Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of ...
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This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.Less
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198716358
- eISBN:
- 9780191785047
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716358.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ...
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This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ‘Preface’, and his modest ‘quietist’ metaethics examined. Sidgwick’s objections to several forms of naturalism are explained, and an account is offered of Sidgwick’s non-naturalism and of his rationalist views on justification and his internalism about motivation. Methods are distinguished from principles, and Sidgwick’s focus on only three ethical theories is defended. Sidgwick is criticized for seeking excessive precision in ethics, and for use of unnecessary ethical concepts. The chapter ends with a section on Sidgwick’s views of politics, where it is argued that there is a stronger case than Sidgwick allows for seeing political theory as a branch of ethics.Less
This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ‘Preface’, and his modest ‘quietist’ metaethics examined. Sidgwick’s objections to several forms of naturalism are explained, and an account is offered of Sidgwick’s non-naturalism and of his rationalist views on justification and his internalism about motivation. Methods are distinguished from principles, and Sidgwick’s focus on only three ethical theories is defended. Sidgwick is criticized for seeking excessive precision in ethics, and for use of unnecessary ethical concepts. The chapter ends with a section on Sidgwick’s views of politics, where it is argued that there is a stronger case than Sidgwick allows for seeing political theory as a branch of ethics.
