D.C. Stove
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole ...
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This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism.Less
This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism.
George Molnar
Stephen Mumford (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199204175
- eISBN:
- 9780191695537
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers ...
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This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. This book sets about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remain, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Hume's assumptions. This book shows both that the notion of a power is central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. This book's account of powers is as realistic as any that has appeared so far, and shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend on their manifestations for their existence; nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. The book thus appropriates the notion of intentionality from Brentano and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. It offers a persuasive case for the existence of some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, the book does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, the book's final position is dualistic.Less
This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. This book sets about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remain, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Hume's assumptions. This book shows both that the notion of a power is central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. This book's account of powers is as realistic as any that has appeared so far, and shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend on their manifestations for their existence; nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. The book thus appropriates the notion of intentionality from Brentano and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. It offers a persuasive case for the existence of some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, the book does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, the book's final position is dualistic.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable ...
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This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable premiss which is false. However, not all of the conclusions are hostile to Hume's argument. Its true premisses suffice to prove an important negative conclusion, though not a sceptical one, about inductive inferences. And what has historically been learnt from Hume's argument is of very great importance, even though it is partly opposite to what Hume intended to teach. The identification of this argument involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of his premisses, as being statements of logical probability. Hume's scepticism about induction is quite interesting enough, even considered in itself, to justify the present inquiry.Less
This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable premiss which is false. However, not all of the conclusions are hostile to Hume's argument. Its true premisses suffice to prove an important negative conclusion, though not a sceptical one, about inductive inferences. And what has historically been learnt from Hume's argument is of very great importance, even though it is partly opposite to what Hume intended to teach. The identification of this argument involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of his premisses, as being statements of logical probability. Hume's scepticism about induction is quite interesting enough, even considered in itself, to justify the present inquiry.
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242703
- eISBN:
- 9780191680540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242703.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
There is a tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. This book argues against this view. While allowing that experiences ...
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There is a tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. This book argues against this view. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, it presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. The book applies the resulting analytical framework to a discussion of justified belief, dealing, firstly, with how beliefs may derive justification from other beliefs, and secondly, with how current sensory experiences may contribute to the justification of a person's beliefs. A key theme in the book's general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the book develops a view of concepts and their mastery; explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein; illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman; and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism.Less
There is a tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. This book argues against this view. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, it presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. The book applies the resulting analytical framework to a discussion of justified belief, dealing, firstly, with how beliefs may derive justification from other beliefs, and secondly, with how current sensory experiences may contribute to the justification of a person's beliefs. A key theme in the book's general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the book develops a view of concepts and their mastery; explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein; illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman; and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199217250
- eISBN:
- 9780191696053
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, ...
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This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, Moore, and now Davidson, who also relies crucially on an assumption of virtuous circularity. Along the way various lines of objection are explored. Part I of this book considers historical alternatives to the view developed in Part II. It begins with G. E. Moore's legendary proof, and the epistemology that lies behind it. That leads to classical foundationalism, a more general position encompassing the indirect realism advocated by Moore. Next the book turns to the quietist naturalism found in David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. After that comes Thomas Reid's common sense alternative. A quite different option is the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. Finally, Part I concludes with a study of Donald Davidson's distinctive form of epistemology naturalized (as the book argues). The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic circularity. This alternative retains elements of the earlier approaches, while discarding what was found wanting in them.Less
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, Moore, and now Davidson, who also relies crucially on an assumption of virtuous circularity. Along the way various lines of objection are explored. Part I of this book considers historical alternatives to the view developed in Part II. It begins with G. E. Moore's legendary proof, and the epistemology that lies behind it. That leads to classical foundationalism, a more general position encompassing the indirect realism advocated by Moore. Next the book turns to the quietist naturalism found in David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. After that comes Thomas Reid's common sense alternative. A quite different option is the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. Finally, Part I concludes with a study of Donald Davidson's distinctive form of epistemology naturalized (as the book argues). The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic circularity. This alternative retains elements of the earlier approaches, while discarding what was found wanting in them.
