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In this chapter, it is argued that some instances of racist hate speech are speech acts that constitute illegal acts of racial discrimination. By identifying a previously overlooked mechanism by which utterances enact norms (the covert exercitive), one comes to see that some racist hate speech enacts discriminatory norms in public places. Such speech thus acts very similarly to ‘Whites Only’ signs. This result has two important consequences. First, it affords at least a prima facie case for the regulation of this subset of racist hate speech. Second, it disproves a certain naive conception of so-called political speech. Although both racist hate speech and ‘Whites Only’ signs express political messages, they do not and should not count as political speech for the purposes of a free speech principle. Thus, expressing a political opinion is insufficient for being political speech (in the relevant sense).

This chapter presents the material in the philosophy of language that is required to follow the arguments in the book. A general introduction to an intentionalist neo-Gricean framework for understanding language use is presented. General information about speech act theory and the felicity conditions for successful speech acts is covered. Since the book focuses on exercitive speech, that is, speech that enacts permissibility facts, additional information is given about exercitives and their felicity conditions. This chapter also clarifies some of the key concepts used throughout the book. The nature of enactment, different kinds of enactment, the important distinction between constituting and merely causing harm, and the nature of social norms are all presented.

This chapter argues that conversational contributions routinely enact norms for the conversation to which they contribute. When an utterance adds to a conversation, it enacts changes to the conversational score. This is because the score tracks everything relevant to the proper assessment and development of the conversation. Moreover, since what is appropriate or permissible in the conversation depends on the score, changing the score thereby changes what is permissible in that conversation and this involves the enacting of norms. Such conversational exercitives involve an important but overlooked mechanism of verbal norm enactment.

This chapter explores differences between conversational exercitives and standard exercitives. Although both enact norms, standard exercitives do so via an exercise of speaker authority. Moreover, with standard exercitives, the speaker intends to enact a norm and intends for the hearer to recognize that intention. Standard exercitives are communicative. Conversational exercitives work differently. The speaker does not need to have or exercise authority; the speaker need not consciously intend to enact a norm and participants need not consciously recognize that a norm is enacted. With conversational exercitives, norms are enacted simply in virtue of contributing to the norm-governed activity of conversation.

This chapter argues that the phenomenon of conversational exercitives generalizes. It is not just verbal contributions to conversations that enact norms; verbal contributions to other norm-governed activities also do so. Such covert exercitives are developed and the complex role of intention is clarified and explored. It is also argued that the covert enacting of a permissibility fact (by a covert or conversational exercitive) does not depend on the communication of the intention to enact that permissibility fact. As a result, such exercitives are not a communicative (illocutionary) phenomenon. Rather, they constitute what is here called a parallel act.

It is familiar from speech act theory how saying so can make it so. When the C.E.O. declares that no more overtime will be approved, for example, the C.E.O. thereby enacts a new company policy; her words effect an immediate change to the norms and policies operative in that company. Clearly, speech can enact facts about what is permissible and the familiar way for speech to do this is via an exercise of speaker authority. In this essay, though, I argue for a different way that speech enacts permissibility facts. Starting in the kinematics (i.e. the mechanics) of conversation, I first argue that conversational contributions routinely enact norms for the very conversation to which they contribute. I then argue that this phenomenon generalizes in a way that illuminates the crucial role of speech in enacting and perpetuating social hierarchy.