Lawrence C. Becker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199917549
- eISBN:
- 9780199950454
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199917549.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 8 shows how the elements of basically healthy agency run parallel to and can be represented as norms of basic justice.
Chapter 8 shows how the elements of basically healthy agency run parallel to and can be represented as norms of basic justice.
Edouard Machery and Ron Mallon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582143
- eISBN:
- 9780191594496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim. It distinguishes three possible versions of this claim and reviews ...
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This chapter examines whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim. It distinguishes three possible versions of this claim and reviews the evidence in support of each. It concludes that two versions of the claim that morality evolved are relatively well supported, but that they are unlikely to have significant philosophical consequences, while the stronger version, which is of real interest to philosophers, is in fact empirically unsupported.Less
This chapter examines whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim. It distinguishes three possible versions of this claim and reviews the evidence in support of each. It concludes that two versions of the claim that morality evolved are relatively well supported, but that they are unlikely to have significant philosophical consequences, while the stronger version, which is of real interest to philosophers, is in fact empirically unsupported.
Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199539659
- eISBN:
- 9780191594908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539659.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter begins the task of outlining the alternative deliberative model of contractualism, focusing on explaining in detail the nature of the hypothetical choice scenario facing individuals ...
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This chapter begins the task of outlining the alternative deliberative model of contractualism, focusing on explaining in detail the nature of the hypothetical choice scenario facing individuals within the deliberative contractual situation. It outlines a conception of practical reason, deliberative rationality, which holds that an act is deliberatively rational just in case the decision is based on the outcome of deliberation with others who are affected by the decision that fully complies with relevant deliberativenorms. It then considers the issue of what considerations constitute legitimate inputs to the deliberative contractual situation; the idea of a common code comprising conduct-constraining principles; and finally the issue of who or what should be granted inclusion within the deliberative contractual situation.Less
This chapter begins the task of outlining the alternative deliberative model of contractualism, focusing on explaining in detail the nature of the hypothetical choice scenario facing individuals within the deliberative contractual situation. It outlines a conception of practical reason, deliberative rationality, which holds that an act is deliberatively rational just in case the decision is based on the outcome of deliberation with others who are affected by the decision that fully complies with relevant deliberativenorms. It then considers the issue of what considerations constitute legitimate inputs to the deliberative contractual situation; the idea of a common code comprising conduct-constraining principles; and finally the issue of who or what should be granted inclusion within the deliberative contractual situation.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To say that someone should have realized that he was acting wrongly or foolishly is to imply that there is some norm that his not realizing what he was doing failed to satisfy. Because that norm must ...
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To say that someone should have realized that he was acting wrongly or foolishly is to imply that there is some norm that his not realizing what he was doing failed to satisfy. Because that norm must apply to anyone in the agent's situation, one question about it is how to draw the boundary between the agent and his situation. A second question, which cuts across the first, is whether the norm is merely statistical or more robustly normative. In this chapter, the first of these questions is taken up but then deferred, while the second is examined at some length. The upshot is that far from being merely statistical, the relevant norms are supplied by the very moral or prudential principles whose violation renders the acts wrong or foolish in the first place.Less
To say that someone should have realized that he was acting wrongly or foolishly is to imply that there is some norm that his not realizing what he was doing failed to satisfy. Because that norm must apply to anyone in the agent's situation, one question about it is how to draw the boundary between the agent and his situation. A second question, which cuts across the first, is whether the norm is merely statistical or more robustly normative. In this chapter, the first of these questions is taken up but then deferred, while the second is examined at some length. The upshot is that far from being merely statistical, the relevant norms are supplied by the very moral or prudential principles whose violation renders the acts wrong or foolish in the first place.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A large tradition of work in moral psychology explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g., hitting another person) from ...