J. J. Valberg
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242918
- eISBN:
- 9780191680625
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242918.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If we reason in a certain way about our experience, we are driven to the conclusion that what is present to us — the object of our experience — is something that exists only in so far as it is ...
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If we reason in a certain way about our experience, we are driven to the conclusion that what is present to us — the object of our experience — is something that exists only in so far as it is present, hence that it is not part of the world. If, on the other hand, we simply open up to our experience, all we find is the world. This book sets out both to explain why we are entangled in this puzzle and to consider ways of solving it. In examining the puzzle, and possible solutions to it, this book discusses relevant views of Hume, Kant, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Strawson, as well as ideas from the recent philosophy of perception. Finally, it describes and analyses a manifestation of the puzzle outside philosophy, in everyday experience.Less
If we reason in a certain way about our experience, we are driven to the conclusion that what is present to us — the object of our experience — is something that exists only in so far as it is present, hence that it is not part of the world. If, on the other hand, we simply open up to our experience, all we find is the world. This book sets out both to explain why we are entangled in this puzzle and to consider ways of solving it. In examining the puzzle, and possible solutions to it, this book discusses relevant views of Hume, Kant, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Strawson, as well as ideas from the recent philosophy of perception. Finally, it describes and analyses a manifestation of the puzzle outside philosophy, in everyday experience.
George Molnar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199204175
- eISBN:
- 9780191695537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter briefly discusses actuality and some objections to this concept. It quotes David Hume, who says that manifested powers are identical with their manifestations. Another defence of ...
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This chapter briefly discusses actuality and some objections to this concept. It quotes David Hume, who says that manifested powers are identical with their manifestations. Another defence of actuality is an argument of causality from Mellor, who states that dispositions can be causes. What is not ‘actual’ cannot be a cause or any part of a cause. The chapter claims that this is enough to show that powers are not equated with mere possibilities.Less
This chapter briefly discusses actuality and some objections to this concept. It quotes David Hume, who says that manifested powers are identical with their manifestations. Another defence of actuality is an argument of causality from Mellor, who states that dispositions can be causes. What is not ‘actual’ cannot be a cause or any part of a cause. The chapter claims that this is enough to show that powers are not equated with mere possibilities.
J. L. Mackie
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198246428
- eISBN:
- 9780191597954
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198246420.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation ...
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In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation as it is ‘in the objects’ and attempts to provide an account of both aspects. Mackie examines the treatment of causation by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Ducasse, Kneale, Hart and Honore, and von Wright. Mackie's own account involves an analysis of causal statements in terms of counterfactual conditionals though these are judged to be incapable of giving a complete account of causation. Mackie argues that regularity theory too can only offer an incomplete picture of the nature of causation. In the course of his analysis, Mackie critically examines the account of causation offered by Kant, as well as the contemporary Kantian approaches offered by philosophers such as Bennett and Strawson. Also addressed are issues such as the direction of causation, the relation of statistical laws and functional laws, the role of causal statements in legal contexts, and the understanding of causes both as ‘facts’ and ‘events’. Throughout the discussion of these topics, Mackie develops his own complex account of the nature of causation, finally bringing his analysis to bear in regard to the topic of teleology and the question of whether final causes can be justifiably reduced to efficient causes.Less
In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation as it is ‘in the objects’ and attempts to provide an account of both aspects. Mackie examines the treatment of causation by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Ducasse, Kneale, Hart and Honore, and von Wright. Mackie's own account involves an analysis of causal statements in terms of counterfactual conditionals though these are judged to be incapable of giving a complete account of causation. Mackie argues that regularity theory too can only offer an incomplete picture of the nature of causation. In the course of his analysis, Mackie critically examines the account of causation offered by Kant, as well as the contemporary Kantian approaches offered by philosophers such as Bennett and Strawson. Also addressed are issues such as the direction of causation, the relation of statistical laws and functional laws, the role of causal statements in legal contexts, and the understanding of causes both as ‘facts’ and ‘events’. Throughout the discussion of these topics, Mackie develops his own complex account of the nature of causation, finally bringing his analysis to bear in regard to the topic of teleology and the question of whether final causes can be justifiably reduced to efficient causes.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608591
- eISBN:
- 9780191729621
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume to Quine, Burge, McDowell, Goldman, Fogelin, and Sosa in our own ...
