A. A. Long
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199279128
- eISBN:
- 9780191706769
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279128.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In urging himself and Lucilius to cultivate a ‘good mentality’ (bona mens), Seneca's principal point is that objective human excellence and authentic happiness depend intrinsically and essentially on ...
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In urging himself and Lucilius to cultivate a ‘good mentality’ (bona mens), Seneca's principal point is that objective human excellence and authentic happiness depend intrinsically and essentially on the state of one's mind, and only instrumentally and contingently on the health and condition of one's body. This division between mind and body involves the folk psychology recognized in everyday consciousness; and it is compatible with the strict physicalism endorsed both by Stoicism and by most modern theorists. Seneca, moreover, taps completely into the contemporary world when one moves from the academy into popular culture.Less
In urging himself and Lucilius to cultivate a ‘good mentality’ (bona mens), Seneca's principal point is that objective human excellence and authentic happiness depend intrinsically and essentially on the state of one's mind, and only instrumentally and contingently on the health and condition of one's body. This division between mind and body involves the folk psychology recognized in everyday consciousness; and it is compatible with the strict physicalism endorsed both by Stoicism and by most modern theorists. Seneca, moreover, taps completely into the contemporary world when one moves from the academy into popular culture.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226080505
- eISBN:
- 9780226080543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226080543.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Having defined eudaimonia as “an activity of soul in accordance with complete or perfect virtue” and identified it as the first principle (archē) for the sake of which everything else is done, Book I ...
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Having defined eudaimonia as “an activity of soul in accordance with complete or perfect virtue” and identified it as the first principle (archē) for the sake of which everything else is done, Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics seemed to promise a movement of thought that would descend from that principle to deduce what complete or perfect virtue is. Book II, however, in turning to the investigation of virtue, makes no explicit attempt to move from happiness as the first principle. The investigation of human excellence that is supposed to lead back to the question of happiness begins and ends with Socrates. In Socratic eyes, what habituation would produce looks as if it could only be “demotic virtue,” control over behavior based on the calculation of how to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The formal definition of ethical virtue in Book II replaced the mean in relation to feelings and actions, which the phronimos chooses, with the mean state between two extremes that constitutes a disposition of character.Less
Having defined eudaimonia as “an activity of soul in accordance with complete or perfect virtue” and identified it as the first principle (archē) for the sake of which everything else is done, Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics seemed to promise a movement of thought that would descend from that principle to deduce what complete or perfect virtue is. Book II, however, in turning to the investigation of virtue, makes no explicit attempt to move from happiness as the first principle. The investigation of human excellence that is supposed to lead back to the question of happiness begins and ends with Socrates. In Socratic eyes, what habituation would produce looks as if it could only be “demotic virtue,” control over behavior based on the calculation of how to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The formal definition of ethical virtue in Book II replaced the mean in relation to feelings and actions, which the phronimos chooses, with the mean state between two extremes that constitutes a disposition of character.