Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590667
- eISBN:
- 9780191595530
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590667.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
A large number of people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. The law governing attempted crimes, then, is of practical importance, but the questions that arise in the ...
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A large number of people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. The law governing attempted crimes, then, is of practical importance, but the questions that arise in the adjudication of attempts also intersect with questions addressed by the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, if anything, in order to be trying to do something. This book offers solutions to a variety of difficult problems that courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes through application of the philosophy of action. The book argues that the problems that courts face admit of principled solution through reflection on either (i) what it is to try to do something, (ii) what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something, or (iii) what sentence for an attempt is fair, given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book proposes an account of the nature of trying to act, called “The Guiding Commitment View”, and uses that account to make progress on problems courts face. Under this account, to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success, and to be guided by those commitments. It is argued that when the implications of this simple and intuitively plausible position are appreciated, we are able to recognize principled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.Less
A large number of people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. The law governing attempted crimes, then, is of practical importance, but the questions that arise in the adjudication of attempts also intersect with questions addressed by the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, if anything, in order to be trying to do something. This book offers solutions to a variety of difficult problems that courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes through application of the philosophy of action. The book argues that the problems that courts face admit of principled solution through reflection on either (i) what it is to try to do something, (ii) what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something, or (iii) what sentence for an attempt is fair, given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book proposes an account of the nature of trying to act, called “The Guiding Commitment View”, and uses that account to make progress on problems courts face. Under this account, to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success, and to be guided by those commitments. It is argued that when the implications of this simple and intuitively plausible position are appreciated, we are able to recognize principled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.
Joel Feinberg
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195155266
- eISBN:
- 9780199833177
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195155262.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This article takes up the issue of governmental subsidies of the arts, an issue that parallels an examination of governmental restraints on liberty in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In the ...
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This article takes up the issue of governmental subsidies of the arts, an issue that parallels an examination of governmental restraints on liberty in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In the present article, after considering the limited support offered by considerations like rotational justice, it is argued that supporting the arts in part through government funds derived from mandatory taxation is justified on the grounds that it is good to create, maintain, and preserve things of high intrinsic value even when they do not generate benefits. This position is based upon a rejection of the ancient claim that all worthwhile things produce benefits either directly or indirectly for everyone.Less
This article takes up the issue of governmental subsidies of the arts, an issue that parallels an examination of governmental restraints on liberty in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In the present article, after considering the limited support offered by considerations like rotational justice, it is argued that supporting the arts in part through government funds derived from mandatory taxation is justified on the grounds that it is good to create, maintain, and preserve things of high intrinsic value even when they do not generate benefits. This position is based upon a rejection of the ancient claim that all worthwhile things produce benefits either directly or indirectly for everyone.
Martha C. Nussbaum
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199777853
- eISBN:
- 9780190267612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199777853.003.0034
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter reviews the book Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbervilles (2008), by Nicola Lacey. In her historical narrative, Lacey explores the British public's ...
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This chapter reviews the book Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbervilles (2008), by Nicola Lacey. In her historical narrative, Lacey explores the British public's fascination with female crime and extreme mental states, the restrictions to women's freedom that the Victorian era brought, and the resilience of women in the face of these constraints, their refusal to be treated as mere “playthings of love.” Although Lacey bases her study largely on novels, she does not mention Anthony Trollope, who created the fictitious character Matilda Carbury in his 1875 book The Way We Live Now. Otherwise, her coverage of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels dealing with gender and power is impressive, and her aim to show thinking about criminal law reform and changing perceptions of female criminality through the prism of the novel is original and illuminating.Less
This chapter reviews the book Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbervilles (2008), by Nicola Lacey. In her historical narrative, Lacey explores the British public's fascination with female crime and extreme mental states, the restrictions to women's freedom that the Victorian era brought, and the resilience of women in the face of these constraints, their refusal to be treated as mere “playthings of love.” Although Lacey bases her study largely on novels, she does not mention Anthony Trollope, who created the fictitious character Matilda Carbury in his 1875 book The Way We Live Now. Otherwise, her coverage of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels dealing with gender and power is impressive, and her aim to show thinking about criminal law reform and changing perceptions of female criminality through the prism of the novel is original and illuminating.