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This book explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume to Quine, Burge, McDowell, Goldman, Fogelin, and Sosa in our own day. Seven of the chapters focus on David Hume, and examine the sources and implications of his ‘naturalism’ and his ‘scepticism’. Three others deal with the legacy of that ‘naturalism’ in the 20th century. In each case the book moves beyond providing a description of historical contexts and developments, and confronts the philosophical issues as they present themselves to the philosophers in question.Less
This book explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume to Quine, Burge, McDowell, Goldman, Fogelin, and Sosa in our own day. Seven of the chapters focus on David Hume, and examine the sources and implications of his ‘naturalism’ and his ‘scepticism’. Three others deal with the legacy of that ‘naturalism’ in the 20th century. In each case the book moves beyond providing a description of historical contexts and developments, and confronts the philosophical issues as they present themselves to the philosophers in question.
Don Garrett
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay distinguishes varieties of skepticism along six dimensions. It argues that Hume is unmitigated in his rational support skepticism and in his prescriptive skepticism about certain “high and ...
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This essay distinguishes varieties of skepticism along six dimensions. It argues that Hume is unmitigated in his rational support skepticism and in his prescriptive skepticism about certain “high and distant enquiries”, but mitigated in his general practising skepticism and in his general epistemic merit skepticism. Hume’s skepticism must be seen as mitigated in these ways in order to solve four central puzzles for Hume scholars.Less
This essay distinguishes varieties of skepticism along six dimensions. It argues that Hume is unmitigated in his rational support skepticism and in his prescriptive skepticism about certain “high and distant enquiries”, but mitigated in his general practising skepticism and in his general epistemic merit skepticism. Hume’s skepticism must be seen as mitigated in these ways in order to solve four central puzzles for Hume scholars.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199202416
- eISBN:
- 9780191708558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202416.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the claim of early Buddhists, especially Vasubandhu and Abhidharma, to espouse reductionism as a theory of personal identity. A comparison of the Buddhist no-self theory with ...
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This chapter examines the claim of early Buddhists, especially Vasubandhu and Abhidharma, to espouse reductionism as a theory of personal identity. A comparison of the Buddhist no-self theory with Hume and Parfit is explored. Various criticisms of reductionism from within the Indian tradition are mentioned.Less
This chapter examines the claim of early Buddhists, especially Vasubandhu and Abhidharma, to espouse reductionism as a theory of personal identity. A comparison of the Buddhist no-self theory with Hume and Parfit is explored. Various criticisms of reductionism from within the Indian tradition are mentioned.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199218219
- eISBN:
- 9780191711596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of ...
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This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependency at all, no matter how many equants and epicycles are appended to the original rough draft. The systematic connections between judgements about causes and judgements about counterfactuals can be explained by the involvement of a third factor, some component of the truth conditions of counterfactual claims that is also a component of the truth conditions for causal claims. This third factor would provide the analogue of a ‘common cause’ explanation for the systematic connections between causal claims and counterfactuals: neither underpins the other but the third factor underpins them both.Less
This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependency at all, no matter how many equants and epicycles are appended to the original rough draft. The systematic connections between judgements about causes and judgements about counterfactuals can be explained by the involvement of a third factor, some component of the truth conditions of counterfactual claims that is also a component of the truth conditions for causal claims. This third factor would provide the analogue of a ‘common cause’ explanation for the systematic connections between causal claims and counterfactuals: neither underpins the other but the third factor underpins them both.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199218219
- eISBN:
- 9780191711596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the commonality in the preceding chapters. It is argued that the non-Humean package is an alternative account that runs into no logical, methodological, and or scientific ...
