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This book advances a novel theory of international justice that combines the orthodox liberal notion that the lives of individuals are what ultimately matter morally with the putatively antiliberal idea of an irreducibly collective right of self‐governance. The individual and his or her rights are placed at center stage insofar as political states are judged legitimate if they adequately protect the human rights of their constituents and respect the rights of all others. Yet, the book argues that legitimate states have a moral right to self‐determination and that this right is inherently collective, irreducible to the individual rights of the persons who constitute them. Exploring the implications of these ideas, the book addresses issues pertaining to democracy, secession, international criminal law, armed intervention, political assassination, global distributive justice, and immigration. A number of the positions taken in the book run against the grain of current academic opinion: there is no human right to democracy; separatist groups can be morally entitled to secede from legitimate states; the fact that it is a matter of brute luck whether one is born in a wealthy state or a poorer one does not mean that economic inequalities across states must be minimized or even kept within certain limits; most existing states have no right against armed intervention; and it is morally permissible for a legitimate state to exclude all would‐be immigrants.

The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume XIII 1820-1914 Fields of Development is one of three volumes devoted to that period of relative peace across Europe running from the defeat of Napoleon to the terrible war against the two Kaisers. Volume XIII takes up five subject areas — some primarily public in orientation, some private, some increasingly mixed — where, between 1820 and 1914, any original clay was substantially remoulded. The volume covers the criminal law and its techniques of detection, prosecution, and punishment; provisions for social aid in accordance with the earnest moral endeavour of Victorian thought and action; family law as it came to apply both to the interests of the propertied classes and the great body of people supported by manual labour; labour law as it faced class conflict through the demands and actions of employers and trade unions; and the development of conceptions that would protect individuals against external intrusions upon their personal lives and allow them exclusive control over the results of their intellectual endeavours. Detailed footnoting to historical sources and literature occurs in the course of the narrative. Each volume has tables of cases and of statutes covering the materials in that volume.

This book collects together a selection of John Gardner's best-known and most provocative writings on the theory of criminal law. Gardner tackles persistent and troublesome questions about the philosophical foundations of the criminal law. Which wrongs are suitable to be crimes and why? What are the conditions of criminal responsibility, and how do they relate to the conditions of moral responsibility? What does it take to be complicit in another's wrongdoing? Should crimes ever be excused, and if so, on what basis? How, if at all, should the criminal law adapt to conditions of social and cultural diversity? The issues raised in these essays have a significance extending beyond the law. What does it mean to be a responsible agent and why does it matter? Is my moral character only or mostly my own business? Is there a difference between being reasonable and being rational? These and many other moral problems lurk in the background of the criminal law, and the pieces in this book bring them into the foreground. Theoretical writings on the criminal law have often been dominated by a preoccupation with the justification of criminal punishment. This work is different. Although it discusses the legitimacy of criminal punishment, it proceeds on the footing that the criminal law does many important things apart from punishing people. In particular, Gardner argues that the criminal law provides an important forum for people to explain themselves. Such a forum would be important, argues Gardner, even if criminal punishment were to be abolished.

As the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda enter the final phase of their work, it is an appropriate time to reflect on the significant contribution that these unique institutions have made to the development of international criminal law. Judgments issued by the ad hoc tribunals have served to clarify and elucidate key concepts and principles of international criminal law. On several occasions, this practice and jurisprudence has pushed the progressive development of this dynamic and growing branch of international law. This book examines the specific development of international criminal law by the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals in the areas of sources of law, substantive crimes, criminal liability, defences, fair trial rights, and procedure. Several chapters address the theories of interpretation employed by judges at the ad hoc tribunals and the challenges presented by judicial creativity in international criminal trials. This book provides a thoughtful analysis by scholars, practitioners, and judges of the profound changes in the field that are attributable to the judicial creativity demonstrated at the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

The rules governing who will be punished and how much determine a society's success in two of its most fundamental functions: doing justice and protecting citizens from crime. Drawing from the existing theoretical literature and adding to it recent insights from the social sciences, this book describes the nature of the practical challenge in setting rational punishment principles, how past efforts have failed, and the alternatives that have been tried. It ultimately proposes a principle for distributing criminal liability and punishment that will be most likely to do justice and control crime. This long-awaited volume, from one of the world's leading criminal law experts, is a brilliant synthesis of social science research and legal reasoning that brings together three decades of work on criminal liability and punishment issues in a compelling line of argument that addresses all of the important issues in assessing liability and punishment.

Traditional international law aims to protect the values and interests of states. The rapidly increasing corpus of international human rights law (including international humanitarian law and international criminal law) increasingly challenges the basic tenets of general international law. In order to become accepted as the law of the world community, general international law needs to reflect better the values and interests of a wider range of actors, including the individual. This book examines the impact of international human rights law on general international law. It considers areas including the structure of international obligations, the formation of customary international law, treaty law, immunities, state responsibility, and diplomatic protection. The book traces the extent to which concepts emanating from international human rights law are being incorporated by the guardians of traditional international law: the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission.

International criminal justice has undergone rapid recent development. Since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the following year, the field has changed beyond recognition. The traditional immunity of presidents or heads of government, prime ministers, and other functionaries acting in an official capacity no longer prevails; the doctrine of superior orders is inapplicable except, where appropriate, as in mitigation; and the gap between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict has closed. More generally, the bridge has been crossed between the irresponsibility of the state and the criminal responsibility of the individual. As a result, the traditional impunity of the state has practically gone. This book assesses some of the workings of the ICTY that have shaped these developments. It provides an insightful overview of the nature of this criminal court, established on behalf of the whole of the international community. It reflects on its transformation into one of the leading fora for the growth of international criminal law first-hand, offering a unique perspective on the challenges it has faced.

Criminal punishment is increasingly regarded as a necessary element of human rights protection. There is a growing conviction at the international level that those responsible for the most serious crimes should not go unpunished. Though there is a wealth of legal writing on international criminal law, the question why and to what extent criminal prosecution is a necessary means of human rights protection has hardly been addressed comprehensively. This book examines the duty to prosecute serious human rights violations. It does so by exploring the concepts of impunity and amnesties, and by exposing flaws in criminal proceedings. With its survey of the relevant human rights instruments and jurisprudence, the subject of this book is placed at the interface of international criminal law and international human rights. The book analyses the rapidly growing body of human rights case law, dealing with criminalization, prosecution, and punishment of serious human rights violations. It identifies and critically examines the standards for the conduct of criminal proceedings developed by the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. As the analysis reveals shortcomings in the current conceptualization of the prosecution of human rights violations, the book develops a solid theoretical framework for future jurisprudence. By evaluating the relationship between criminal law and the protection of human rights, the book elucidates not only the potential but also the limits of the role human rights law can play in the emerging concept of international criminal justice. The underlying rationale for prosecuting serious human rights violations is also relevant for post-conflict situations, in which it is often argued that criminal punishment threatens peace and reconciliation. The question how to deal with post-conflict justice under international law is a continuing theme throughout the book.