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A Case for the Psychological Reality of Language

Michael Devitt

in Ignorance of Language

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199250967
eISBN:
9780191603945
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199250960.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter begins with the popular “Representational Theory of the Mind” (RTM), according to which a thought involves a mental representation. It then follows Fodor in arguing for the controversial ... More


Representation, Meaning, and Thought

Grant Gillett

Published in print:
1992
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198239932
eISBN:
9780191680045
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239932.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein alongside many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental ... More


Introduction

Grant Gillett

in Representation, Meaning, and Thought

Published in print:
1992
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198239932
eISBN:
9780191680045
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239932.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the concept of representation and attempts to describe and explain the complex strategies higher animals have. These creatures also have mental representations that are ... More


Preconceptual Representation

Jerry A. Fodor

in LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199548774
eISBN:
9780191721106
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

This chapter argues that at least some of the mental representations that are causally implicated in the formation of perceptual beliefs are indeed non-conceptual. The line of argument offered goes ... More


Solipsistic Semantics

Ernest Lepore and Barry Loewer

in Meaning, Mind, and Matter: Philosophical Essays

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199580781
eISBN:
9780191595264
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580781.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores Cartesian and more contemporary motivations for the view that there must be an internalist semantics for mental representations, including arguments that are intended to show ... More


The Case Against Linguistically Enhanced Propositions

Scott Soames

in Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195145281
eISBN:
9780199833702
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195145283.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter examines and criticizes two leading semantic theories of attitude ascriptions of the form x believes / asserts that S. According to these theories, ascriptions of this sort report that ... More


Attitudes in Context

Mark Richard

in Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199557950
eISBN:
9780191747267
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557950.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends the author's ‘Propositional Attitudes’ (and chapter 5) against criticisms by Crimmins; amends the account of representations employed in therein; compares the author’s and John ... More


Afterword

John Hawthorne and David Manley

in The Reference Book

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199693672
eISBN:
9780191739002
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

The Afterword re-evaluates the central questions of the book. It begins by examining the possibility (suggested by Paul Pietroski) that no expressions of natural language are paradigmatically ... More


Narrow Content

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198785965
eISBN:
9780191860843
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785965.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s ... More


How I Say What You Think

Mark Richard

in Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199557950
eISBN:
9780191747267
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557950.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A semantics for attitude verbs and ‘that’-terms is given in this chapter. The terms name fusions of linguistic items and Russellian referents; the verbs are treated as contextually sensitive. The ... More


Perceiving Language: Issues between Travis and Chomsky

John Collins

in The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198783916
eISBN:
9780191826566
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

Charles Travis seeks to forge a concord between Frege, McDowell, and Chomsky. The three thinkers all profoundly reject empiricism in the guise of rejecting of what Travis calls the Martian Principle. ... More


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