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This chapter examines the commonality in the preceding chapters. It is argued that the non-Humean package is an alternative account that runs into no logical, methodological, and or scientific objections. The non-Humean package is much closer to the intuitive picture of the world that we begin our investigations with. The fundamental asymmetry in the passage of time is inherent in our basic initial conception of the world, and the fundamental status of the laws of physics is implicit in physical practice.Less
This chapter examines the commonality in the preceding chapters. It is argued that the non-Humean package is an alternative account that runs into no logical, methodological, and or scientific objections. The non-Humean package is much closer to the intuitive picture of the world that we begin our investigations with. The fundamental asymmetry in the passage of time is inherent in our basic initial conception of the world, and the fundamental status of the laws of physics is implicit in physical practice.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199532889
- eISBN:
- 9780191714450
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532889.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides an outline of the structure of Hume's epistemology, as presented in the first two sections of Part III of the first book of the Treatise. Whereas in the more familiar discussion ...
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This chapter provides an outline of the structure of Hume's epistemology, as presented in the first two sections of Part III of the first book of the Treatise. Whereas in the more familiar discussion in the Enquiry, Hume divides the epistemological terrain into two domains: ‘relations of ideas’, in which either intuitive or demonstrative knowledge is attainable; and ‘matters of fact’, in which it is not (often termed ‘Hume's Fork’), the present discussion focuses on the basically equivalent but more complex formulation in the Treatise in terms of two species of ‘philosophical relations’. The aim is to show how Hume's analysis is best seen as a modification of Locke's and is intimately connected with the perceptual model of cognition. In view of the latter, it is also argued that a priori knowledge for Hume is neither analytic nor synthetic in the Kantian sense.Less
This chapter provides an outline of the structure of Hume's epistemology, as presented in the first two sections of Part III of the first book of the Treatise. Whereas in the more familiar discussion in the Enquiry, Hume divides the epistemological terrain into two domains: ‘relations of ideas’, in which either intuitive or demonstrative knowledge is attainable; and ‘matters of fact’, in which it is not (often termed ‘Hume's Fork’), the present discussion focuses on the basically equivalent but more complex formulation in the Treatise in terms of two species of ‘philosophical relations’. The aim is to show how Hume's analysis is best seen as a modification of Locke's and is intimately connected with the perceptual model of cognition. In view of the latter, it is also argued that a priori knowledge for Hume is neither analytic nor synthetic in the Kantian sense.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199266463
- eISBN:
- 9780191709111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter addresses the question of what conceivability is. It proposes an account that locates conceivability proper with respect to various subscripted impostors; makes for a revealing contrast ...
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This chapter addresses the question of what conceivability is. It proposes an account that locates conceivability proper with respect to various subscripted impostors; makes for a revealing contrast with inconceivability and undecidability; and predicts that a conceived proposition will appear as possible.Less
This chapter addresses the question of what conceivability is. It proposes an account that locates conceivability proper with respect to various subscripted impostors; makes for a revealing contrast with inconceivability and undecidability; and predicts that a conceived proposition will appear as possible.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that ...
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Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. The same goes for the view that he is a phenomenalist about physical objects. He makes an epistemological claim about all we can know about objects, not about what objects are, let alone about what objects knowably are. It's true that Hume defines causation as regular succession, but he uses ‘definition’ like his contemporaries Burke and Priestley when they write (respectively): ‘A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined’, and ‘A definition of any particular thing cannot be anything more than an enumeration of its known properties’.Less
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. The same goes for the view that he is a phenomenalist about physical objects. He makes an epistemological claim about all we can know about objects, not about what objects are, let alone about what objects knowably are. It's true that Hume defines causation as regular succession, but he uses ‘definition’ like his contemporaries Burke and Priestley when they write (respectively): ‘A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined’, and ‘A definition of any particular thing cannot be anything more than an enumeration of its known properties’.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that ...