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A large tradition of work in moral psychology explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g., hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g., playing with your food). This method plausibly reveals a capacity for a kind of coremoral judgment. Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinguish. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This chapter argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (“a normative theory”) and an affective mechanism that confers a special status on the norms.Less
A large tradition of work in moral psychology explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g., hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g., playing with your food). This method plausibly reveals a capacity for a kind of coremoral judgment. Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinguish. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This chapter argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (“a normative theory”) and an affective mechanism that confers a special status on the norms.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter turns to the genealogy of “harm norms,” norms against causing pain and suffering to others. The chapter sets out a range of historical and anthropological facts that need to be captured ...
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This chapter turns to the genealogy of “harm norms,” norms against causing pain and suffering to others. The chapter sets out a range of historical and anthropological facts that need to be captured by a genealogy of harm norms. In particular, an adequate genealogy needs to explain the broad similarities and differences in harm norms across cultures and the characteristic evolution of harm norms. One prominent explanation for these facts appeals to moral progress. This chapter proposes an alternative account of the genealogy of norms that draws on the central thesis of chapter 6, that norms which resonate with our emotions will be more likely to survive.Less
This chapter turns to the genealogy of “harm norms,” norms against causing pain and suffering to others. The chapter sets out a range of historical and anthropological facts that need to be captured by a genealogy of harm norms. In particular, an adequate genealogy needs to explain the broad similarities and differences in harm norms across cultures and the characteristic evolution of harm norms. One prominent explanation for these facts appeals to moral progress. This chapter proposes an alternative account of the genealogy of norms that draws on the central thesis of chapter 6, that norms which resonate with our emotions will be more likely to survive.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590667
- eISBN:
- 9780191595530
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590667.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
In almost all jurisdictions, a defendant has committed an attempt only if he intends to complete the crime. Intention is an element of attempt even when the crime can be completed without intent. ...
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In almost all jurisdictions, a defendant has committed an attempt only if he intends to complete the crime. Intention is an element of attempt even when the crime can be completed without intent. This chapter offers the following rationale for this dominant approach: a person has not attempted to act a certain way unless he intends to act that way. This claim is denied by most philosophers of action. The chapter shows that their arguments against it are flawed, and offers a positive argument for the claim. Trying is governed by the same norms of rationality that govern intention, and this fact, when coupled with a view of intention as distinctive in virtue of the norms that govern it, strongly supports the claim that trying necessarily involves intent.Less
In almost all jurisdictions, a defendant has committed an attempt only if he intends to complete the crime. Intention is an element of attempt even when the crime can be completed without intent. This chapter offers the following rationale for this dominant approach: a person has not attempted to act a certain way unless he intends to act that way. This claim is denied by most philosophers of action. The chapter shows that their arguments against it are flawed, and offers a positive argument for the claim. Trying is governed by the same norms of rationality that govern intention, and this fact, when coupled with a view of intention as distinctive in virtue of the norms that govern it, strongly supports the claim that trying necessarily involves intent.
Fritz Allhoff
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226014838
- eISBN:
- 9780226014821
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226014821.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The general consensus among philosophers is that the use of torture is never justified. This book demonstrates the weakness of the case against torture. While allowing that torture constitutes a ...
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The general consensus among philosophers is that the use of torture is never justified. This book demonstrates the weakness of the case against torture. While allowing that torture constitutes a moral wrong, it nevertheless argues that, in exceptional cases, it represents the lesser of two evils. The book does not take this position lightly. It begins by examining the way terrorism challenges traditional norms, discussing the morality of various practices of torture, and critically exploring the infamous ticking time-bomb scenario. After carefully considering these issues from a purely philosophical perspective, the book turns to the empirical ramifications of his arguments, addressing criticisms of torture and analyzing the impact its adoption could have on democracy, institutional structures, and foreign policy. The crucial questions of how to justly authorize torture and how to set limits on its use make up the final section of the book.Less
The general consensus among philosophers is that the use of torture is never justified. This book demonstrates the weakness of the case against torture. While allowing that torture constitutes a moral wrong, it nevertheless argues that, in exceptional cases, it represents the lesser of two evils. The book does not take this position lightly. It begins by examining the way terrorism challenges traditional norms, discussing the morality of various practices of torture, and critically exploring the infamous ticking time-bomb scenario. After carefully considering these issues from a purely philosophical perspective, the book turns to the empirical ramifications of his arguments, addressing criticisms of torture and analyzing the impact its adoption could have on democracy, institutional structures, and foreign policy. The crucial questions of how to justly authorize torture and how to set limits on its use make up the final section of the book.
Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and ...
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This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.Less
This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.
Cristina Bicchieri
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190622046
- eISBN:
- 9780190622084
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190622046.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Norms in the Wild takes a unique look at social norms, answering questions about diagnosis (how can we tell that a shared practice is a social norm?), measurement (how do we measure expectations and ...
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Norms in the Wild takes a unique look at social norms, answering questions about diagnosis (how can we tell that a shared practice is a social norm?), measurement (how do we measure expectations and preferences?), and change (which tools can we adopt to effect norm change?). The theories developed in the book are brought to life by examining real-life cases of norm creation and abandonment, the rationale behind policy interventions, and how change can be spearheaded by various types of trendsetters, be they individuals, groups, or the media. By exploring how a range of problems, from poor sanitation to child marriage, can be addressed, the book shows how social norms can have a causal impact on collective behavior, and which interventions may succeed in creating new norms or abandoning harmful ones. In laying the theoretical groundwork for implementing social changes in a contextually sensitive and empirically based way, it also diagnoses why some less culturally attuned attempts to eliminate negative practices have failed.Less
Norms in the Wild takes a unique look at social norms, answering questions about diagnosis (how can we tell that a shared practice is a social norm?), measurement (how do we measure expectations and preferences?), and change (which tools can we adopt to effect norm change?). The theories developed in the book are brought to life by examining real-life cases of norm creation and abandonment, the rationale behind policy interventions, and how change can be spearheaded by various types of trendsetters, be they individuals, groups, or the media. By exploring how a range of problems, from poor sanitation to child marriage, can be addressed, the book shows how social norms can have a causal impact on collective behavior, and which interventions may succeed in creating new norms or abandoning harmful ones. In laying the theoretical groundwork for implementing social changes in a contextually sensitive and empirically based way, it also diagnoses why some less culturally attuned attempts to eliminate negative practices have failed.
Arthur N. Prior
- Published in print:
- 1963
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198241577
- eISBN:
- 9780191680380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198241577.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses Hume and whether one can find whether a moral judgment is to be identified with the judgment that an object is evoking in us a feeling of approval or disapproval. The ...
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This chapter discusses Hume and whether one can find whether a moral judgment is to be identified with the judgment that an object is evoking in us a feeling of approval or disapproval. The discussion also talks about facts and norms. Dr. Popper’s distinction between norms and facts breaks down, along with an analogy between validity and truth.Less
This chapter discusses Hume and whether one can find whether a moral judgment is to be identified with the judgment that an object is evoking in us a feeling of approval or disapproval. The discussion also talks about facts and norms. Dr. Popper’s distinction between norms and facts breaks down, along with an analogy between validity and truth.
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752318
- eISBN:
- 9780191597541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752318.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than ...
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Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than fewer’. Some morality consists ultimately of various independent moral norms; or is there some system behind this variety? The chapter expresses doubts about three major systematic traditions in ethics: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. It ends with the proposal of a less systematic alternative, one that takes seriously the limits of human motivation and knowledge, along with the demand that ethics be effective in society, and constrains the content of moral norms and the extent of the system.Less
Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than fewer’. Some morality consists ultimately of various independent moral norms; or is there some system behind this variety? The chapter expresses doubts about three major systematic traditions in ethics: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. It ends with the proposal of a less systematic alternative, one that takes seriously the limits of human motivation and knowledge, along with the demand that ethics be effective in society, and constrains the content of moral norms and the extent of the system.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter discusses the three main themes of this volume: the nature of norms, of norms in general and of particular kinds of norms; where norms come from, why they arise, persist, change, and ...
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This chapter discusses the three main themes of this volume: the nature of norms, of norms in general and of particular kinds of norms; where norms come from, why they arise, persist, change, and disappear; and how norms help to shape behaviour, attitudes, and modes of deliberation.Less
This chapter discusses the three main themes of this volume: the nature of norms, of norms in general and of particular kinds of norms; where norms come from, why they arise, persist, change, and disappear; and how norms help to shape behaviour, attitudes, and modes of deliberation.
