Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of ...
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This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.Less
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter sketches a map of the ground to be covered in education for virtue, organized around a progression of three types of tasks of moral education. It is argued that society is pretty ...
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This chapter sketches a map of the ground to be covered in education for virtue, organized around a progression of three types of tasks of moral education. It is argued that society is pretty effective inelementarytasks of initiation into the use of ethical concepts andmodularor domain-specific tasks of teaching people how to cooperate in particular institutions and roles.Integrativetasks — more difficult but indispensable for the formation of a clearly good moral character — seem to demand more individual autonomy, and to lie less within the power of social groups. In opposition to some situationist arguments, the last section of the chapter defends the desirability of teaching virtue to the extent that it can be taught.Less
This chapter sketches a map of the ground to be covered in education for virtue, organized around a progression of three types of tasks of moral education. It is argued that society is pretty effective inelementarytasks of initiation into the use of ethical concepts andmodularor domain-specific tasks of teaching people how to cooperate in particular institutions and roles.Integrativetasks — more difficult but indispensable for the formation of a clearly good moral character — seem to demand more individual autonomy, and to lie less within the power of social groups. In opposition to some situationist arguments, the last section of the chapter defends the desirability of teaching virtue to the extent that it can be taught.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804775380
- eISBN:
- 9780804778978
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804775380.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines Franz Kafka's thoughts on the concept of distraction. It explains that Kafka questioned the ethical status of a principle of distraction and argued that if the principle were ...
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This chapter examines Franz Kafka's thoughts on the concept of distraction. It explains that Kafka questioned the ethical status of a principle of distraction and argued that if the principle were accepted, a reform of ethical concepts would have to follow. It analyzes Kafka's concept of “er” and explains that the disruption in the most unified and universal human activity in Aristotle and the recueil of misfires in the moral and ethical agent Jean de La Bruyère become a political phenomenon in Kafka's depiction of diasporic-dispersed-distracted “living.”Less
This chapter examines Franz Kafka's thoughts on the concept of distraction. It explains that Kafka questioned the ethical status of a principle of distraction and argued that if the principle were accepted, a reform of ethical concepts would have to follow. It analyzes Kafka's concept of “er” and explains that the disruption in the most unified and universal human activity in Aristotle and the recueil of misfires in the moral and ethical agent Jean de La Bruyère become a political phenomenon in Kafka's depiction of diasporic-dispersed-distracted “living.”
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198716358
- eISBN:
- 9780191785047
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716358.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ...
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This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ‘Preface’, and his modest ‘quietist’ metaethics examined. Sidgwick’s objections to several forms of naturalism are explained, and an account is offered of Sidgwick’s non-naturalism and of his rationalist views on justification and his internalism about motivation. Methods are distinguished from principles, and Sidgwick’s focus on only three ethical theories is defended. Sidgwick is criticized for seeking excessive precision in ethics, and for use of unnecessary ethical concepts. The chapter ends with a section on Sidgwick’s views of politics, where it is argued that there is a stronger case than Sidgwick allows for seeing political theory as a branch of ethics.Less
This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ‘Preface’, and his modest ‘quietist’ metaethics examined. Sidgwick’s objections to several forms of naturalism are explained, and an account is offered of Sidgwick’s non-naturalism and of his rationalist views on justification and his internalism about motivation. Methods are distinguished from principles, and Sidgwick’s focus on only three ethical theories is defended. Sidgwick is criticized for seeking excessive precision in ethics, and for use of unnecessary ethical concepts. The chapter ends with a section on Sidgwick’s views of politics, where it is argued that there is a stronger case than Sidgwick allows for seeing political theory as a branch of ethics.
