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Theorists of oppression note that marriage law has historically oppressed women and people of color and argue that it continues to perpetuate oppression of women, gays and lesbians, and minority racial and ethnic groups. For example, John Stuart Mill and 20th century radical feminists compared marriage to slavery. Susan Moller Okin argued that gender-structured marriage makes wives economically vulnerable. Claudia Card has argued that marriage facilitates abuse and, far from serving gay and lesbian liberation, same-sex marriage would encourage assimilation to a heteronormative ideal of monogamy. And Patricia Hill Collins has argued that marriage law has functioned as an important symbol of racial hierarchy; U.S. marriage promotion continues to be racially inflected in ways which devalue practices found in African-American communities. Such critiques will be crucial to my arguments for marriage reform. I will argue, though, that marriage is not essentially unjust; its symbolism can be changed through extensive restructuring.

This chapter considers whether political liberals can recognize exemptions from generally applicable laws when those laws substantially burden living in accordance with a religious comprehensive doctrine. It is argued that in some cases political liberals can recognize religious accommodations or exemptions. However, political liberals cannot single out religion, in particular, for special treatment; when other commitments function in the same way, those commitments should enjoy the same status as religious commitments. Nevertheless, it is claimed that political liberals cannot recognize exemptions or accommodations on any basis when a law is needed to secure and protect the equal standing of all persons as free and equal citizens.

This chapter addresses criticisms of the sex equality approach from those who argue that pornography is a right flowing from a right to freedom of expression—the free speech defense of pornography, by self-styled feminists, who claim that pornography (its making and its use) is a part of sexual liberation for women, and by gays and lesbians insofar as they allege it plays an important role in the communities of sexual minorities. Finally, I examine the arguments to those, like Altman, who locate a “right to pornography” in the right to sexual autonomy. I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently establishes their conclusions.

This chapter makes the foundational egalitarian case against marriage. It starts with a historical overview of feminist objections to marriage. Marriage undermines women’s equality both practically and symbolically. Feminists criticize marriage for being both sexist and heterosexist. This two-pronged attack looks puzzling. How can it be both bad for women to be married and bad for lesbians and gays to be unmarried? The discussion continues with an analysis of whether same-sex marriage is egalitarian. It concludes that, in a marriage regime, same-sex marriage is both required by and insufficient for equality. Finally, the chapter argues that reformed versions of marriage such as civil union still enact inequality between those who have and those who lack the relevant status. It follows that the abolition of state-recognized marriage best meets the myriad egalitarian objections to the institution.