Taketoshi Okita
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682676
- eISBN:
- 9780191763168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682676.003.0073
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The present discussion divides public health activities into two broad categories: countermeasures against acute infectious diseases, and health promotion measures. On countermeasures against acute ...
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The present discussion divides public health activities into two broad categories: countermeasures against acute infectious diseases, and health promotion measures. On countermeasures against acute infectious diseases, as Dawson points out, the way of thinking that regards individual freedom alone as a dominant value or supports non-interference with individual liberty would hold back implementation of necessary countermeasures. This will not change the fact that freedom of quarantined individuals is restricted. In public health activities, something that cannot be justified always remains; therefore, a framework for debate premised on unflagging verification of activities should be warranted. On health promotion measures, a perspective that questions the goals of public health and considers the kind of society it helps to shape is required, given that it is in social norms that public health activities are rooted.Less
The present discussion divides public health activities into two broad categories: countermeasures against acute infectious diseases, and health promotion measures. On countermeasures against acute infectious diseases, as Dawson points out, the way of thinking that regards individual freedom alone as a dominant value or supports non-interference with individual liberty would hold back implementation of necessary countermeasures. This will not change the fact that freedom of quarantined individuals is restricted. In public health activities, something that cannot be justified always remains; therefore, a framework for debate premised on unflagging verification of activities should be warranted. On health promotion measures, a perspective that questions the goals of public health and considers the kind of society it helps to shape is required, given that it is in social norms that public health activities are rooted.
Joel Feinberg
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195064704
- eISBN:
- 9780199833207
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195064704.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Feinberg's target here is the strict legal moralist, who defends (1) true morality (the set of rational norms that apply equally to all peoples) (2) a retributive theory of punishment, and (3) the ...
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Feinberg's target here is the strict legal moralist, who defends (1) true morality (the set of rational norms that apply equally to all peoples) (2) a retributive theory of punishment, and (3) the view that criminal law may legitimately prevent free‐floating evils on the ground that they are immoral. According to Feinberg, the full doctrine of strict legal moralism is internally inconsistent since one cannot cling to both retributivism and moralism, as this would involve retributive punishment for victimless crimes. After contrasting pure strict moralism with impure strict moralism (which appeals to the indirect effects on public welfare of allowing harmless immoral conduct), Feinberg discusses Patrick Devlin's claim that liberals are inconsistent given their exclusion from the law of the consent defense for some crimes. To this, Feinberg replies that liberals, who permit this defense for all crimes except where it is not workable or would harm third parties, are not prey to this objection.Less
Feinberg's target here is the strict legal moralist, who defends (1) true morality (the set of rational norms that apply equally to all peoples) (2) a retributive theory of punishment, and (3) the view that criminal law may legitimately prevent free‐floating evils on the ground that they are immoral. According to Feinberg, the full doctrine of strict legal moralism is internally inconsistent since one cannot cling to both retributivism and moralism, as this would involve retributive punishment for victimless crimes. After contrasting pure strict moralism with impure strict moralism (which appeals to the indirect effects on public welfare of allowing harmless immoral conduct), Feinberg discusses Patrick Devlin's claim that liberals are inconsistent given their exclusion from the law of the consent defense for some crimes. To this, Feinberg replies that liberals, who permit this defense for all crimes except where it is not workable or would harm third parties, are not prey to this objection.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. This book aims to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering an account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist, ...
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Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. This book aims to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering an account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist, and change; and how they work. Norms, the book argues, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another — with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognize the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms.Less
Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. This book aims to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering an account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist, and change; and how they work. Norms, the book argues, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another — with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognize the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms.
Sally Haslanger
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199892631
- eISBN:
- 9780199980055
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199892631.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the stance of objectivity is a male stance and, more specifically, a stance of objectification: “to look at the world objectively is to objectify it.” This chapter ...