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Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. Sceptics do not claim to know the ultimate nature of (non-mental) reality. Hume does hold that ‘regular succession’ is all we can legitimately and positively contentfully mean by the word ‘causation’ when we use it in philosophy, since this is the only clear and distinct meaning we can give to the word on his empiricist principles, and philosophy is committed to using only clear and distinct ideas. At the same time, he is clear on the point that there is something like natural necessity in the world, as many quotations show, including quotations from his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Less
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. Sceptics do not claim to know the ultimate nature of (non-mental) reality. Hume does hold that ‘regular succession’ is all we can legitimately and positively contentfully mean by the word ‘causation’ when we use it in philosophy, since this is the only clear and distinct meaning we can give to the word on his empiricist principles, and philosophy is committed to using only clear and distinct ideas. At the same time, he is clear on the point that there is something like natural necessity in the world, as many quotations show, including quotations from his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter covers the structure and content of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It begins by addressing the preliminary textual identification of the argument. It considers the ...
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This chapter covers the structure and content of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It begins by addressing the preliminary textual identification of the argument. It considers the structure of the argument, and its content in the language of Hume. The dictionary of the elements of Hume's argument is also presented. It then translates some parts of Hume's terminology into language less likely to be misunderstood. The problems of translation of Hume's argument and the argument after these translations have been made are reported as well.Less
This chapter covers the structure and content of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It begins by addressing the preliminary textual identification of the argument. It considers the structure of the argument, and its content in the language of Hume. The dictionary of the elements of Hume's argument is also presented. It then translates some parts of Hume's terminology into language less likely to be misunderstood. The problems of translation of Hume's argument and the argument after these translations have been made are reported as well.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is ...
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This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is the explicitness of it. For the conclusion (j), then, Hume's argument has just three premisses: the two premisses he states, (e) and (f), and the unstated one just mentioned. The whole proposition stated reduces to this: that all predictive-inductive inferences are invalid, and that all the inferences, which result from supplementing the premisses of a predictive-inductive inference by further observational premisses, are also invalid. The essence of Hume's argument is explained. Hume's argument in stage 2 may be summed up in the following way: from premisses which prove at most the invalidity of predictive-inductive inferences, along with the unstated premiss that an inference is unreasonable if it is invalid, Hume concluded that predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable.Less
This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is the explicitness of it. For the conclusion (j), then, Hume's argument has just three premisses: the two premisses he states, (e) and (f), and the unstated one just mentioned. The whole proposition stated reduces to this: that all predictive-inductive inferences are invalid, and that all the inferences, which result from supplementing the premisses of a predictive-inductive inference by further observational premisses, are also invalid. The essence of Hume's argument is explained. Hume's argument in stage 2 may be summed up in the following way: from premisses which prove at most the invalidity of predictive-inductive inferences, along with the unstated premiss that an inference is unreasonable if it is invalid, Hume concluded that predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter reviews the further interpretation and generalization of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It first introduces the nature of Hume's predictive-inductive scepticism. It also ...
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This chapter reviews the further interpretation and generalization of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It first introduces the nature of Hume's predictive-inductive scepticism. It also addresses the sceptical content of the statement of logical probability. In addition, Hume's first suppressed premiss as a statement of logical probability is shown. The fallibilist consequence as a statement of logical probability, and the deductivist premiss as a statement of logical probability are covered. The chapter then outlines the generalization of the sceptical conclusion and fallibilist consequence, and the essence of Hume's argument for general inductive scepticism.Less
This chapter reviews the further interpretation and generalization of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It first introduces the nature of Hume's predictive-inductive scepticism. It also addresses the sceptical content of the statement of logical probability. In addition, Hume's first suppressed premiss as a statement of logical probability is shown. The fallibilist consequence as a statement of logical probability, and the deductivist premiss as a statement of logical probability are covered. The chapter then outlines the generalization of the sceptical conclusion and fallibilist consequence, and the essence of Hume's argument for general inductive scepticism.
