the comparison between Plato and Aristotle. It concludes that despite their general agreement, it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle simply took over Plato’s use of optimality reasoning without significant modifications.