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Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the stance of objectivity is a male stance and, more specifically, a stance of objectification: “to look at the world objectively is to objectify it.” This chapter develops an interpretation of MacKinnon's account of gender and objectification to determine how objectivity is relevant. The chapter argues that there are epistemic norms that, under conditions of injustice, help sustain the position of the dominant. The chapter concludes, however, that these are norms of “assumed objectivity” that, although common, are not what genuine objectivity recommends.Less
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the stance of objectivity is a male stance and, more specifically, a stance of objectification: “to look at the world objectively is to objectify it.” This chapter develops an interpretation of MacKinnon's account of gender and objectification to determine how objectivity is relevant. The chapter argues that there are epistemic norms that, under conditions of injustice, help sustain the position of the dominant. The chapter concludes, however, that these are norms of “assumed objectivity” that, although common, are not what genuine objectivity recommends.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter considers how to make sense of the notion of norms following within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic framework. It begins by providing a general characterization of the notion of ...
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This chapter considers how to make sense of the notion of norms following within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic framework. It begins by providing a general characterization of the notion of internalizing a norm. It then proposes a conative or desire-based account that can provide the foundation for a rational-choice-theoretic interpretation of the notion of norm following. Next, it discusses how norms figure in the kind of augmented utility function that this suggests. Finally, it considers the application of norm following to the different kinds of norms: formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.Less
This chapter considers how to make sense of the notion of norms following within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic framework. It begins by providing a general characterization of the notion of internalizing a norm. It then proposes a conative or desire-based account that can provide the foundation for a rational-choice-theoretic interpretation of the notion of norm following. Next, it discusses how norms figure in the kind of augmented utility function that this suggests. Finally, it considers the application of norm following to the different kinds of norms: formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines the notion of norm conforming within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic perspective. It begins by discussing the notion of externalizing a norm in more detail. It then presents ...
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This chapter examines the notion of norm conforming within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic perspective. It begins by discussing the notion of externalizing a norm in more detail. It then presents some examples of salient considerations that undergird our disposition to treat norms as instrumental reasons. It focuses, in particular, on the desire to avoid sanctions: both tangible sanctions and intangible sanctions. Finally, this account of norm conforming is applied to formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.Less
This chapter examines the notion of norm conforming within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic perspective. It begins by discussing the notion of externalizing a norm in more detail. It then presents some examples of salient considerations that undergird our disposition to treat norms as instrumental reasons. It focuses, in particular, on the desire to avoid sanctions: both tangible sanctions and intangible sanctions. Finally, this account of norm conforming is applied to formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.
Mark Greenberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606443
- eISBN:
- 9780191729683
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that there is a picture of how law works that most legal theorists are implicitly committed to and take to be common ground. This Standard Picture (SP, for short) is generally not ...
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This chapter argues that there is a picture of how law works that most legal theorists are implicitly committed to and take to be common ground. This Standard Picture (SP, for short) is generally not acknowledged or defended. SP leads to a characteristic set of concerns and problems and yields a distinctive way of thinking about how law is supposed to operate. The chapter suggests that the issue of whether SP is correct is a fundamental one for the philosophy of law, more basic, for example, than the issue that divides legal positivists and anti‐positivists. The chapter has three main goals: 1) to identify and articulate in some detail the Standard Picture; 2) to show that SP is widely held and has important consequences for other debates in the philosophy of law; 3) to show that SP leads to a serious theoretical problem.Less
This chapter argues that there is a picture of how law works that most legal theorists are implicitly committed to and take to be common ground. This Standard Picture (SP, for short) is generally not acknowledged or defended. SP leads to a characteristic set of concerns and problems and yields a distinctive way of thinking about how law is supposed to operate. The chapter suggests that the issue of whether SP is correct is a fundamental one for the philosophy of law, more basic, for example, than the issue that divides legal positivists and anti‐positivists. The chapter has three main goals: 1) to identify and articulate in some detail the Standard Picture; 2) to show that SP is widely held and has important consequences for other debates in the philosophy of law; 3) to show that SP leads to a serious theoretical problem.
