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This chapter narrates the systematic efforts of nationalist leaders in the diaspora to establish a national Korean state in the aftermath of the large-scale 1919 March First uprising. Japan’s brutal suppression of the national uprising in Korea made it necessary for national liberation activities to be carried out from abroad, ushering in a new phase in the nationalist movement as the locus of political activities occurred largely outside the Korean peninsula. These activities resulted in the formation of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Shanghai, which developed out of multiple ideological and strategic strands within the diaspora. The globalization of American power following World War I empowered the U.S. component of the Korean diaspora to play significant roles, ideologically and organizationally, in defining the vision of a new Korean nation-state that was embodied in the KPG. For the next several years, the activities of the KPG would remain at the center of the national liberation movement.

This chapter details how, with the People's Republic of China winning Mainland China and the diplomatic recognition of Indonesia, the positions of the Nationalists and Communists reversed. Having switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, Jakarta nevertheless allowed the Chinese Nationalist Party apparatus to continue its activities until 1958. Jakarta's ambiguous attitude induced a battle for influence between the two rival Chinese governments. As a regime in exile, the Chinese Nationalist government adjusted its past policies to fit the new circumstances resulting from its retreat to Taiwan. Having lost formal diplomatic representation, the Nationalists forged clandestine alliances with the Indonesian right-wing forces through the personal networks of the remaining Chinese Nationalist loyalists. In contrast with Taipei, Beijing prioritized state-to-state diplomacy over its connections to the overseas Chinese. By suspending the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) among the overseas Chinese and signing the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, Beijing attempted to ease Jakarta's concern that the ethnic Chinese could be used as a Communist fifth column.

This chapter focuses on Lincoln’s decision to reject calls for Seward’s replacement as secretary of state and on the two partners’ successful efforts to block European diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy and intervention in the American war. Seward skillfully managed maritime issues associated with the blockade, and Lincoln shifted the primary stated emphasis of US diplomacy from preserving the Union to freeing the slaves. This shift was embodied in the Emancipation Proclamation and linked northern victory to abolishing slavery. When combined with the Confederate retreat following the battle of Antietam and Seward’s ongoing threats, the North’s stand on the side of liberty ultimately convinced British leaders not to intervene or to recognize the South—making 1862 the war’s pivotal foreign policy year.

Part I of this book deals with diplomatic negotiations between the French Republic and the Ottoman Empire. By covering the entire period between 1792 and 1798, it introduces the chronological framework of this study. Chapter 1 deals with the regime change in French diplomatic representation, from the last ambassador of King Louis XVI to the first envoy of the Republic. The outbreak of war and the downfall of the king led to the replacement of monarchist government agents, altered the conduct of diplomacy, and changed the disposition of the French administration in the Levant. The chapter explains how French old regime diplomacy ended in 1792 and how the Ottoman government and the diplomatic corps in Istanbul reacted to this regime change.